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PREFACE
This thesis undertakes a comparative investigation of recent 
trends in corporate sector gearing ratios. Other studies in this 
area have tended to use national accounts data as their basis for 
empirical work. This can cause problems in cross-country 
comparative studies because of differences in national account­
ing procedures and modifications in these procedures over time. 
This thesis takes an alternative approach using the harmonized
BACH data bank to analyze and characterise behaviour.
\
The BACH bank contains harmonised company accounts data for 
European Community countries, the US and Japan. It allows cross 
country comparisons to be made avoiding many of the problems 
encountered in studies based on national accounts data. Although 
the data bank was only set up in 1986, it has yielded useful and 
interesting. information concerning the comparative financial 
behaviour of the corporate sector in some of the major in­
dustrialised nations. Its usefulness should improve over time 
as more observations become available and a greater data set is 
generated.
The data bank is analyzed in some detail allowing the 
presentation of a number of important stylised facts. This 
allows us to consider the reasons behind trends observed. We 
then draw out a number of implications, including possible
consequences for investment and the conduct of monetary policy. 
The role of financial liberalisation and the link between the 
corporate and financial sector are found to be important 
determinants of corporate sector financial behaviour. As a 
consequence, it is possible that these factors influence 
investment and monetary policy.
The thesis is organised in six parts. An introduction is 
followed by a detailed presentation of recent trends in corporate 
sector financial structure. Chapters three and four are devoted 
to theoretical and empirical analysis of the determination of 
corporate sector financial structure. Empirical estimation is 
carried out in chapter five, with chapter six concluding the 
thesis.
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I INTRODUCTION
The use of debt to finance activity has displayed a 
tendency to rise in a number of industrialised economies over 
the past few decades.
For much of the last fifteen years there has been^ a general trend towards greater issuance of debt than equity in many industrial nations ... Most analysts agree that leverage ratios are higher today than in 1970.
Bank for International Settlements, 1986: p 198
Concerns have however, been expressed that borrowing may 
be reaching excessive levels in certain sectors (e.g. Business 
Week 1988‘; Kaufman 1986). In this study we have investigated
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potential causes of recent trends in corporate sector indebted­
ness and gone on to consider certain possible consequences of 
the trends observed.
Studies involving international comparisons of corporate 
sector financial behaviour run into problems concerning 
differences in sectoral definition, coverage and accounting 
procedures. Empirical studies based on national accounts data
1 'Special Report on Leverage,1 Business Week. 7th 
November 1988.
suffer from quite severe problems in this regard. In this study 
an alternative approach has been adopted. To this end informa­
tion from the BACH data bank has been presented and analyzed. 
The BACH bank contains harmonized company accounts data for the 
EC countries, the USA and Japan. As such, a number of the 
problems encountered when using national accounts data are 
avoided.
Information from the BACH data bank is used to identify 
recent trends in corporate sector financing. Explanations 
underlying these trends are then considered and possible 
consequences of the patterns observed.
There are many aspects of financial behaviour that could be 
considered. For example, increasing numbers of private sector 
agents would appear to be experiencing difficulty in servicing 
and redeeming ever-increasing outstanding debts, and concern has 
thus been growing that the risk of financial fragility may have 
risen as a consequence. A great deal of attention has hence 
been devoted to analyzing debt-income ratios, which appear to 
have displayed a general tendency to rise in many industrialised 
countries. See e.g. Davis (1987) for a thorough and wide- 
ranging presentation of possible causes and implications of 
rising sectoral debt-income ratios. Debt-cash flow is another 
ratio that has been monitored. Even firms that stand to receive 
very healthy profits in the future on projects currently being 
undertaken can get into difficulties if cash flow is not suffi­
cient to meet short-term needs. This is an important considera­
tion especially given that, with the exception of the US, and 
more recently Germany, the proportion of short-term debt in the
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financial structures of the corporate sectors in the major 
economies far outweighs more long-term debt. The relationship 
between increasing use of debt and the risk of bankruptcy has 
also been considered, although mainly from a theoretical point 
of view - to date there has been relatively little empirical 
investigation of this topic. Other aspects have also been 
considered, each with their own implications. Again see Davis 
(1986) who looks at many different debt ratios in a study of 
recent portfolio behaviour in the non-financial corporate sector 
of the major industrialised countries.
In this study, however, we have investigated the implica­
tions for physical investment of an increase in the relative use 
of corporate debt. The firm can draw on essentially two broad 
classes of finance to carry out investment: debt and equity. 
The holders of these liabilities attempt to control the managers 
of firms in different ways, and give them different incentives 
to behave in certain ways. Changes in the proportion of 
financing deriving from debt could well change the incentives 
and controls facing managers and their behaviour. This could 
in turn affect their investment decisions. In this study we 
have chosen to investigate precisely how debt-liability ratios, 
commonly known as gearing ratios or leverage (US), have changed 
in recent years, and the consequences of this behaviour for 
corporate investment.
We have not only looked at the behaviour of corporate 
gearing over time but also across countries. A thorough study 
able to explain both these features appears to be lacking. 
There are a number of studies that analyze the behaviour of
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gearing ratios in one country. The models are often country- 
specific, however, and cannot be used as general models for 
cross country comparison (see Marsh 1982 for the UK; and Taggart 
1977 for the US for example). On the other hand there are a 
number of studies that explain cross country differences 
(Corbett 1987), but which do not provide models capable of 
satisfactorily explaining the behaviour of corporate gearing 
ratios over time within a country. Finally, there are those 
that combine these two features, but within a static framework 
(Mayer 1987b; 1989). The aim of this study has been to develop 
a general model combining all these features capable of 
explaining the determination of aggregate corporate gearing 
ratios and their evolution over time.
In chapter II, the recent behaviour of gearing ratios in 
the French, German, US, UK and Japanese corporate sectors is 
outlined. To date much of the empirical work on international 
comparisons of trends in corporate financial structure has been 
based on national accounts data. These studies suffer from 
problems of sectoral definition, and because of differences in 
definition and coverage of the relevant data. There are also 
differences In national accounting procedures. In this study 
many of these problems are avoided by using company accounts 
data contained in the BACH data bank provided by the Commission 
of the European Communities. The data in the bank is harmonised 
across the EC countries, Japan and the USA according to a common 
accounting framework. Even within the BACH data bank, however, 
the quality of aggregated corporate sector data varies across 
the countries studies and we have therefore concentrated on
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manufacturing where cross-country discrepancies seemed the 
smallest. In the countries studied, gearing ratios displayed 
a general upward trend until the early 1980s, with the exception 
of Japan. The increase over this period was to be expected 
given the conditions favourable to the use of debt existing at 
the time: relatively low real interest rates and high levels of 
inflation. Since that time, however, inflation has tended to 
fall and real interest rates to rise in the countries studied. 
The continued rise of gearing ratios in the 1980s (with the 
exception of Japan and more recently France) is thus rather 
puzzling.
Over time, the corporate sector gearing ratio could be 
expected to move broadly counter-cyclically (Bernanke, 1981; 
L6vy-Garboua and Maarek, 1985). During a recession, the rate 
of growth of profits and internal equity slows or falls. When 
profit growth is low, managers are likely to be reluctant to 
make equity issues for risk of under-pricing. As firms turn to 
debt to meet financing needs, the gearing ratio rises. A 
general tendency for gearing ratios to rise in the major 
industrialised economies was thus witnessed following the oil- 
shocks and recessions of the 1970s.
Since the early 1980s, however, there has been a general 
upswing in economic activity. We would generally expect 
managers to prefer to issue equity when firms are enjoying 
healthy profits and when demand is strong. However, with the 
exception of Japan, and more recently France, there appears to 
have been no tendency in the countries Investigated in this 
study for the pace of increase of gearing ratios to slow down
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or even decrease during the 1980s despite significantly improved 
economic performance in this period.
Whilst gearing ratios have been rising, the ratio of 
investment to GDP in the manufacturing sector of the countries 
under consideration has been displaying a general decline over 
the past twenty years, again with an exception being found in 
Japan. An increase in gearing would thus appear to be associ­
ated with a decline in proportion of investment in GDP. 
However, countries enjoying the highest gearing ratios - Japan, 
France and Germany - have also enjoyed greater investment as a 
proportion of GDP than the US and the UK, suggesting that 
increasing gearing ratios should be associated with increasing 
investment. The link between gearing and investment is thus far 
from clear.
To properly assess the implications of recent rises in 
corporate gearing ratios we must be able to explain precisely 
how the gearing ratio is determined. Accordingly, we turn in 
chapter III to a discussion of the theory explaining the deter­
mination of corporate gearing ratios. The analysis begins with 
basic relationships at the microeconomic level, and is progres­
sively developed through increasingly sophisticated models. 
Macroeconomic elements are also taken into account allowing an 
analysis that embraces both micro and macro considerations.
In the simplest models, an optimal gearing ratio is 
determined where the average cost of capital is minimised, 
subject to certain risk constraints. The least costly combina­
tion of the various forms of finance in the capital structure 
is sought, given prevailing exogenous influences such as
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taxation, inflation and interest rates. In 1958, however, 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) published their theory proving that 
there was no optimal gearing ratio. Since then, successive of 
the very strict assumptions underlying the MM model have been 
relaxed, and these developments in corporate financial theory 
are traced through.
The effects of risk and return on financial structure are 
discussed in the various theories. It is necessary to
consider both real and nominal rates of return. As a result, 
the effects of inflation and price uncertainty on financial 
behaviour are then considered in detail.
An increase in the rate of inflation is likely to encourage 
managers to issue more debt if the burden of outstanding 
corporate debt falls allowing them to increase debt issues, and 
because future reductions in the burden of current issues may 
be anticipated. At the same time, however, the holders of fixed 
rate debt suffer real losses, paying for any inflationary gains 
earned by the corporations. Thus to increase debt issue in 
inflationary periods, firms would have to offer a premium 
compensating holders for anticipated losses, the cost of which 
should cancel out any potential gains to be made, providing 
there are no asymmetries of information. Moreover, not all 
corporate debt used in the countries studied is fixed rate. On 
variable rate debt, higher rates of return will be required to 
compensate for reduced real yields in the face of inflation, and 
in anticipation of possible further reductions. Furthermore, 
if the real burden of outstanding debt does change in the 
presence of inflation, the value of equity is also likely to be
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affected through changes in investor's preferences. In a 
discussion of the effects of inflation, it is important to 
specify whether debt and equity liabilities are measured at book 
or market values as the two can lead to quite different con­
clusions. There are thus many factors to be taken into account 
when considering the effects of inflation on the gearing ratio.
Another major determinant of corporate financial patterns, 
according to the literature at least, is taxation. The relative 
tax treatment of debt and equity should be significant in 
helping determine corporate gearing ratios, favouring debt over 
equity as interest payments are considered as fixed costs and 
therefore deductible against corporation tax. The bias implied 
by fiscal effects may be further enhanced when considered in 
conjunction with inflation as taxes are levied on nominal 
amounts. However, in this study we are interested in a 
comparative analysis of the behaviour of corporate gearing 
ratios over time, not in discrete changes in gearing ratios 
following modifications of national tax laws. Furthermore, the 
explanation of gearing in terms of fiscal considerations, 
although extremely important according to the literature, 
appears to behave rather poorly in empirical tests (see e.g. 
Coates and Woolley 1975; Mayer 1987b). Our efforts have not 
therefore been concentrated in this direction.
Instead, the traditional separation of finance and invest­
ment is then relaxed as more modem theories are considered. 
The idea of non-neutrality of corporate financial structure and 
policy lays behind the most recent theories of corporate finance 
which outline the role played by transactions, information and
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agency costs in the determination of gearing ratios. Signalling 
theories are also considered in which the firm itself can affect 
the way it is viewed and priced, and the terms it is offered. 
Good profit performance, for example, could cause the firm to 
be more highly valued in the market, making profits another 
determinant of financial structure. At the aggregate level, we 
see that the position of the corporate sector as a whole may 
dictate the terms offered to individual firms.
Another factor that appears to help explain recent move­
ments in corporate gearing ratios is the trend towards 
liberalisation of capital markets. Since the late 1970s, 
financial markets in the major industrialised economies have 
been subject to Increasing competition, innovation and dereg­
ulation. Availability of existing instruments has increased, 
and many new instruments have been introduced, enhancing 
liquidity and generating both equity and credit. Increasing 
competitiveness and lower regulatory costs have allowed
Ireductions in required rates of return, and deregulation has 
broadened access. Mechanisms allowing the hedging of interest 
rate risk, and the transfer of price and credit risk have been 
introduced. At the same time, a general rise in the indebted­
ness of the corporate sector has been witnessed. Increased 
availability and lower required return on credit should allow 
higher investment. It might appear that measures to encourage 
increased corporate gearing ratios should therefore be encour­
aged. We see, however, that the benefits of financial 
liberalisation may be offset by a number of potentially damaging 
side effects.
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Although deregulation, innovation and increased competition 
should help bring down the cost of financial capital, uncer­
tainty surrounding the liberalisation process may drive up 
required rates of return. In pricing new assets, for example, 
it is possible that markets fail to anticipate risk correctly 
and could demand too high (or low) a rate of return. Although 
it is unlikely that excessive yields would be earned for long 
in competitive financial markets, during the period in question, 
the high required rates of return on finance could deter firms 
from investing. On the other hand, yields could be driven down 
so far that risk is not properly accounted for: financial
distress and bankruptcies might then ensue following, for 
example, an increase in interest rates due to demand pressures.
In this case, monetary policy itself may be affected. 
Governments in highly indebted economies might not be prepared 
to raise interest rates when necessary to curb inflation, for 
fear of provoking bankruptcies and potentially widespread 
financial instability. In this case, stability is maintained 
at the cost of rising inflation.
In chapter IV empirical evidence concerning the determi­
nants of corporate financial structure is presented and analyzed 
in an attempt to find an explanation for the recent deviation 
of movements in corporate gearing ratios away from counter­
cyclicality. Interest rate behaviour would not appear capable 
of explaining recent trends. We would expect the relationship 
between gearing ratios and real interest rates to be broadly 
negative. A fall in interest rates and the required rate of 
return on debt should, ceteris paribus, encourage corporations
10
to take out more debt. Low and often negative real interest 
rates in the 1970s were accompanied by rising gearing ratios. 
Since the early 1980s, however, real interest rates have been 
historically high. Very high required rates of return on debt 
should therefore discourage its use but, as mentioned above, 
there is no clear evidence of a slow down or reversal of the 
rate of growth of corporate gearing ratios.
The behaviour of inflation does not appear able to offer a 
satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon either. If 
inflation reduces the burden of fixed rate debt more than it 
increases rates of return required on variable rate and new 
fixed rate debt, we would expect Inflation and gearing to be 
roughly positively correlated at least in the short run. During 
the 1970s gearing ratios in the countries studied rose steadily 
in a decade of high inflation rates. Inflation has, however, 
slowed considerably since the late 1970s, but not the rate of 
increase in the gearing ratio. However, in the 1980s, increased
Iuse has been made of variable rate debt suggesting that the 
advantages. deriving from the reduction in the burden of 
outstanding fixed rate debt in the face of inflation have been 
declining. The link between gearing and inflation could thus 
well have changed.
Empirical evidence of the effects of financial liberalisa­
tion on gearing ratios is then considered. We see that 
financial liberalisation has probably brought about an increase 
in the availability of credit and reduced credit rationing. It 
is also likely to have affected the cost of capital. Costs 
should have fallen in the face of deregulation, and as a result
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of increased competition. However, it is difficult to assess 
risk on new instruments and existing instruments being traded 
in new conditions. Risk could be underestimated driving down 
yields further, or overestimated. These effects are only likely 
to be short term however, with 'correct' rates of return being 
demanded once risk position has been established. Nevertheless, 
in the short run at least, financial liberalisation could have 
a strong impact on risk premia. Risk premia could also be 
expected to move countercyclically, rising in recessions as 
creditworthiness deteriorates and vice-versa. So falling risk 
premia could have been expected in the 1980s as the 
industrialised nations moved out of recession. However, risk 
premia in the countries under consideration have risen in the 
1980s. Moreover, they have been highest in the countries 
enjoying the greatest degree of financial innovation i.e the US 
and the UK.
In chapter V some very simple empirical tests are carried 
out. Attempts were made to estimate the determination of 
corporate gearing ratios over time, and the relationship between 
gearing and investment and gearing and monetary policy was 
investigated. We were unable to find any clear evidence to 
suggest that corporate sector financial behaviour has been 
influencing monetary policy in the way described above in the 
countries studied during the last two decades. There was, 
however, evidence suggesting that financial structure influences 
investment behaviour in a number of the countries. Finally, we 
saw that financial liberalisation appears to play an important 
role in the determination of corporate sector gearing ratios in
12
the countries where the liberalisation process has been most 
highly developed: the USA and the UK.
The thesis ends with a presentation of conclusions includ­
ing an assessment of implications for policy.
13
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II CORPORATE SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Over the past twenty years gearing ratios in Japan, France 
and Germany have been much higher than in the US and the UK. 
Investment as a proportion of GDP has also been higher in the 
former three countries than elsewhere. High gearing ratios would 
thus appear to be linked to higher investment. However, time 
series data shows that gearing ratios and investment have tended 
to move in opposite directions over the past two decades. 
Empirical evidence indicates that there has been a general rise 
in the outstanding stock of debt in the non-financial sectors, 
both public and private, of the major industrialised economies. 
Corporate sector gearing ratios have increased significantly over 
the last twenty years in the UK, the USA, France and Germany, 
while Japanese gearing ratios have fallen. At the same time 
investment as a proportion of GDP has fallen in all of the 
countries studied, again with the exception of Japan. Trends in 
gearing ratios and investment would appear to be negatively 
related over time.
Detailed presentation of these results follows in the rest 
of this chapter.
14
A INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
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Studies involving international comparisons of corporate 
sector behaviour run immediately into definitional problems: 
firstly, over what constitutes the corporate sector in each 
country1, and secondly, concerning the definition and coverage of 
the relevant data2. There are also differences in national 
accounting procedures (Nobes and Parker 1985) and modifications 
in these procedures over time. Much of the empirical work on 
international comparisons of trends in corporate financial 
structure has been based on national accounts data affected by 
these problems (Davis 1987; Borio 1990). The differences in 
definition can be fairly considerable. Any results derived must 
therefore be treated with a certain degree of caution. In this 
study information from the BACH3 data bank provided by the 
Commission of the European Communities has been used (Sananes 
1989) . The BACH data bank contains harmonised data which avoids 
many of the problems involved in comparisons of national accounts
1 The SNA definition of the non-financial enterprise
sector includes both public and private corporations, with
unincorporated enterprises classified as belonging to the 
household sector. None of the countries considered here follow 
this definition however. Both Japan and France exclude large 
public corporations from the non-financial enterprise sector, arid 
the US and the UK exclude all public corporations. The US also 
includes unincorporated enterprises along with Germany.
2 See, for example, the Methodological Supplements of
OECD Financial Statistics.
* Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized.
data.
The BACH data, which covers the EC, Japan and the USA, comes 
from a sample of company accounts intended to be representative 
of the enterprise sectors of these countries4. A study of this 
data source was considered an important contribution to the 
field. As such, information yielded by the BACH data bank is 
considered in some detail below.
The data in the BACH bank is assembled according to a 
standard accounting framework laid out in the Fourth Council 
Directive of 1978s. In this way
the bank will provide the best available estimates of 
a range of accounting variables, assembled on a 
comparative basis, because, as far as is known, no 
systematic attempt has been made, in the past, to 
place time series of company accounts for different 
countries on a basis that permits inter-country 
comparisons of balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts.
Green and Sananes 1988: p 2
In this study we are interested in trends in corporate 
sector financial structure both over time and across countries. 
Balance sheet data covers the world wide activities of companies, 
including issues of securities on both domestic and foreign
16
* There are breaks in both the French and UK series in
the early 1980s due to changes in accounting procedure.
5 Directive number 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 (OJ L222/78).
markets. As such it contains comprehensive data on how companies 
fund themselves. This compares to flow of funds data which only 
records the domestic activities of companies and is more suitable 
for an analysis of domestic financial systems (Mayer 1989) . 
However, we are also interested in the consequences of observed 
funding patterns. One of the possible consequences investigated 
has been the link between observed corporate financial behaviour 
and investment. A thorough study of this area would ideally 
contain an analysis of financial flow data. However, while there 
are plans to extend the BACH data bank in the future to cover 
flow of funds data, at present only stock data is available. 
Investigation of the link between gearing and investment has 
therefore been somewhat limited.
The data on debt stocks has been aggregated across the 
companies sampled in each country in the data bank. As a result 
information 0n the nature of debt stocks is restricted: nothing 
may be indicated about the nature of debt i.e. whether it carries 
fixed or variable returns, whether it is transferrable, index- 
linked or carries roll over facilities, whether any simultaneous 
conditions have had to be fulfilled to obtain the debt, whether 
it is secured or unsecured, etc. For example, although secured 
loans are less risky than unsecured loans, they are far from risk 
free. Property lenders have had their fingers badly burnt in the 
current recession in the face of declines in property prices 
resulting in much reduced returns in the event of borrower
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default. These characteristics should be explicitly considered 
wherever possible as they yield important information concerning 
the implications of the debt in question.
The framework outlining the format of the BACH data set 
permits variations in accounting practices between countries, for 
example with regard to depreciation and the valuation of assets 
and stocks, limiting the degree of harmonisation to a certain 
extent. However, when using ratios, this problem is reduced to 
the extent to which the numerator and denominator are affected 
to similar degrees. As a result, we concentrate in this study 
on the behaviour of financial ratios.
Full details of definitions involved and data problems en­
countered are described as they occur throughout the text.
The corporate sectors of the US, the UK, Japan, France and 
Germany have been compared and contrasted. The members of this 
group have very diverse financial systems and characteristics, 
although there are sub-groups with a number of striking similari­
ties. The degree of diversity among the countries in the sanple 
can only enhance the validity of any conclusions reached. Form
these countries, the BACH data bank contains valid and comparable 
data on the corporate sector financing patterns over a reasonable 
length of time. It should be noted however, that the framework 
outlined by the Fourth Directive has had to be applied retrospec­
tively and the extent to which conversion could be achieved has 
been limited.
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Selection of the time period to be investigated is of major 
importance. In the introduction we outlined theoretical reasons 
why the corporate gearing ratio should move counter-cyclically. 
Ideally, a fairly long time period should be covered if this 
hypothesis is to be assessed empirically. However, in order to 
enhance the validity of empirical results in a study involving 
international comparisons, where feasible all quantitative 
analysis has been based on the harmonised data found in the BACH 
data bank. Unfortunately the BACH data bank contains observa­
tions starting only in 1971 or even later (1975 for Japan and 
1983 for the USA) . Various other sources have been used to 
extend the very short BACH series for the US, none of which are 
strictly comparable with the BACH data. Care must thus be used 
in interpreting the relative magnitudes of trends observed in the 
US as opposed to the other countries in the sample.
Thus although the trend increases in gearing ratios that 
would be expected following downturns in economic activity are 
clearly in evidence between 1971 and the early 1980s in France, 
Germany and the UK, this is not the case in the US and Japan. 
However, other studies (e.g. Taggart 1985; Davis 1987) indicate 
that US gearing ratios during the 1970s had increased sig­
nificantly from those prevailing in the 1960s. The same evidence 
cannot be found for Japan. We will shortly see that this is due 
both to circumstances specific to Japan, and to differences with 
the rest of the group concerning classification, measurement and
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characteristics of instruments used (see White 1984) which have 
not been completely eradicated despite the use of a harmonised 
data set such as the BACH data bank. With the exception of 
Japan, then, if a long enough time period is considered, 
corporate gearing ratios would indeed appear to have moved 
counter-cyclically in the countries studied until the early 
1980s.
We will shortly see that since this time, however, the 
pattern would appear to have broken down.
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B GEARING RATIOS
The BACH data bank contains balance sheet data at historical 
costs*. Although the BACH data yields many advantages over other 
sources in terms of coverage and comparability of sources, the 
use of book value data at historical costs can be problematic. 
While historical cost book values are considered by accountants
‘ Harmonized data on the US is only available from 1983. 
In order to provide longer series on the financing of US 
industry, data has been taken from OECD Financial Statistics. 
The data is measured at current values and is not thus strictly 
comparable with the BACH data. Furthermore, the OECD data covers 
the non-financial corporate sector. The stock of debt with 
respect to equity would appear to be lower in the more broadly 
defined OECD sector and thus ratios derived from OECD data with 
equity in the denominator will be consistently lower than the 
BACH ratios. However, on the whole both measures indicate similar 
behaviour with regard to the trends of the various ratios 
considered in this chapter.
to be objective and verifiable by an independent third party
(i.e. an auditor) , and anecdotal evidence suggests they are often
used by banks and corporate managers when making- financial
decisions, they can get seriously out of line with current market
values (Parker 1983). This is especially true in times of
inflation when problems in the interpretation of equity values
are particularly acute. Ideally, we should correct for this by
using data at market values. However, we have not been able to
obtain a (consistent) set of data at market prices of anything
like the quality and extent of the BACH data. Moreover, market
\
values include the discounted value of expected future dividends 
which can give a misleading picture of cash flow and solvency 
positions.
Although we are interested in aggregate corporate sector 
behaviour, there are gaps in the coverage of certain industries 
in the BACH data bank. Data on the manufacturing sector is the 
most extensive and of superior quality to the data on other 
sectors in the bank. We have thus limited ourselves to using 
data on the manufacturing sector7. The trade-off of using the 
superior data is that the results produced may not represent 
aggregate corporate sector behaviour entirely accurately, and in
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7 The OECD data for the US covers the non-financial 
corporate sector. The stock of debt with respect to equity would 
appear to be lower in the more broadly defined OECD sector and 
thus ratios derived from OECD data with equity in the denominator 
are consistently lower than the BACH ratios. However, on the 
whole both measures indicate similar behaviour with regard to the. 
trends of the various ratios considered in this chapter.
particular do not take account of the behaviour of the services 
sector which has displayed substantial growth and development 
during the 1980s. Nevertheless, many of the financial choices 
and decisions facing companies in the manufacturing sector are 
common to all industries. It should be noted, however, that 
certain subsectors have specific problems. Small businesses, for 
example, are generally not able to obtain finance on the same 
basis as larger companies. Larger companies enjoy economies of 
scale when raising finance, paying lower proportionate fixed 
costs such as fees, accountancy costs etc. Small and medium­
sized companies can often face particular problems when trying 
to obtain credit. They may not have the track record of larger 
firms, or the negotiating power. As a result, credit can be both 
relatively expensive and difficult to obtain. Although the BACH 
data bank does contain some information on financing by company 
size, the data are very limited and it has not therefore been 
possible to carry out an analysis of financing behaviour by size.
Given that the BACH data is at historical book value, and 
that it comes from only a subset of firms, any attempt at inter­
temporal or inter-country analysis using t”he absolute values 
contained in the bank would not be recommended. However, 
comparisons of the behaviour of ratios can be usefully made. The 
usefulness of the BACH data bank is further enhanced in a study 
such as this where trends are compared not only across time, but 
also across countries since the data have been harmonised as much
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as possible. Using this source, we outline below the behaviour 
of gearing ratios over time in the various countries considered.
B.l Corporate Gearing Ratios
Corporations may choose between three sources when deciding 
how to fund industrial investment: retained earnings, equity 
issue or debt issue. The retained earnings of the firm are owned 
by the shareholders and therefore represent internal equity. The 
basic choice to be made is thus between the use of debt or 
equity. In figure II.1 measures of total debt as a proportion 
of total liabilities (total debt plus equity) in the five 
countries studied are presented.
In this study, total debt liabilities are measured by short­
term debts including bank loans and overdrafts, and trade and 
other creditors of less than one year, and long-term debts 
including bank loans and other creditors of more than one year, 
provisions for liabilities and charges, accruals and deferred 
income. The definition of debt instruments is not always 
straightforward. It should be mentioned, for example, that there 
is some debate as to the appropriate classification of provi­
sions. White (1984) measures provisions as equities. He 
suggests this is appropriate in studies involving international 
comparisons since provisions are viewed in significantly 
different ways in different countries. In Japan for example many
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provisions may be offset against taxable income8, and there is 
therefore an incentive for Japanese corporations to declare 
higher sums for these provisions than is the case elsewhere, and 
thus to understate equity. When provisions are classed as debts, 
the gearing ratio thus appears much higher in Japan as compared 
to other countries than it would if they were not classed as 
debts. For this reason, White chooses to class all provisions 
as equity. However, the majority of provisions for e.g.
pensions, deferred taxation, etc. are liable to be incurred and 
should thus be considered debts. Hence, although the problem of 
classifying provisions is recognised, we choose not to follow 
White.
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* For example, inventory price fluctuations, doubtful 
receivables, development costs, etc.
II.1 The Ratio of Total Debt to Liabilities
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Source: BACH, Commission of the European Communities and
OECD Financial Statistics (USA*)
Another problem lies with the category 'trade creditors', 
which is defined in different ways in different countries (for 
example, in Japan, the UK and the US consumer credit extended by 
retail businesses is included, but not in the other countries) . 
These differences are compounded by differences in sectoral 
definitions - for example, the more wide-ranging the definition 
of the corporate sector is, the greater is the likelihood that 
the various credits extended will cancel each other out. Thus 
there is usually great variation in this measure. Some scholars 
choose to leave this measure aside in the search for greater 
accuracy at the cost, however, of a less representative measure.
In our case, although the problem has not been completely 
eradicated in the BACH data bank, the high degree of harmoniza­
tion achieved allows us to include this data as well.
~ In figure II. 1 two features in financing trends over the 
past twenty years become immediately obvious: first, there has 
been a general rise in debt ratios over the period, with the 
exception of Japan, and more recently, France; and second, there 
have been significant differences in gearing levels, with the 
rates in the USA* and the UK being much lower than elsewhere.
The decline in the Japanese ratio may be explained by the 
relative strength of the Japanese economy. After the second 
world war, the Japanese economy grew very quickly as attempts 
were made to catch up with the West. A high saving rate provided 
substantial funds for industry and Japanese managers were able 
to engage in high levels of capital spending thanks to various 
incentives, such as very high rates of depreciation. Along with 
the rest of the industrialised world, Japanese industry also 
benefitted from the very low real rates of interest prevailing 
in the 1970s. As a result, Japan alone of the countries studied 
did not enter recession in the early 1980s. Relatively high 
levels of corporate profits were thus earned, boosting equity
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9 Although there is a significant difference between the 
two measures of US gearing, both measures are much lower than 
ratios found in the other members of the group, and both measures 
display the same trend during periods of co-existence. From now 
on, separate consideration of the two measures is not carried out 
explicitly unless necessary to the issues being discussed.
capital and reserves10, and encouraging new equity issue.
Although in the BACH data bank both debt contracts and 
shares are measured at nominal historical values, the book value 
of new issues is of course the market price at the time of issue 
(less any discount offered on issue). In inflationary periods 
a firm enjoying high nominal profits and earnings could expect 
to enjoy an increase in the market value of its securities and 
find new issues highly valued. Unless the value of new issues 
of debt exceeds the value of new internal and external equity, 
gearing ratios decrease. In this situation, signals given by the 
data are clearly biased, since outstanding stocks are not 
measured at the same price as the new issues. The extent of the 
bias increases with the proportion of stocks that are not 
revalued. Thus the greater the proportion of short-term debt in 
total debt, and the more short-term the contracts are, the less 
serious the bias becomes, as unanticipated inflation can then be 
accounted for when old contracts are renewed, or new contracts 
are drawn up.
A more serious problem with regard to measurement of longer 
term debt is that no indication is given in the BACH data bank 
of the proportions of fixed and floating rate debt. If monetary 
policy is tightened in the face of high inflation, the real
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10 In this study, reserves include: share premia, legal, 
statutory and other reserves, minority interests, and profit for 
the financial year. Given that the data are at historical costs, 
reserves arising from the revaluation of assets are not included.
burden of fixed rate liabilities falls, while required rates of 
return on floating debts are increased in line with higher 
interest rates. Although the use of floating rate debt has 
tended to increase in recent years, the lack of information in 
the BACH data bank makes it rather difficult to interpret the 
impact of inflation on long term debt.
In figures II.3a and II.3b below we see that in the period 
under consideration 60-70% of Japanese corporate debt was 
classified as short-term (less than one year), and the potential 
bias outlined above with regard to debt was thus likely to have 
been relatively small. The same is true of the French and 
particularly the British corporate sectors, where high propor­
tions of short-term debt have also been used. The problem may 
be slightly more serious in Germany, and particularly the USA, 
where proportions of short-term debt used are rather low. It is 
thus possible that gearing ratios in Germany and the USA are 
somewhat understated with respect to the other countries in the 
sample, the true value of debt being relatively more understated 
than elsewhere.
In the 1980s, the trend decrease in Japanese corporate 
gearing ratios would not appear to have been reversed. There are 
a number of reasons for this. Firstly, real interest rates in 
Japan Tas elsewhere) have been historically very high (see 
chapter IV, section B.2), making the use of debt relatively 
unattractive. Financial developments and reforms have helped
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increase the supply of finance, including equity. At the same 
time, real equity yields have been falling (see chapter IV, 
section B.4). Thus both the absolute and relative real return 
required on debt has been rising in Japan over the period 
studied, encouraging companies to increase the relative use of 
equity in financing activity11.
In France, on the other hand, rather unusual behaviour may 
be observed in the 1980s. A significant rise in the corporate 
gearing ratio occurred in the early 1980s followed by a much 
greater fall after 1984. A number of factors specific to the 
French economy may help explain this behaviour.
Between 1981 and 1984 the French economy was subjected to 
'stop-go' policies which ended up giving France the highest rates 
of inflation in the group during this period (see chapter IV, 
figure IV.10). At this time, the corporate gearing ratio was 
already following an upward trend due to the low real interest 
rates enjoyed during the 1970s. Moreover, inflationary expect­
ations are likely to have encouraged the use of debt, signifi­
cantly reinforcing this trend. Since the early 1980s, however, 
there has been a substantial increase in real interest rates in 
France, as elsewhere. Real long-term rates of interest have been 
second only to those in the US since 1984 and the highest since 
1986. These high required rates of return would appear to have
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11 Evidence on the relative cost of finance may be found 
in chapter IV, section B.5.
begun to outweigh the inflationary benefits of debt at a certain
point, causing the use of corporate debt relative to equity to
fall. Huge increases in the issue of equity have occurred since
1984. Very tight monetary policy was introduced in 1984
successfully reducing inflation, and the relative supply of
corporate debt thus decreased as real returns increased and
inflation was expected to continue to fall. Improving corporate
sector performance and business confidence consequent upon the
subsequent world boom helped boost equity values, allowing the
market in equity to become buoyant. A sharp increase in the
\
index of share quotations in France has even exceeded Japanese 
increases since 1984. Since that time, firms have continued to 
boost equity holdings and reduce debts as disinflation reduces 
the extent to which the real burden of debt declines (OECD, 
1988/89).
In the UK, the USA and Germany, however, a steady increase 
in the corporate gearing ratio was witnessed during the 1970s 
during a period of high inflation and low real interest rates. 
These factors would appear to have been two of the main deter- 
minants of corporate financial behaviour in the past, but their 
influence during the past decade would appear to have weakened 
significantly. In the 1980s, gearing ratios have continued to 
increase despite falling inflation and very high real interest 
rates. A further major determinant of corporate financial 
behaviour would thus appear to have come into play during the
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1980s: a common explanatory factor would appear to be financial 
liberalisation. In the UK and US where liberalisation has been 
particularly strong steady increases in gearing have been ex­
perienced, whereas in Germany where the liberalisation process 
has been more hesitant increases in the corporate gearing ratio 
have been more erratic.
We could expect gearing ratios to rise in line with greater
financial liberalisation for a number of reasons. Innovation
arising from the liberalisation process should bring about
increased availability of credit through the introduction of new
\
instruments, and through increased use of existing instruments. 
Financial deregulation should reinforce this trend. These 
factors are likely to reduce the incidence of credit rationing, 
with a shift in allocation from quantity to price rationing. At 
the same time increased competition is likely to reduce non­
profit maximising behaviour, and the shaving of margins should 
bring about a decrease in required rates of return. Increased 
uncertainty surrounding the liberalisation process might cause 
risk premia and debt yields to rise in the short term, but 
competitive forces are unlikely to allow excessive yields to be 
earned on new instruments for long. On the other hand, margins 
could be shaved too finely, not taking adequate account of risk. 
Again,, this is only likely to be a short term phenomenon with 
required rates of return subsequently rising as evidence arises 
that risk has not been sufficiently taken into account.
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To sum up, in the face of financial liberalisation, 
increased availability and reduced rates of return required on 
credit is likely to encourage firms to increase gearing ratios, 
all other things remaining unchanged. In the short term, there 
may, however, be a degree of over- or under-shooting in pricing 
new instruments until risk position is established.
The rising trend in the US has been reinforced by substan­
tial debt issue used to retire equity (illegal except in very
rare circumstances in the UK12), and by the substitution of debt
for equity in leveraged buy-outs, the scale and prevalence of 
which may themselves be largely due to the liberalisation 
process. Greater financial competition encouraging extended use 
of existing or creation of new financial resources has allowed 
the build up of powerful, profitable corporate empires through 
various means e.g. mergers, takeovers and buy-outs. This puts 
increasing pressure on companies to behave in a predatory way. 
Failure to do this may be interpreted by the markets as a sign 
that they are not able to. To avoid becoming prey to acquisi­
tive corporate behaviour, firms have thus had to behave increas­
ingly aggressively simply to survive and not be taken over. 
Furthermore, during the 1980s members of the financial sector 
would appear to have been encouraging this trend in order to 
compete for the heavy sums to be made through various fees and
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13 Redeemable preference shares made be bought back by UK 
corporations.
commissions. A great deal of this activity was financed by debt.
This suggests that the demand for the finance necessary to 
carry out this activity has increased, but it also implies that 
finance obtained is going less to physical than to financial 
investment. This would certainly appear to hold in the manufac­
turing sector. In figure II.9 below we see that despite rising 
gearing ratios gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of 
GDP has been in steady decline over the past twenty years in the 
countries under consideration, with the exception of Japan. 
However, in the countries studied manufacturing investment has 
also been in relative decline over the past twenty years, so a 
falling share of manufacturing investment in GDP is not surpris­
ing.
With regard to the large differences in the levels of 
gearing ratios pointed out above, there are a number of possible 
explanations.' Firstly, there are some problems with the data. 
As mentioned above, figures in the BACH data bank are at 
historical costs, and therefore the value of company assets and 
equity etc. are generally undervalued in real terms, especially 
in periods of high inflation. This problem affects all coun­
tries, but there are certain accounting differences between the 
countries that remain despite attempts to harmonize the data. 
For example, French and British companies periodically revalue 
their assets whereas the companies in the other countries in the 
sample do not. Furthermore, a large number of provisions, which
33
are generally classed as liabilities, may be used to offset 
corporation tax in Japan, much more so than elsewhere. There is 
therefore an incentive for Japanese companies to use these 
widely. Japanese equity is thus probably understated. Another 
significant difference may be found in the fact that French, 
German and Japanese company accounts are not consolidated. Debt 
in these countries will thus appear much higher than in the US 
and the UK where accounts are consolidated and inter-company debt 
is netted out13. Obviously, the greater the proportion of inter­
company debt, the more serious the problem. However, although 
gross trade credit appears substantial in a number of the 
countries studied, when inter-company debt is netted off, net 
trade credit is negligible (Mayer 1989).
There are also a number of theoretical explanations. It 
would not appear that the traditional determinants of corporate 
gearing e.g. taxation, inflation and cost of capital are 
sufficiently similar between the US and the UK and different from 
the rest to explain the results observed. Coates and Woolley 
(1975) thus conclude that these differences^ in behaviour are due 
to institutional or attitudinal reasons. On the other hand, Hu 
(1975) (see chapter III.A.8 below) provides an historical 
explanation of the gap between the low-geared US and UK corporate
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u Even US and UK accounts are not perfectly compatible 
on this point since the UK accounts are consolidated on a world­
wide basis, whereas in the US most domestic parents and sub­
sidiaries are consolidated, but foreign operations are treated 
on an investment basis.
sectors as compared to the rest. When we analyze the nature of 
these gearing ratios more closely, the picture becomes a little 
more comprehensible.
Corbett (1987) states, for example, "the structure of 
corporate finance in Japan creates a type of contract between 
banks and clients which is neither conventional debt nor equity 
holding but a blend of the two'14. High debt levels in Japan do 
not thus have the same implications as elsewhere. Whereas in the 
UK and the US banks will look carefully at the value of firms in 
terms of the security they provide against loans advanced, in 
Japan the banks tend to be more interested in the value of the 
firm as a going concern rather than simply its ability to satisfy 
short term obligations. They are thus prepared to take a longer 
term view, being prepared even to sustain short-term losses if 
necessary, and to actively step in and help the firm in the event 
of financial difficulties. Similar links are also to be found 
between German banks and corporations. High gearing ratios in 
these countries do not thus have the same implications in terms 
of risk that ratios of similar size in the US or the UK would.
In an attempt to look more closely at the debt-liability 
ratio, a breakdown between long- and short-term debt was subse­
quently made.
Looking at the results produced (figs. II.2a to II.2e), we 
see that the proportion of short-term debt in the gearing ratio
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tends to be much higher than the proportion of long-term debt 
with respect to total liabilities. An exception is to be found 
in Germany, where the ratios were more or less evenly matched 
~until the early 1980s after which time the proportion of long­
term debt actually began to exceed the proportion of short-term 
debt, and the USA, where long-term debt exceeded short-term debt 
throughout the period. An analysis of the breakdown is important 
in this study as it has significant implications for corporate 
investment.
Longer term debt may give greater freedom to invest than
\
short term debt as returns do not need to be earned so quickly. 
With access to long-term debt, short-term losses can even be made 
in the anticipation of long-term gains: a likely occurrence with 
projects that require heavy initial outlays and that generate 
returns only after a considerable delay. Predominate use of 
short-term debt may mean that some potentially profitable 
projects are not undertaken. A tendency to undertake smaller 
projects that do not require large capital borrowing or that can 
be financed from retained earnings, or projects that yield short­
term profits may arise. It is also possible that investment in 
areas that do not yield tangible returns, such as advertising and 
research and development may be curtailed.
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Debt - Liability Ratios
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Source: BACH, Connnission of the European Communities and
OECD Financial Statistics (USA total* short* long*)
However, short-term debt can often be rolled over and it is 
generally relatively cheaper than long-term debt. Where firms 
feel secure of roll-over facilities, short-term debt can have 
similar characteristics to long term debt, but with a lower 
required rate of return. Thus in figs. II.3a and II.3b we see 
that although the UK has the lowest proportion of long-term debt 
with respect to total debt, as well as the lowest level of 
investment in the group (see section D below), and that -Germany 
at the other end of the scale enjoys the second highest propor­
tion of long-term debt in total debt and the second highest level
of investment, the relationship between these variables is far 
from straightforward. Japan has the second lowest proportion of 
long-term debt but the highest level of investment in the group, 
whereas the US has the highest proportion of long-term debt but 
the lowest level of investment.
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We saw above, however, that Japanese companies are able to 
take a longer term view than would be implied by length of 
financing used, helping explain their successful investment 
performance. Thus clearly the nature of the relationship between 
the corporate and financial sectors is of major importance to 
both financing patterns and the transformation of corporate 
finance into physical investment. Further discussion of these 
points follows in chapter III below.
II.4a Short-Term Debt to Liability Ratio
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In figures II.4a and II.4b we see a cross-country comparison 
of short and long-term debt to liability ratios. Although the 
UK has by far the highest short debt-total debt ratio, its short 
term debt-liability ratio is lower than the French and Japanese 
ratios due to its much lower total gearing ratio. The US short 
term debt-liability ratio is thus the lowest in the group in line 
with it having the lowest short debt-total debt ratio and the 
lowest gearing ratio. The positions are reversed in the com­
parison of long-term debt-total debt ratios and long-term debt- 
liability ratios. Here the UK has the lowest ratios in both 
graphs II.3b and II.4b, whereas although the US has the highest 
long debt-total debt ratio it comes down in the ranking of long 
debt-liability ratios because of its low gearing ratio.
There do not appear to be any other significant differences 
between the behaviour of debt-equity and debt-liability ratios, 
and we turn now to a discussion of further empirical observations 
relevant to the study in hand.
B.2 Debt-Income Ratio 
*
We are interested in the effects of financing on investment 
and have therefore concentrated on the behaviour of debt as a 
proportion of liabilities used to fund that investment. However, 
it is interesting to see how patterns in corporate sector 
financing compare to financing patterns in other sectors of the
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economy. Behaviour in the corporate sector is determined by both 
sector specific influences, such as the relationship between the 
corporate sector and financial markets, and the effect financial 
liberalisation has had on this, and more general influences 
affecting the economy as a whole. Comparing the behaviour of the 
corporate sector with other sectors of the economy can yield 
insights into the relative importance of the different influen­
ces. We briefly present in this section trends in sectoral 
gearing ratios over the past two decades.
The use of borrowing to finance the activities of the non- 
financial sectors of the economies is considered below. Clearly, 
a denominator comprised of debt and equity liabilities is no 
longer suitable when comparisons with the household and public 
sector are to be made. A general measure of economic activity 
has therefore been used: GDP. In this section, the data is from 
national accounts published in various issues of OECD Financial 
Statistics. The UK data for the corporate sector and households 
was not, however, available over the entire period in the OECD 
publications and has therefore been taken from CSO Financial 
Statistics.
Given that the data comes from national accounts, there are 
great variations between the countries regarding measurement, 
sectoral classification, accounting procedures etc. For example, 
methods of valuation vary from country to country, with the US 
and French data being measured at market value, the UK and
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Japanese data at book values, and the German data comprising a 
mixture of the two. Because of this and for reasons mentioned 
earlier, we preferred to use data from the BACH data bank in our 
detailed comparative analysis of corporate financial behaviour. 
A bank containing harmonized data allowing international inter­
sectoral comparisons to be made is not available, and it was thus 
necessary to use national accounts data. The results produced 
in this section are thus not strictly comparable across coun­
tries .
We begin by outlining the behaviour of corporate sector 
debt-income ratios. Once again a general upward tendency in the 
use of corporate debt is to be witnessed in the countries under 
consideration over the past two decades. Indeed, over the period 
as a whole, even the Japanese ratio now appears to have in­
creased, implying that corporate sector liabilities have grown 
faster than economic activity in Japan as a whole.
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II.5 Corporate debt as a proportion of GDP
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The ranking of the ratios also remains basically unchanged, 
with the US and UK corporate sectors displaying significantly 
lower gearing ratios than the others.
The behaviour of debt/income ratios is somewhat different 
in the other sectors of the countries under consideration, 
however. Trends in non-financial sector debt-income ratios are 
presented in figures II.6a-II.6e below. The following sectoral 
breakdown is considered: the corporate sector, households and the 
public sector.
For a long period the aggregate non-financial debt-income
ratio was more or less constant in the US causing much debate and 
investigation (e.g. Friedman 1982, 1985a; McDonald 1983). After 
1982 it displayed a marked increase however. This ratio was 
always much less stable elsewhere. In the UK it showed a trend 
decrease during the 1970s due mainly to a decrease in the public 
debt-income ratio before beginning to rise again in the early 
1980s along with the French ratio, whereas the Japanese and 
German ratios displayed a general increase over the period. 
Following recent increases, the German and US non-financial debt- 
income ratios had almost caught up with the UK and French ratios 
by the end of the 1980s. The Japanese ratio has, however, 
remained considerably higher than all the rest.
Debt - GDP Ratios
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II.6a Germany
II.6b France II.6c UK
II.6d Japan II.6e USA
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Source: OECD Financial Statistics;
CSO Financial Statistics (UK).
Similarly to the corporate debt-income ratio, household 
sector gearing has also shown a general increase in all countries 
considered over the period. This rise has been especially marked 
in the US, and even more so in the UK in recent years. The level 
of this ratio has remained highest in the US and UK1S. Financial
15 Although the differences between the countries are too 
numerous to mention in this brief description here, it is worth 
mentioning a particularly large difference between German 
accounting and the other members of the group with regard to the 
definition of the household sector. In the German case, housing 
is not included with the household/personal sector. The measure 
of household debt used here thus significantly understates the 
extent of German personal sector gearing, relative to the other 
countries.
liberalisation was particularly marked in these countries, 
allowing households much increased access to credit in the 1980s. 
Deregulation allowed increased competition in the supply of 
certain products e.g. mortgages; increased competition helped 
drive down the rate of return required on credit e.g. the margin 
of borrowing rates over risk free rates was shaved in an attempt 
to compete for business; innovation allowed the development of 
new forms of finance such as junk bonds, swaps, options, floating 
rate instruments (with or without caps or collars) etc. 
Financial liberalisation could thus be a significant factor 
behind recent trends in both corporate and household sector 
financial behaviour.
With regard to public debt-income ratios, however, quite 
different patterns are to be observed. Over the period in 
question the ratio has increased in all the countries in the 
sample, with the exception being found this time in the UK, where 
it has fallen significantly. In the US the ratio displayed a 
trend decrease until the early 1980s, after which time substan­
tial increases have occurred. In Japan, the increase over the 
period has been particularly spectacular. During the 1980s, the 
UK has been replaced by Japan as the country with the most highly 
geared public sector. The German ratio has remained lowest, and 
the US ratio, despite large recent increases, is still lower than 
the French ratio. Thus despite much concern over the actual size
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of the US public debt ratio, it is in fact relatively low1*.
Thus although there appears to have been a general increase 
in debt-income ratios in the countries studied during the period 
in question, some notable exceptions exist. Furthermore, the 
ranking of gearing ratios in different sectors has varied greatly 
between the countries in question. It should be remembered that 
the differences observed stem to a certain extent from the lack 
of comparability of the data used. The results generated should 
therefore be treated with caution.
Nevertheless, it would appear that increases witnessed are
\
not all due to general factors which may have emerged to 
encourage the use of debt by all sectors of the economy, e.g. 
increased availability of credit. There must are further sector- 
and country-specific explanations.
The denominator used so far in this section has been a 
measure of national income. This was selected as a common 
denominator for the purposes of sectoral comparison. However, 
measures of sectoral income would be more appropriate since they 
take account of changes in income shares etc. Unfortunately, it 
has proved impossible to find sufficiently comparable data to 
carry out a meaningful inter-sectoral analysis. We have thus
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w Indeed, R.J. Eisner in 'How Real is the Federal 
Deficit?' (The Free Press, New York, 1986) claims that more 
accurate measurement of US public debt would indicate that real 
levels have been much lower than suggested recently, and fairly 
small budget deficits, or even surpluses, have been experienced 
in recent years.
concentrated on the behaviour of the corporate sector alone. 
Turning once more to the BACH data bank, measures have been 
constructed for the corporate sector using gross corporate income 
as recorded in company accounts as the denominator of the debt- 
income ratio.
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II.7a
Debt-Income Ratios 
Total Debt-Gross Income Ratio
Germany
France
UK
Japan
USA_
USA*
II.7b Short-Term Debt to 
Gross Income Ratio
II.7c Long-Term Debt to 
Gross Income Ratio
au*
Source: BACH, Commission of the European Communities, OECD
Financial Statistics (USA*), Economic Report of the 
President (US income)
Except in France, rather different behaviour in debt-income 
ratios as compared to the measures of corporate gearing outlined 
at the start of this chapter (debt-equity and debt-liability 
ratios) is to be seen. In the other countries in the sample, the 
debt-income ratio fell at differing rates between the early 1970s 
and the mid-1980s, after which time sharp increases were 
witnessed. However, except in the cases of the USA and the UK, 
in the late 1980s the ratios had not reattained the levels of 
the early 1970s.
It would thus appear that although corporate indebtedness 
has risen significantly since the early 1970s, there has also 
been a substantial rise in corporate sector income. This has 
prevented corporate debt-income ratios from exceeding early 1970s 
levels at the end of the 1980s everywhere except in the USA where 
a staggering rise is to be witnessed despite income reaching 
record levels at the peak of the boom. There may thus indeed be 
cause for concern in the US about rising gearing ratios (see 
Bemanke 1989) .
B.3 Summary
In this section various measures of the corporate gearing 
ratio have been considered. Over the past twenty years, gearing 
ratios in France, Germany and Japan have been higher than in the 
US and the UK. At the same time, we have seen that with the
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exception of Japan and more recently France, the ratio of debt
to total liabilities appears to have been increasing in the
countries under consideration since the early 1970s. The upward
trend has persisted during the 1980s despite a general upturn in
economic activity. The same broad trends have also been
witnessed in debt-national income ratios in both the corporate
sector, and other non-financial sectors of the economy.
Moreover, although since the early 1970s debt-corporate income
ratios appear to have risen significantly only in the USA, there
have been significant increases in all the countries concerned
\
with the exception of France since the mid-1980s. This is 
surprising given that the increases followed the ending of 
recession in the early 1980s and subsequent move into a period 
of sustained growth and rising income accompanied by high real 
interest rates.
A general rise throughout the 1970s and 1980s in the debt- 
liability ratio in the countries in our sample has been es­
tablished above; we will now consider the behaviour of the weight 
of this debtin the capital structure, i.e. the debt burden.
C DEBT BURDEN
The total weight of outstanding debt interest payments is 
a measure of the burden of debt. We could expect the burden of
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debt as a proportion of corporate income to move counter- 
cyclically, in the same way as the gearing ratio. During 
recessions the burden of debt must weigh more heavily on firms 
as income or profits fall and debt service takes up an increasing 
proportion of available finance. In expansionary periods, on the 
other hand, rising income and profits should automatically reduce 
the debt burden. We see below that this indeed appears to have 
been the case.
C.1 Income Gearing
\
This indicator is defined here as the burden of interest 
payments and other charges of debt as a proportion of income. 
In chart II.8 below, we see that this ratio appears to have 
behaved in a similar way to the gearing ratios described in 
section B up till the early 1980s.
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II.8 Burden of Debt
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Source: BACH, Commission of the European Communities and
OECD Financial Statistics (USA*)
However, after peaking in 1981 (slightly later in France) 
at the height of the recession it has since been falling and 
values would not now appear to be disturbingly high, except 
perhaps in the US. The wider US measure based on OECD data 
(USA*) remains well above 1970s levels and exceeds ratios in all 
the other countries in the sample by 1987. Furthermore, the 
continued fall back in the ratio from the peak in the early 1980s 
enjoyed elsewhere was subsequently offset in the US due to large 
increases in corporate debt holdings since the late 1970s (chart 
II.2e) and high yields (see chapter IV).
Although the US evidence is conflicting, both charts II.7a
and II.8 indicate that income has risen sufficiently in the late 
1980s to cope with increases in debt. As a result, some 
commentators suggested that fears over increasing financial 
fragility were exaggerated or even misplaced (Modigliani and 
Poterba 1989), although the subsequent slow-down and fall in 
income following the onset of recession will have changed the 
picture more recently. These tendencies could well affect 
investment decisions both directly, and indirectly, through the 
interaction of financial structure with yields and behaviour in 
the financial markets. We go on now to look at the behaviour of 
investment in recent years.
D INVESTMENT
As a proportion of GDP, manufacturing investment has 
generally been in decline since the mid-1970s in the countries 
studied with the exception, once more, of Japan.
In Japan the investment ratio has picked up significantly 
since the late 1970s, following a substantial decline during the 
1970s. There is evidence of a slight upturn in German and UK 
manufacturing investment since the mid-1980s, but on nothing 
like the Japanese scale.
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II.9 Investment as a Proportion of GDP
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Source: BDS data bank, Commission of the European Communities
Another feature to be noted, is the great difference between 
the level of investment carried out in Japan as compared to the 
rest. The rate of investment as a proportion of GDP in Japan has 
significantly exceeded rates in the other countries over the 
entire period.
Thus again Japan stands apart from the other countries 
studied here. In section B we noted that the fall in the gearing 
ratio during the 1970s and 1980s was unique to Japan. Here, we 
note that relatively strong investment performance is also unique 
to Japan.
We explained earlier how these features were both largely 
due to characteristics prevailing in Japan. After the second 
world war the Japanese economy grew very quickly as attempts were 
made to catch up with the West. A high saving ratio provided 
substantial funds for industry, and Japanese managers were able 
to engage in high levels of investment thanks to various 
incentives such as very high rates of depreciation. High profits 
in turn helped boost equity values and issues. At the same 
time, we discussed earlier how Japanese debt tends to be 
relatively understated. Rising investment has thus been 
accompanied by falling debt-equity ratios in Japan. The picture 
in the other countries is, however, rather different.
When considering the relationship between gearing and 
investment, the gross ratios outlined in section B are not the 
necessarily the best bench mark. A more appropriate measure to 
consider is gearing net of financial assets since we are then 
considering only the liabilities available for physical invest­
ment (Corbett, 1987) . We have presented a measure of net gearing 
in chart 11.10. Although once investment in financial assets 
such as shares has been netted off the ratios are clearly lower 
than the gross gearing ratios presented at the beginning of this 
chapter, trends displayed and the ranking of the countries remain 
unchanged.
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11.10 Ratio of Total Debt Net of Financial Assets as a 
Proportion of Total Liabilities
Source: BACH, Commission of the European Communities and
OECD Financial Statistics (USA*)
Comparing financial and investment behaviour, we see for 
example that Japanese gearing ratios are high relative to the 
other countries in the group, and so is the level of investment. 
On the other hand, US investment and US gearing ratios are both 
relatively low. High gearing ratios would thus appear to go hand 
in hand with high levels of investment. However, .over time 
gearing and investment would appear to move in opposing direc­
tions. Whilst gearing ratios have generally been increasing 
since the early 1970s in Germany, France, the UK and the US, 
investment has tended to fall over this period. In Japan, on the
other hand, where gearing ratios have been falling, investment 
as a proportion of GDP has grown strongly since the recession of 
the mid-1970s.
Hence, although it was suggested above that rising gearing 
ratios probably do not pose a serious threat to financial
stability, they may have damaging real effects. Although high
gearing ratios in Japan have been associated with high invest­
ment, increased gearing does not seem to be associated with 
increased investment. It is therefore of the utmost importance 
that the gearing - investment link be thoroughly investigated and 
as precisely established as possible.
E SUMMARY OF STYLISED FACTS
1) Over the past twenty years gearing ratios have been much 
higher in Japan, France and Germany than in the UK and the US.
2) Investment as a proportion of GDP has also been higher in 
Japan, France and Germany than in the UK and the US.
3) There has been a significant increase in gearing ratios 
over the last twenty years in the countries investigated with the 
exception of Japan.
4) While gearing ratios have been rising over the past two 
decades, corporate investment as a proportion of GDP has been 
steadily falling, again with the exception of Japan.
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5) Thus although higher gearing ratios would appear to be 
associated with higher investment, over time investment and 
gearing would appear to be negatively related.
In an attempt to discover more precisely the link between 
patterns in corporate finance and investment, we turn in the 
next chapter to a theoretical examination of the determination 
of corporate financial structure, before presenting an empirical 
analysis of the determinants in chapter IV.
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Ill THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE: THEORETI­
CAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we begin our description of corporate 
financial behaviour with a simple model based on some rather 
restrictive assumptions. We then proceed to gradually relax 
these assumptions and extend the analysis, with the aim of 
formulating a realistic and far-reaching description of the role 
of the corporate gearing ratio.
We begin by presuming that managers acting in shareholders'
\
interests aim to maximize the market value of the firm. Share­
holders have the power to inpose sanctions on managers to behave 
in this way through the possibility of takeovers and/or the 
threat of dismissal. Managers must thus try and find investment 
projects which yield shareholder wealth maximisation. When 
deciding how to finance these investments, presuming unlimited 
availability of finance1, the required return and riskiness of 
the various sources of funds available must be assessed. These 
basic and simple assumptions underlie the traditional theory of 
corporate finance. We will look first at this before moving on 
to more sophisticated developments.
1 This is a very strong assumption that we will see is 
unlikely to hold in many cases, particularly in the short run.
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Firms are obliged to pay some specified return on corporate
bonds and loans. Corporate debt is thus safer and with a lower
required rate of return than equity which does not guarantee any
specific return. Increasing the gearing ratio should lead to a
reduction in the average cost of capital as lower yield debt
replaces higher yield equity. However increasing amounts of
debt in the financial structure of the firm lead to increasing
\
risk of financial distress and bankruptcy as the proportion of 
fixed obligations to be paid with respect to capital (or income 
or profits) rises. Creditors then demand higher returns on their 
loans to compensate them for the increased risk faced as the 
gearing ratio rises.
The required rate of return on equity also rises as equity 
holders face increased uncertainty with respect to dividend 
income and to the value of their shares.
Furthermore, if investors are already satisfied with the 
volume of securities on the market, higher returns must be 
offered to them if they are to be persuaded to take up the 
increased supply.
At a certain point, the above costs associated with 
increased gearing ratios begin to outweigh the advantages gained 
from increasing the proportion of relatively less expensive debt
A THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OP CORPORATE PINANCE
in the capital structure and cause the initially falling weighted 
average cost of capital to start rising.
In this way, the optimal combination of the various sources 
of funds in the capital structure, the gearing ratio, can be 
determined. The gearing ratio here is a measure of the propor­
tion of debt, D, to all sources of funds. For the sake of 
simplicity, funds are divided into two broad groupings: debt, 
including bonds and other forms of borrowing, and equity, E2.
The gearing ratio, G, is then:
66
G = D
<D + E)
To recap then, according to the traditional theory of 
corporate financial behaviour, there exists some optimal gearing 
ratio towards which managers aim, where the cost of capital is 
minimised subject to a chosen acceptable level of risk. As 
gearing rises, the financial advantages of debt relative to
2 It is sometimes difficult to decide what group.a liabili­
ty should fall into, especially recently with a proliferation of 
financial instruments on the market whose characteristics 
increasingly defy more traditional categorization. There exist 
some liabilities which sinqply defy classification e.g. 'mandatory 
redeemable preferred stock' which is classified between equity 
and a liability by the Securities and Exchange Commissioh. There 
exist others that, although they appear to be debt, have the 
characteristics of equity thanks to the nature of the loan and/or 
of the financial system in which they are traded, see e.g. 
Corbett (1987), or 'How to Juggle Numbers so the Debt doesn't 
Show', Business Week. 7th November 1988, p. 52.
equity outweigh the additional risk entailed and the weighted 
average cost of capital falls. This process continues up to a 
certain point after which rising required rates of return on both 
debt and equity cause the cost of capital curve to rise. The 
curve is thus U-shaped.
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Figure 1. The optimal gearing ratio according to the traditional 
theory of corporate finance.
Cost of Capital
This can be seen in figure 1 where G* represents the optimal 
gearing ratio. The equity yield curve is shown to be consis­
tently above the debt yield curve. One might expect equity to 
be less expensive than debt since once flotation costs have been 
laid out, the only remaining charges are the dividends set at the 
discretion of the managers of the firm. Moreover, the nominal 
interest payable on debt - which may also involve an initial fee 
when arranged - is usually fixed and does not rise as profits 
increase as could be the case with dividends.
However, equity holders demand a premium for holding 
liabilities that are more risky. Moreover, interest payments on
debt are considered to be fixed costs. They are hence deductible
against corporation tax3. As a result the cost of equity tends
to exceed the cost of debt. At the same time, the real return
on equity involves some further charges than immediately
apparent. According to the dividend model the real return on
equity capital is equal to current yield (dividends divided by
share price) plus the growth rate of future dividends. Even if
no dividends are paid, real returns are still positive and could
be represented by earnings yield (earnings per share divided by
share price) plus the growth rate of earnings. Alternatively,
\
the real return on equity according to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model is equal to the long-term risk-free rate of return (on e.g. 
government bonds), plus overall risk weighted by the covariance 
of the stock with market fluctuations (beta value).
Thus in general the real return on equity is likely to be 
higher than the required rate of return on debt. This assumption 
is supported by empirical evidence (see chapter IV section B.5).
However, the above analysis does not constitute a theory of 
corporate finance. It is a rationalisation of average capital 
structures witnessed in western economies. A full theory 
describing the dynamic relationship between the cost of capital 
and financial structure, and their interaction with market forces
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3 The weighted average cost of capital thus becomes: 
[(D/D+E) * r0* (l-te)] + [(E/E+D) * rs] 
where tcis the rate of corporation tax.
has yet to be formulated. In theoretical terms, it has in fact 
been argued that the traditional model with its U-shaped cost of 
capital curve may not be valid. In 1958, Modigliani and Miller 
described the conditions under which the weighted average cost 
of capital curve may be flat. They showed how corporate 
financial policy may be irrelevant, in which case an optimal 
gearing ratio does not exist. Although their arguments are based 
on some very strict assumptions which if relaxed may allow 
differing results - a point duly noted by the authors in their 
seminal paper - this was nevertheless the» first rigorous 
formalisation of corporate financial theory and serves as a 
useful departure point for a discussion of this area.
Studies in this field to date have usually departed from the 
basic Modigliani-Miller model and inproved realism through 
extension of the model, or through relaxation of one or more of 
the assumptions. This procedure is followed throughout this 
chapter, serving as the basis for the ensuing discussion of the 
development of the theory of corporate finance. First the basic 
Modigliani-MiHer model itself must be outlined.
B THE MODIGLIANI-MILLER THEOREM - NO TAX, NO BANKRUPTCY
Although investment decisions may have real effects, the way 
in which investment is financed - by debt, equity issue or
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retained earnings - need have no real effects as far as the 
market value of the firm is concerned according to the Modigli- 
ani-Miller theorem. Investors in this case are indifferent to 
variations in the gearing ratio and to whether returns on equity 
are in the form of dividends or capital gains.
The Modigliani-Miller position is argued from the basis of 
some very strict assumptions. It is presumed that individuals 
and companies can borrow at the same rate of interest. Corporate 
and personal borrowers are presumed to have identical risk 
characteristics i.e. firms do not enjoy limited liability unless 
it is presumed that individuals do as well. Expectations are 
homogeneous. Capital markets are perfect: there are no transac­
tions, bankruptcy, agency or information gathering costs, there 
are no borrowing constraints and there is no taxation. In the 
light of these assumptions, the Modigliani-Miller position is 
derived in the following way.
As already noted, corporate debt pays a known return whereas 
returns to equity are variable, depending on e.g. firm profitabi­
lity. Individuals are thus prepared to accept a lower return for 
holding debt than they would require to hold equity. From the 
point of view of cost of finance, debt is the preferred method 
of financing for the managers of the firm.
If the gearing ratio rises as a consequence of increased 
debt issue however, a larger share of firm income is obliged to 
go to debt service. As returns to equity look less certain, or
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even liable to decrease, equity holders demand higher yields. 
Gamblers with a preference for risk may find equity more 
attractive the more uncertain returns are. At very high gearing 
levels, the required rates of return on equity could welT begin 
to fall as a result of this effect. At the same time, however, 
required rates of return on debt are liable to start rising along 
with the gearing ratio as the risk borne by debt holders 
increases. Even when there is no bankruptcy, returns to debt are 
not guaranteed if the value of assets falls below the value of 
the liability.
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Figure 2. Cost of Capital in a Modigliani-Miller No-Tax World,
Cost of Capital Cost of Equity
Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital
Coat of Debt
Gearing Ratio, G
Modigliani and Miller argue that at any 'reasonable' level 
of gearing, the advantage of the lower required rates of return 
on debt relative to equity are exactly offset by the increasing 
returns demanded by equity-holders as the gearing ratio rises. 
At very high gearing levels, returns to equity are extremely 
risky. It may be that equity in such companies is held only by 
risk preferers. Beyond certain gearing ratios, required rates 
of return and the cost of equity to the firm could then fall. 
However, this is likely to be offset by increases in the cost of 
debt at high gearing levels mentioned in the previous section.
Thus if a firm varies its gearing ratio, the market value 
of the firm is not affected - only investment counts. The way 
it is financed is irrelevant as in figure 2 above. This is
because of the existence of arbitrage, which operates in the 
following way.
Let us consider for example two firms with identical risk 
characteristics and the same market valuation. One firm 
increases its gearing ratio. Debt is relatively cheaper than 
equity. Increasing the proportion of debt in the capital 
structure results in a lower average cost of capital and a higher 
stock market valuation. Although the price of this firm's shares 
is now higher, its shareholders are however, facing increased 
risk. They thus sell shares in this firm and buy in the lower 
geared firm in order to re-attain their desired risk position. 
The normal laws of supply and demand apply, so the sale of shares 
in the more highly geared firm causes their price to fall and 
the price of the shares being bought rises. This process 
continues until the market values of both firms are once again 
equal.
Furthermore, this ability on the part of investors to undo 
the effects of changing corporate gearing means that firms need 
not be concerned with providing income streams that match the 
desired consumption patterns of debt and equity holders. Firms 
can thus concentrate on selecting the best investments and 
maximizing market value. If the ensuing income streams do not 
match desired consumption patterns, investors can indulge in 
home-made gearing - borrowing and lending in the capital market 
until maximum utility is attained. So dividend policy is also
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irrelevant. Even if some of the assumptions of the above model 
are relaxed, it can still be shown how the firms financial policy 
can be irrelevant. We will first consider the assumption 
concerning no bankruptcy.
C MODIGLIANI-MILLER - NO TAX, COSTLESS BANKRUPTCY
If it is presumed that bankruptcy exists, but simply as a 
transfer of ownership to creditors entailing no costs, and 
creating no moral hazard problems, then as long as there exist 
perfect substitutes for the firm's securities in other available 
securities, the firm's financial policy can still be irrelevant 
(Gordon and Malkiel 1981). The existence of perfect substitutes 
in a perfectly competitive capital market allows investors to 
match the combination of the division of the firm's returns 
between debt and equity by combinations of alternative securi­
ties. Since the sum of the prices of debt and equity in a 
perfect capital market must equal the price of that proportional 
share in the firm, no gains can be made by varying the gearing 
ratio. These conclusions are yielded by the assumptions of the 
capital asset pricing model: perfect markets with no information 
or transactions costs, a fixed quantity of perfectly divisible 
marketable assets and risk-averse utility maximizing individuals 
who have unlimited access to markets at the risk free rate of
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interest which is equal for both borrowers and lenders4. In this 
case, securities are characterised completely by their covariance 
with the overall market return, and a firm's financial policy 
does not affect the market return i.e. firms - like investors - 
are considered to be small and numerous. Hence the value of the 
firm is unaffected by how returns are divided between debt and 
equity: it is determined by expected returns and the degree of 
covariance of these with the market return. The existence of 
complete contingent commodity markets, and intermediaries willing 
to costlessly repackage the firm's financial structure are also 
necessary for the conclusions of the Gordon and Malkiel model to 
be attained. Clearly, all these assumptions are very restric­
tive. We will see that relaxation of some of these assumptions 
can lead to very different results. For example, it was first 
presumed that bankruptcy did not exist, then it was allowed to 
exist but presumed to entail no costs. The question of whether 
bankruptcy does indeed entail any costs is now examined, prior 
to an investigation of how relaxing this assumption can affect 
the conclusions drawn above.
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4 A discussion of these assumptions and the derivation of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model may be found in any good textbook 
on corporate financial theory e.g. Copeland and Weston (1983) .
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D MODIGLIANI-MILLER - NO TAX, COSTLY BANKRUPTCY
As Che proportion of debt in the firm's capital structure 
rises, the probability of financial distress and bankruptcy 
increases. Firms are obliged to pay interest on debt commitments 
and may not usually withhold payments if faced with adverse 
circumstances - as they can with equity dividends. As the 
proportion of fixed obligations rises, the risk of the firm not 
being able to honour commitments rises, and hence its suscep­
tibility to financial distress. In a financially distressed 
position, firms may have to direct funds away from potentially 
profitable investment opportunities into satisfying debts. In 
the extreme case of bankruptcy, considerable further costs may 
be involved. The most obvious are substantial administrative and 
legal costs. However, there is some debate as to the empirical 
relevance of these costs. In the US in the 1960s, for example, 
Baxter (1967), and Stanley and Girth (1971) estimated these costs 
to be of the order of 20% of assets. However the cases inves­
tigated were only of individuals and small companies. Warner 
(1976) in subsequent studies of larger companies found the direct 
costs of bankruptcy to be very small (average 1%), and decreasing 
with increasing firm size. However it must be emphasised that 
these are the direct costs which may only be a fraction of the 
total costs involved. Other costs arise in the sense that assets 
have to be sold off hastily and may realize less than their real
value. They also lose their going concern/synergy value. 
Managers themselves are likely to face very high costs in the 
event of bankruptcy. Unlike investors who generally hold 
diversified portfolios, managers hold completely undiversified 
portfolios as far as their labour is concerned. For an investor, 
bankruptcy of one firm may mean the loss of a very small 
proportion of their portfolio; managers, however, lose all their 
income. The threat of bankruptcy is also costly in the sense 
that it causes an increase in the uncertainty of the already 
uncertain real returns to investment. These indirect costs are 
difficult to define clearly let alone measure. Altman (1984) in 
a study of US industrial firms calculates a proxy by comparing 
the difference between expected profits prior to bankruptcy with 
actual profits. As would be expected, he finds total bankruptcy 
costs higher than direct costs alone. However it is difficult 
to get any real feel for the costs involved. Apart from the few 
studies mentioned here, empirical evidence on the bankruptcy cost 
question is rather scant and it is difficult to reach any 
conclusions on this basis.
m
A possible alternative to bankruptcy is re-organisation (see 
Gordon and Malkiel (1981) for a thorough discussion of this 
topic) . This can, however, be a very complicated and lengthy 
business involving negotiations with each individual investor. 
It may even be an impossible task, and will certainly be costly, 
maybe even as costly if not more so than bankruptcy. Creditors
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may anyway insist on liquidation even when it is less efficient 
that re-organisation. They have priority over equity holders and 
may be concerned only about their own claims being satisfied, not 
about making the effort to ensure that the amount left over for 
equity holders is maximised when this may entail putting 
themselves in an even more uncertain situation. Also, bond­
holders would be paid the par value on their bonds in the event 
of liquidation (presuming there are sufficient funds available), 
so if market conditions were unfavourable to bondholders at the 
time e.g. rising interest rates eroding the market value of 
bonds, it would be in their interest to press for liquidation as 
they would suffer a loss in the event of re-organisation. It may 
also be that bankruptcy is preferable to re-organisation for the 
firm itself. Any new loans to a bankrupt firm get automatic 
priority, whereas new loans to a re-organised firm do not 
necessarily. Thus although re-organisation may be less costly, 
it may be that bankruptcy is the only way in which the firm can 
obtain new funds.
A moral hazard problem may also arise in the event on the 
threat of bankruptcy. Managers acting in the interests of stock­
holders may be tempted to follow an inefficient financial policy. 
If they issued more debt in order to repurchase equity, managers 
would be aiding the stock holders at the expense of existing 
creditors. This process can involve complications however. For 
example, if repurchases mirror dividend payments then they may
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be taxed as such, or there may be accusations of insider trading. 
Furthermore, in some countries e.g. Great Britain, the repurchase 
of stock via debt issue is illegal. Alternatively, managers 
could accept more risky investments in an attempt to improve 
returns to the stockholders at the expense of increased risk 
faced by the debt holders. If new debt issued to finance these 
schemes has the same priority in the event of bankruptcy as the 
existing debt, then existing debt holders face increased credit 
risk with no compensating increase in returns. Creditors could 
try and anticipate these problems by demanding higher interest 
rates when they first agree to take the debt. Nevertheless, once 
the price is set and accepted, it cannot subsequently be varied 
in the face of a change in risk position.
Individuals could instead indicate a preference for indexed 
debt and variable and floating rate corporate debt, which has 
become much more widely used in recent years. Variable rate debt 
is however, subject to both increase and decreases in return, and 
fixed rate debt may be preferred where a known nominal return is 
considered important, for example for cash flow reasons. 
Alternatively, creditors could try insisting on covenants giving 
existing debt priority over new debt. These are not always 
recognised by the courts however, and covenants designed to 
control the types of investments undertaken by managers are very 
limited in their scope. Hence, when debt is risky, it is 
probably impossible to completely eliminate the moral hazard
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issue.
In a Modigliani-Miller world where costly bankruptcy exists, 
corporate debt carries a risk premium. This implies that 
managers would try to finance the firm as much as possible by 
equity capital. As the gearing ratio falls towards zero, any 
outstanding debt remaining becomes essentially riskless and the 
risk premium falls away.
In this situation, the dividend pay out rate would still be 
irrelevant however, unless individual investors had preferences 
between dividends and capital gains. In this case, the firm 
would have an incentive to take these preferences into account.
For example, those investors who use their returns for consump­
tion prefer the firm to pay profits out as dividends in order 
to avoid the transactions costs involved in selling the securi­
ties needed to achieve this desired level of consumption. 
However, if by paying all earnings out as dividends the firm was 
obliged to make new issues of liabilities in order to finance new 
investments, it would be faced with underwriting and selling 
fees. So the fitm might find it advantageous to retain at least 
some of its earnings. Furthermore, those individuals that would 
reinvest anyway prefer earnings to be retained, allowing them to 
avoid brokerage fees and commissions on new investments. Thus 
consumers prefer to invest in firms with little need for new 
funds since they are more likely to receive dividend payments, 
and re-investors prefer those firms in greater need of funds.
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Figure 3. MM without tax with costly bankruptcy
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Cost of Capital
To recap then, the conclusions reached so far in a Modigli­
ani -Mi lier world, but allowing for costly bankruptcy, are that 
the firm aims for a gearing ratio tending towards zero as 
depicted in figure 3, and that dividend policy depends largely 
on investors preferences.
However, at least in the countries under investigation, 
corporations tend to have significantly positive gearing ratios. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the reasons why a firm 
might indeed issue a certain amount of debt, given the assump­
tions laid out above.
Bernanke (1989) describes how use of debt may provide 
incentives to increase efficiency. For example, an entrepreneur 
who begins a solely equity financed firm has an incentive to make 
profits that will be shared out amongst the entrepreneur and the 
shareholders. If a proportion of the finance required comes from 
debt, however, once the fixed debt obligations have been 
satisfied, the pool of claims on the remaining profits is 
smaller. In the second case, the incentive to work harder and 
more efficiently is clearly greater as this entrepreneur enjoys 
greater returns for his efforts. This is in addition to the 
incentive for the manager to perform well to avoid the pos­
sibility of bankruptcy or takeover.
Underwriting and selling fees generally tend to be lower for 
debt than for equity.
Debt is more flexible than equity funding in the sense that 
it can be raised more quickly and easily in order to meet short 
term and seasonal needs.
There may be signalling and agency costs associated with 
debt issue. Recognition of this fact has led to a very fruitful 
literature that will be discussed in more detail later.
Furthermore, equity issues tend to be made when the market 
value of the firm is very high, even excessively so. Investors 
recognizing this either bid the price down or buy debt.
Finally, according to the theory at least, probably the most 
important explanation for the existence of debt in the firm's
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financial structure is taxation. For example, King and Fullerton 
(1984) find the effective tax on new equity to be just over 100% 
higher than that on new debt in the United States, and just under 
100% in the UK.
Modigliani and Miller also recognised the theoretical 
importance of taxation in determining financial structure and 
produced a correction to their original theory incorporating this 
element in 1963.
\
E MODIGLIANI-MILLER - TAX, COSTLY BANKRUPTCY
Firms' profits are liable to corporation tax. If profits 
are retained and the value of the firm rises, equity holders are 
liable to capital gains tax on any gains realised. Alternative­
ly, if profits are distributed, equity holders have to pay income 
tax on dividends received. Thus equity holdings are liable to 
be taxed twice - at the firm and at the individual level, 
regardless of whether profits are retained or not5. Interest 
payments on debts are however considered as fixed costs and can 
be offset against corporate tax liability. In terms of taxation, 
debt is cheaper than equity capital.
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5 This is the case in an economy using a classical system 
such as the US. In all the other countries studied, some attempt 
is made to lessen or remove this double taxation of equity making 
systems more neutral by using either an imputation system or 
shareholders relief schemes.
Thus it could be expected that firms would gear up as much
as possible. This scenario is depicted in figure 4. Replacing
equity with debt brings down the average cost of capital. As the 
gearing ratio increases, the weighted average cost of capital 
falls towards the required rate of return on debt. However, just 
as gearing ratios do not tend to zero, as mentioned above,
neither do they tend on average to 100% in the corporate sectors 
of the countries investigated in this study. There must
therefore be some further costs attached to debt finance that 
have not yet been considered.
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Figure 4. The Modigliani-Miller Model with Tax
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Cost of Capital
One cost involved with increased gearing ratios may arise 
through tax exhaustion. Beyond a certain amount of debt, firms 
may find they no longer have sufficient tax liabilities to take 
advantage of tax relief on debt interest payments. The tax 
advantage then disappears and the cost of debt to the firm rises 
significantly.
If we begin to relax and modify some of the assumptions 
underlying the Modigliani-Milier theorem, a number of further 
possible explanations come to light. We begin by considering a 
major contribution to the theory published by Miller in 1977.
Here he analyzes corporate finance in a world with differential 
tax treatment of investors.
F RELAXATION OP THE ASSUMPTION OP NO DIFFERENTIAL TAX 
TREATMENT
In this analysis, it is still maintained that an optimal 
gearing ratio for the individual firm is indeterminate, but that 
an optimal equilibrium corporate gearing ratio does indeed exist 
in the aggregate. The assumptions on which the model is based 
are the same as those in the Modigliani-Miller tax world, except 
that differential tax treatment of different classes of investors 
is now allowed.
When deciding how to distribute earnings, the firm is faced 
with a number of alternatives. The earnings remaining after 
outstanding debt has been serviced can be used for new invest­
ment, dividends, or to repurchase equity and/or debt. In the
perfect markets of the Modigliani-Miller world, the firm invests
i
until the marginal return on investment is equal to the market 
rate of interest. If the marginal return on investment exceeds 
the market return, the firm increases investment finding an 
advantage to be gained, or if it is less than the market rate it 
switches from capital investment to investment in financial 
assets yielding a higher (the market) rate of return. The same
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must also be true when making a decision about the choice between 
repurchasing securities or purchasing other financial assets. 
Although repurchase of debt leads to a reduction in interest 
outlays, it also reduces tax deductions allowable against firm 
income. On the other hand, as mentioned before, repurchase of 
equity is in some cases illegal, and in others may involve quite 
serious complications. Hence it is presumed that the firm con­
centrates on the choice between investment and paying dividends 
when deciding how to dispose of earnings.
Miller presumes that capital gains are not taxed and 
therefore the firm chooses to retain all earnings, paying no 
dividends which are subject to tax. When Miller developed his 
theory, dividends in the US were indeed taxed more heavily - at 
rates up to 50% - compared to capital gains on which a maximum 
rate of 20% was paid. However, the 1986 Tax Reform Act has since 
brought taxation rates on dividends and capital gains into line 
(Brealey and Myers 1991). Nevertheless, although the assumption 
of zero capital gains tax may seem absurd on the face of it, the 
rate can in fact be very low, below the income tax rate, and may 
indeed be zero in certain circumstances. The tax is due only 
when the asset in question is sold. Payment of this tax can thus 
be postponed indefinitely by simply not selling the asset, and 
there is no penalty for behaving in this way. Indeed, if 
investors die before selling an asset that has earned capital 
gains, they pay no capital gains tax. Furthermore, capital
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losses can be realised selectively, earlier than capital gains: 
in a well diversified portfolio, the payment of capital gains 
taxation can be completely offset. Certain countries make 
positive allowances for capital gains, e.g. in the US 60% of long 
term capital gains are excludable from taxable income; the first 
£5500 p.a. are exempt for individuals in the UK, and much greater 
sums for those nearing retirement age (who tend to hold a greater 
proportion of assets than younger generations).
So it is clear then that the capital gains taxation rate 
may be substantially lower than the rate of tax levied on 
dividends. The investor is thus faced with the choice of holding 
shares and receiving income in the form of capital gains which 
attract little or no tax, or bonds where income is taxed. Thus 
the personal tax system favours equity finance. The bias of the 
\
personal taxation system in favour of equity increases as the 
proportion of equity earnings deriving from capital gains 
increases. •> The corporation tax system, on the other hand, 
favours debt finance as we saw earlier.
Faced with a choice between purchasing corporate bonds and 
fshares, investors are indifferent only if the marginal personal 
tax rate is equal to the corporate tax rate. If the personal tax 
rate is in excess of the corporate tax rate, a higher before tax 
rate of return on bonds must be offered to investors to persuade 
them to hold bonds rather than equity. Presuming the firm has 
sufficient excess tax liabilities, it can simply offset this
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increase against them.
The lower the gearing ratio of the firm, the more likely it 
is to have excess tax liabilities, and the more able it is to 
offer higher rates of return to bondholders.
Thus investors in the highest tax brackets should prefer to 
hold bonds in firms with the lowest gearing ratios, since it is 
only here that they can get returns high enough to offset their 
own personal tax liabilities. These firms are both more capable 
of offering the highest returns, having only a low proportion of 
fixed obligations on their income streams; and more willing, 
since more likely to have unused tax liabilities against which 
they can offset these higher costs. Thus personal tax liabiliti­
es influence the amount of gearing in the corporate sector from 
the demand side. The rate of return on tax exempt securities 
such as some forms of National Savings in the UK and State and 
Local Government Bonds in the US also has an important influence. 
In the presence of tax exempt bond income, before tax returns on 
income tax liable bonds must be sufficiently high to persuade 
individuals to hold them. Thus the rate of return on tax exempt 
bonds represents the minimum return at which investors demand 
corporate bonds. Presuming progressive income taxation*, the 
before tax rate of return needed to attract investors from higher 
and higher tax brackets must rise progressively, if they are to
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‘ See King and Fullerton (1984) for a detailed description 
of the tax systems in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Germany (and Sweden).
be persuaded to hold tax-liable rather than tax exempt bonds.
Thus the demand for bonds can be depicted by an upward
sloping curve, D0 in figure 5, showing the tax exempt rate of
return plus the marginal personal tax rate.
The supply of corporate bonds is determined by the tax
exempt rate of interest plus the rate of corporation tax which
is typically a non-progressive flat rate tax in the countries
studied here, and is thus horizontal, Ds. The optimal level of
corporate bonds outstanding, D*, is determined where demand is
equal to supply, i.e. where the marginal income tax bracket is\
equal to the corporate tax rate. If, for example, the marginal 
income tax rate were lower than the corporate tax rate, there 
would exist unsatisfied demand for corporate debt. Firms could 
take advantage of this and issue relatively more debt, using the 
proceeds to retire equity and thereby gain a net advantage. This 
process would continue until the relatively lower return on debt 
rose sufficiently in an attempt to attract the shrinking 
unsatisfied demand for debt outstanding that no further gains 
could be made.
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Figure 5. The Optimal Stock of Corporate Bonds.
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Thus, there is an equilibrium stock of corporate bonds, and 
hence an equilibrium aggregate corporate gearing ratio. But, 
according to Miller, "there would be no optimum debt ratio for 
any firm7.* His basic argument is very simple: the existence of 
corporate taxation should encourage firms to increase gearing 
ratios wherever possible since there is a net advantage to be 
gained, as demonstrated in the original Modigliani-Miller 
formulation. There is no reason why debt should not follow the 
normal laws of supply and demand. So as firms' demand for debt
7 Miller (1977), p 269.
increases, rates of return offered must be raised and these
increases exactly offset the tax advantages. This can be
demonstrated by looking at tax clientele effects.
Firms with given gearing ratios and dividend policies
attract a clientele of investors who find that this policy
compared to others yields them the most favourable income stream
in terms of tax effects - i.e. the largest after-tax income.
Bond holders, as mentioned before, look at how the before-tax
rate of return they are to receive compares with personal tax
rates on income. If a firm increases its gearing ratio,
\
investors in the higher marginal tax brackets may find that they 
no longer gain any advantage from holding bonds in this firm. 
They then sell their holdings and invest in firms with lower
gearing ratios. But they are replaced by a new clientele of
1
investors who find the firm's new policy more advantageous than 
any other on the market. The opposite behaviour occurs in the 
face of a decrease in the gearing ratio.
The same process occurs with equity holders, who consider 
the difference between taxes they must pay on dividend income,
4and capital gains that have to be paid if they sell shares m  
order to rearrange their portfolios. Again a change in gearing 
causes one clientele of investors to move elsewhere, but they 
are replaced by another.
Thus at the level of the firm, varying the gearing ratio 
simply causes clienteles of investors to change, but the
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aggregate corporate gearing ratio - determined by the interaction 
between the effects of the personal and corporate tax systems - 
remains unaffected.
G FURTHER DETERMINANTS OF THE CORPORATE GEARING RATIO
It is clear then that the corporate gearing ratio plays a 
much more complicated role than that described in the simplistic 
outline of the traditional theory of the firm or in the basic 
Modigliani-Miller model. However, in general it would appear 
that although a unit of debt capital appears relatively less 
expensive than a unit of equity capital at least at low gearing 
levels, increasing levels of debt in the firm's capital structure 
weigh more and more heavily in terms of increased returns 
required and would appear at some point to begin to outweigh the 
advantages gained. Thus gearing increases as long as there is 
a net advantage to be gained up to a point where the value of the 
firm is maximised subject to some chosen degree of risk - the 
position suggested by the traditional rather than the Modigliani- 
Miller model.
The individual characteristics of each firm must define the 
particular position to be adopted regarding the price to be paid 
for finance and the associated level of risk to be borne - known 
as the risk-retum trade-off - and hence the optimal gearing
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ratio. Unfortunately, economic analysis has yet to provide a 
complete theory describing the determination of the optimal 
gearing ratio. There exists no rigorous model of this as there 
does of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. However we can try and 
model the way in which a number of the major factors affect 
corporate indebtedness.
We saw that the objective of managers need not necessarily 
be the maximisation of market value and hence the wealth of the 
owners of the firm - equity holders. Managerial motivation must 
thus be defined. The owners of small family firms, for example, 
may be more concerned with retaining control of their enterprise 
than maximizing wealth. There may be a reluctance to publicly 
issue shares in these firms, and gearing ratios are thus 
relatively high. Other alternative objectives to market value 
maximisation could include preferences for maximizing size, or 
growth. Or it may be that managers pursue objectives that do not 
coincide with the wishes of the owners. However, given the ever­
present threat of takeover/buy-out in the presence of potential 
profits to be made, it is likely that profit maximisation will 
be the predominant objective of corporate managers. Hence it is 
probably not unreasonable to make this assumption as we have done 
throughout this study when looking at the aggregate corporate 
gearing ratio. Nevertheless, it should be noted that outside the 
US hostile takeovers are rare with the partial exception of the 
UK, although there have been a number of hostile takeover
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attempts in France recently (Borio 1990).
The preferences of managers/shareholders as to the desired 
profile of debt in the capital structure - length of debt - could 
also be considered. Short term debt is generally more available 
than longer term debt and the required rate of return is 
generally lower, especially during periods of high inflation when 
investors are unwilling to tie up their funds for long periods 
of time in the face of high price uncertainty. The trade-off is 
however that short term debt is more risky to the borrower since 
due more quickly.
Fixed rate debts offer advantages to both lenders and 
managers who wish to know the nominal stream of interest payments 
to be paid into the future and can help with financial planning. 
In inflationary periods, however, further advantages are to be 
gained by managers as the real burden of outstanding fixed rate 
debt falls. But lenders may prefer variable rate debt for this 
reason and be prepared to accept a lower return in exchange for 
facing less risk. These factors should also be taken into 
account. Likewise, some measure of the narrowness of capital 
markets could be considered. Size of the institutional sector, 
for example is an important determinant of the narrowness of 
capital markets. In general, the narrower the capital market, 
the lower the demand for equity and hence the greater the chance 
of new issues being undervalued.
Government subsidies and other encouragements could also be
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included here, and legal provisions concerned with firm finance.
Clearly the determinants of corporate gearing are many and 
varied. We turn now to a further determinant that is likely to 
have had a major impact of corporate gearing ratios both at the 
level of the firm, and at the aggregate level.
In the discussion so far, the only risk considered in 
relation to debt holdings has been credit risk. We have also 
noted, however, that even if bankruptcy is assumed away, debt is 
still subject to market risk if inflation affects real returns. 
In the next section, the effects of inflation and price uncer­
tainty on corporate gearing ratios are considered in more detail.
H INFLATION AND PRICE UNCERTAINTY
The consequences of inflation and price uncertainty on 
corporate financial patterns are far from straightforward. Many 
effects come into play that influence actual and desired gearing 
ratios, and both the demand and supply of debt and equity. We 
begin with a discussion of the role of equity before going on to 
examine the behaviour of debt in more detail, and finish this 
section by investigating the interrelationship between both debt 
and equity, and inflation and price uncertainty.
Inflation and price uncertainty increase the uncertainty 
surrounding returns to equity as compared to periods of more
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stable prices. In the presence of inflation and price uncertain­
ty investors demand higher premiums to compensate for added risk, 
and the marginal cost of equity to the firm rises. With other 
things remaining unchanged, the gearing ratio desired by the firm 
increases if new equity appears relatively more costly to the 
firm than new debt. Furthermore, although in theory firms may 
pay whatever dividend they like, in practise managers committed 
to maximizing the market value of the firm do not usually reduce 
dividends. They must pay at least a fixed, if not rising, 
nominal return to shareholders on outstanding equity if they are 
to maintain confidence in the value of the stock®. In an 
inflationary period then, if managers want to prevent investors 
from switching out of equity and into e.g. short-term bills as 
a hedge against capital losses, they must match price increases 
with dividend increases. Thus both the marginal and average cost 
of equity is liable to rise in the presence of inflation. These 
various costs rise as inflation rises. If investors feel 
managers are acting according to the objective of maximisation 
of the market value of the firm and trying to maintain the real 
value of equity, they may even prefer to switch out of fixed, 
nominal rate (especially long-term) debt in inflationary periods 
and into equity. In this case, investors themselves help support
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* Despite sharply falling profits in the current 
recession, evidence of dividend cuts is sufficiently rare to 
warrant headlines.
equity prices and limit any decreases in capital gains due to 
inflation, therefore allowing real returns to be maintained 
without real increases in dividends. It is therefore impossible 
to state, a priori, what will happen to real returns to equity 
in inflationary periods. It is not sufficient to look at the 
behaviour of equity in isolation when considering changes in the 
gearing ratio. For example, rising equity prices during a period 
of inflation may cause the market value of the firm to increase 
so much that managers feel the capital structure of the firm can 
comfortably support more debt and a higher gearing ratio. It is
now time to look therefore at the role of debt.
Corporate debt carries a premium to compensate lenders for 
the risk of default over and above the return necessary to 
compensate lenders for their subjective rate of time preference. 
Even if debt is free of default risk, however, it need not
necessarily be entirely risk free.
In the absence of price uncertainty, the real yield on debt, 
r, is equal to its nominal yield, i. In this case, debt should
sell at price Pb which is equal to its full face value, Y, where:
t
r * (iY)/P„
The nominal yield negotiated should cater for any an­
ticipated price changes in order to provide a certain desired 
real return. There are many different types of debt available,
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e.g. convertible, index-linked, floating rate, etc. and more 
different types appearing on the market all the time (see Brealey 
and Myers, 1991, for a list of the major categories) . Index- 
linked debt is designed to cope specifically with erosion of 
real returns due to inflation. However, definition of the rate 
of inflation to be used is not straightforward. A consumer or 
retail price inflation series could well differ significantly 
from asset price inflation and movement in stock prices. Use of 
index-linked debt is surprisingly limited, but floating rate debt 
is becoming more widespread. Although floating rate debt does 
not explicitly allow for inflation, as rates vary, they can be 
set to take into account the relevant rate of inflation according 
to the lender. In the case of debt where the nominal yield is 
fixed, unanticipated price changes cannot, by definition, be 
catered for. In this case, it is not the nominal return on debt 
that varies, but the real return. An unanticipated increase in 
the rate of inflation reduces the real burden of outstanding 
debt, and a fall in the rate of inflation increases the burden. 
On new debt, however, the nominal yield is once again varied so 
as to compensate for these price changes in order to provide 
desired real returns. Thus variations in the burden of fixed 
rate debt caused by unanticipated variations in the rate pf 
inflation affect only the outstanding stock of debt, and are felt 
only until the outstanding debt matures. It is not possible for 
either firms or investors to make consistent gains from varia-
100
tions in the rate of inflation, unless there is asymmetric 
information. Managers can gain an advantage from this source on 
new issues of debt only if they correctly spot inflationary 
tendencies before investors do. It is unlikely however that 
investors suffer from money illusion for long, especially not the 
big institutional investors who probably do not suffer from this 
any longer than the managers themselves. So although the firm 
certainly gains in inflationary periods from the falling burden 
of fixed nominal returns on outstanding debt, it is unlikely that 
any great gains are made from this factor in the longer term.
In the presence of actual or unanticipated inflation, the
variance of real returns on debt may increase. This is an
additional risk over and above those so far mentioned for which
borrowers and lenders try to obtain compensation when negotiating
the nominal rate of return on debt. This additional premium
causes the real return on new issues of both fixed and variable
rate debt to be higher in inflationary periods than in periods
of price stability. The less stable prices are, the greater the
risk involved will be and the higher the marginal cost of debt.
/Although the total real burden of outstanding debt should fall 
in the face of unanticipated inflation if a significant propor­
tion of outstanding debt is fixed rate, desired gearing ratios 
may fall as new debt becomes more costly to the firm. With 
regard to the demand for corporate debt in the presence of 
expectations of increasing or persistent price instability, if
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higher and higher real returns on longer term debt are not 
offered, investors may prefer to switch into more short-term debt 
in order to be able to hedge against this risk or floating rate 
debt. Faced with the choice of shorter or more long term debt 
at the same price, the firm could be expected to prefer more long 
term debt in order to avoid the costs and uncertainties involved 
with renegotiating expiring short-term debt. The higher prices 
that must, however, be paid on longer term debt might deter firms 
from using debt, again bringing about a fall in desired gearing 
ratios.
Although it is clear that inflation and price variability 
have a number of opposing effects, the costs involved increase 
with uncertainty. Thus the greater and more persistent price 
variability is, the more likely desired gearing ratios will be 
to fall.
A further cost related to price instability may be demon­
strated if we relax the implicit assumption so-far held that 
there exists only one risk-free rate of interest for both 
borrowers and lenders. In practise, borrowing rates usually 
exceed lending rates, and this asymmetry entails costs which rise 
as the gap between the rates rises. We saw above that inflation 
reduces the real burden of fixed rate debt. A disinflationary 
recession curbs this effect. In times of recession and financial 
uncertainty, credit risk rises. In the face of insolvencies, the 
confidence of lenders falls and rates of return required on loans
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rise. In this atmosphere it is likely that greater efforts are 
made to gain information regarding the creditworthiness of the 
borrower. In incomplete financial markets the costs-of inter­
mediation and information gathering are non trivial. In times 
of recession and financial disruption these costs are likely to 
rise. When lenders are faced with increased risk, they may 
demand higher returns, not only explicitly, but also implicitly 
in the shape of more complex contracts, or demands for higher 
collateral. Thus the effective cost of borrowing for a given
safe interest rate rises. The greater the risk, i.e. the worse
\
the state of the economy, the greater the real cost of credit
will be. At the same time, incomes fall, reducing the capacity
of borrowers to service debts. Further insolvencies ensue,
causing further loss of confidence on the part of lenders and
further increases in the cost of credit. Many of these extra
costs apply only to the borrower, and do not cause a matching
increase in income on the part of savers. Consumption by
borrowers falls, while the consumption of savers remains
unchanged. The effect of this is to reduce aggregate demand. 
i
Bernanke (1983) argues that these increased costs of credit 
intermediation were the key cause of the propagation of the Great 
Depression. They made borrowing increasingly expensive and 
difficult to obtain, without an equivalent increase in the return 
to saving. As a result, investment was curtailed for lack of 
funds, further depressing aggregate demand.
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In a recession, disinflation (or deflation in the case of 
the Great Depression) causes the burden of outstanding fixed rate 
debt to rise. At the same time, the cost of variable rate debt 
and new borrowing rises while the value of equity falls. As a 
result, gearing ratios measured at both book and market values 
could be expected to rise.
The reverse is true in times of recession when falling 
profits cause an erosion of reserves and a reduction in the value 
of the firm's equity leading to an increase in the market value 
gearing ratio. This may cause firms to feel over-indebted even 
though they have not necessarily changed their financial 
structures. Attempts may then be made to reduce indebtedness, 
bringing down book value gearing ratios. In this case, poten­
tially profitable investment may be foregone and aggregate output 
from the corporate sector as a whole would be reduced, worsening 
the recession.
There have been a number of attempts to outline the role of 
corporate indebtedness in the business cycle. For example, 
Fisher's Debt-Deflation theory (1933) was an analysis of this 
phenomenon with respect to the Great Depression. The trigger 
here was deflation caused by over-indebtedness. In times of 
economic prosperity, a rise in the business confidence of agents 
is reflected in the use of increasing levels of debt to finance 
investments. Increased output and employment, and therefore 
demand, is accompanied by rising prices and inflation as the
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economy moves towards full employment, thereby reducing real 
rates of interest and the real burden of outstanding fixed rate 
debt. Although in the face of a falling real burden of debt 
rational agents should be willing to increase nominal holdings 
to maintain the real value of debt-holdings at some chosen level, 
Fisher argues that at some stage agents may begin to act 
irrationally. For example, they may begin to feel over-indebted 
as nominal debt holdings rise above a certain level, and hence 
make attempts to liquidate debts, thus reducing demand and 
slowing inflation. The rate of growth of profits slows and 
further attempts are made to liquidate debts. As loans to the 
banks are paid off, the velocity of circulation falls causing 
prices to fall and the burden of outstanding debt to increase 
still further. Increasing numbers of agents go bankrupt, 
weakening the position of their creditors who may become bankrupt 
themselves, setting a domino effect in motion. This is accom­
panied by reductions in output and demand further aggravating the 
depression as the economy moves into a downward debt-deflation 
spiral.
/
Minsky (1982b), in his 'Financial Instability Hypothesis', 
further develops Fisher's argument. He suggests that the economy 
naturally tends towards this debt-deflation spiral as it also 
naturally tends towards a boom: the boom-depression cycle being 
an inherent characteristic of capitalist economies.
Minsky's argument is similar to Fisher's. Starting in an
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economy which has recently emerged from a depression, gradually 
agents become more confident. Higher and higher amounts of debt 
to finance enterprise are used and the financial structure of the 
economy becomes increasingly fragile as time passes (see e.g. 
Friedman 1986). Improving economic activity is accompanied by 
rising gearing ratios. At some stage however, interest rates 
begin to rise triggering an increase in the burden of debt and 
the debt-deflation spiral. This arises because, for example, the 
supply of finance is not sufficient to keep pace with demand; or 
because the authorities, becoming alarmed at the levels of debt 
in the economy, engage in monetary tightening in an effort to 
discourage use of debt. The downturn is then accompanied by 
falling gearing ratios.
According to Minsky, the gearing ratios should hence move 
pro-cyclically. However, firms are unwilling to sell equity when 
profits are negative. Greater reliance on debt rather than 
equity for funding needs could then be expected, not less. 
Recession is thus likely to be associated with increasing gearing 
ratios, not falling ratios.
On the other hand, during a boom, gearing ratios are more 
likely to rise. In an upturn the income and profits of the 
average firm typically increase causing the value of the firm to 
rise. With renewed inflation the burden of outstanding fixed 
rate debt falls. In this period reserves tend to build up, and 
it is unlikely that they will be distributed in the form of
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increased dividends until a considerable time has elapsed and 
managers are confident that increased income is permanent, not 
transitory. Moreover, it is precisely when the firm is in a 
strong position and well regarded in the markets that managers 
are most likely to make new issues of equity i.e. during a boom 
(Bernanke 1981). Gearing ratios could thus also be expected to 
fall. So falling gearing ratios are likely to be associated with 
economic upturns.
Minsky suggests that the debt-deflation spiral can only be 
halted by government intervention and argues that this is 
precisely why recent recessions have been much less severe than 
the Great Depression. Governments now are not only much more 
willing to pursue actively interventionist policies, but they are 
also a lot bigger - providing a far greater proportion of 
national income than in the 1930s and hence much larger and more 
powerful automatic stabilizers.
However, even in the absence of big and/or interventionist 
governments, a general desire to reduce indebtedness might not
necessarily lead to a downward deflationary spiral. Deflation
/
should certainly be contractionary as real interest rates and the 
burden of outstanding fixed rate debts rise, reducing output and 
demand on the part of debtors. But lower prices also have 
expansionary effects. Demand should rise in the face of lower 
prices, encouraging increased output and thus income. Further­
more, lower prices may cause the real value of assets and thus
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wealth to rise. This positive real balance effect should also 
lead to increasing demand on the part of creditors. The net 
effect will depend on the relative propensities to consume of 
creditors and debtors. If debtors have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume than creditors, the reduction in demand on 
the part of the former is likely to outweigh increases engendered 
by the latter. In this case, the net effect on aggregate demand 
would be negative. However, it is possible that a period of 
mild recession might on average be beneficial for a highly 
indebted corporate sector. A long period pf stability and 
prosperity may allow increasing numbers of inefficient and over- 
indebted firms to survive, causing the corporate sector to 
stagnate. In this case, injections of government expenditure 
fail to alleviate the stagnation as firms are too weak and 
inefficient to react positively. A mild recession should then 
weed out the inefficient, over-indebted firms, but allow the 
efficient competitive firms to survive. Improved average 
productivity may allow national income to increase as a result.
Greater use of index-linked or floating rate debt would 
remove a lot of the problems caused by price variability and 
instability. Surprisingly, until recently the use of index- 
linked debt has not been particularly widespread9. We saw above
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9 The interested reader may consult e.g. the contribu­
tions in Dornbusch R. and Sinvonsen M.H. (eds.) (1983), "Infl­
ation, Debt, and Indexation, " The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, for 
suggested reasons.
that there are problems in selecting the relevant rate of 
inflation against which to index the debt. Moreover, whichever 
index is used, a time lag will occur before the relevant rate of 
inflation is known. Perhaps investors prefer to compensate for 
variations in the real burden of debt in other ways. They may 
prefer to switch into equity for example, if they believe that 
managers faced with the threat of take-over try and maintain the 
real value of equity; or they may prefer to switch into debt of 
a more short-term nature. The shorter the debt, the shorter the 
period during which undesired variations in real burdens 
sustained will be; and investors can more quickly re-negotiate 
conditions in order to obtain compensation for temporary losses, 
and prevent their continuation. Or more recently, increasing use 
has been made of floating rate debt instruments such as floating 
rate notes (FRNs) . However, in the BIS reporting area, as late 
as the mid 1980s, corporate debt issue was predominately fixed 
rate - banks and governments were the main issuers of FRNs. 
Moreover, FRNs mainly replaced existing variable rate syndicated 
loans, implying that international variable rate debt did not 
necessarily increase (Bank for International Settlements, 1986: 
p 134) .
Clearly, when considering this question then, it is not 
sufficient to look only at how the level of the gearing ratio 
moves in the presence of inflation and price uncertainty, but 
also at what happens to the nature of the gearing ratio.
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To recap then, in periods of inflation and price uncertain­
ty, the cost of new debt and equity could be expected to rise. 
The greater and more persistent price variability is, the greater 
the costs involved will be. Although the burden of outstanding 
fixed rate debt falls, required rates of return on new debt and 
existing variable rate debt rise. In the short run, gearing and 
inflation could be expected to move in the same direction. Over 
time, however, the inflationary advantages of fixed rate debt are 
increasingly outweighed by the disadvantages of higher returns 
required on variable rate debts and new fixed rate debt. As a 
consequence desired gearing ratios could begin to fall in the 
longer term.
I THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GEARING AND INVESTMENT
It has so far been assumed that financing patterns are 
neutral; it is likely, however, that they have an effect on 
investment decisions (see Auerbach 1985; Gordon and Malkiel 1981; 
Mayer 1987a). The existence of corporate limited liability, for 
example, may not allow the complete separation of finance and 
investment. Managers of highly geared firms protected by limited 
liability may choose to undertake riskier investments .if they 
believe these to be in the best interests of the equity holders. 
Thus varying the gearing ratio may lead to costly distortions of
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the investment decision.
This may also arise when the assumption of perfect, or 
costless, symmetric information is relaxed, and the existence of 
transaction costs is allowed for.
When there is asymmetric information conflicts of interest 
between the agent (manager) and the principal (investor) may 
arise10. Up to now we have presumed that managers are motivated 
by the attempt to attain shareholder wealth maximisation. It 
is, however, possible that managers have other goals, for example 
maximisation of market share, power or prestige etc. They also 
have an informational advantage over investors concerning their 
own behaviour, and the firm's future returns. Investors 
therefore try and set up incentives or contracts forcing managers 
to act in the best interest of the investors. To ensure their 
wishes are carried out they must monitor managers' behaviour. 
These actions are costly, and costs arising from any divergence 
of management behaviour from that which is in the best interests 
of investors are known as agency costs (see Fama 1980).
Funds raised from borrowing may also entail agency costs. 
t
Debt holders may not have a vote as do equity holders, but they 
can still inpose implicit restraints on corporate management. 
For example they could stipulate that the funds they provide may 
only be used for certain specified purposes. Or these costs may
Ill
10 This is sometimes alternatively referred to as an 
insider-outsider problem.
become explicit if debt holders allow management a free hand in 
the use of funds they provide, but demand a higher return to 
compensate for the increased risk they face due to loss of 
control.
Equity issues may involve moral hazard and agency cost 
problems too (see Jensen and Meckling 1977). This can be seen 
in the following example. Consider a firm that is initially run 
by one owner-manager who issues some shares to raise finance, 
thereby diluting ownership. In this case, the manager may try 
and maximize utility at the expense of the new shareholders. It 
is costly for the new shareholders, aware of this tendency, to 
monitor the actions of the manager and constrain him to act in 
their best interests. The greater the number and diversity of 
shareholders, the more difficult it is for them to organize any 
concerted action. Thus agency costs arising from equity issue 
increase with the proportion of equity in the capital structure.
If increased gearing is associated with a decrease in 
equity, shareholding is liable to become more concentrated unless 
existing shareholders choose to dilute their holdings. In this 
case owners are in a better position to discipline and control 
managers. Hence there is a reduction in the agency costs and 
moral hazard problems involved with equity issue. The net change 
in these costs must thus be considered.
According to this analysis, the financial policy chosen by 
managers is the one where the agency costs associated with the
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various types of finance are minimised. Investors - who have 
the power to control and sanction managers - are aware of the 
tendency of managers to act in their own interests at the expense 
of the investors, and of how capital structure influences their 
behaviour. Managers, aware that investors possess this knowledge 
try, therefore, to minimize agency costs in order to maximize 
market value.
Another idea that has developed from the work on asymmetric
information is the theory of signalling (see Ross 1977) .
Borrowing may be perceived by investors as a ^ignal regarding
\
manager's perceptions of bankruptcy risk. Managers are unlikely 
to take on new debt if the risk of bankruptcy is very high since 
the return they would have to pay on it would also be extremely 
high. Furthermore, in the event of bankruptcy, managers are 
likely to be faced with direct costs in terms of the loss of 
their present job, or of harm to their future career prospects. 
Thus new borrowing may be taken on to signal to the market that 
the firm is in a healthy position. An optimal proportion of debt 
in the financial structure thus arises where the difference 
between the benefits from signalling and the expected costs 
associated with bankruptcy risk is maximised.
Asymmetric information can also lead to credit rationing. 
Credit rationing as a disequilibrium phenomenon can exist in the 
presence of constraints put on the market by the authorities, for 
example interest rate controls. However, it has also been shown
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how credit rationing may exist in equilibrium due to the presence 
of imperfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Imperfect 
information in capital markets derives from the fact that 
borrowers know their own position and risk of default better 
than lenders. The existence of imperfect information can cause 
the price of debt to affect the nature of transactions between 
borrowers and lenders, and may not necessarily clear the market. 
There can for example be adverse selection effects. 'Risky' 
borrowers who feel that their likelihood of default on a loan is 
high may be prepared to pay higher rates of interest to obtain 
a loan than 'safer' borrowers. Increases in interest rates 
charged by lenders might not lead to an increase in returns, but 
might in fact lead to a decrease in returns since their action 
has caused them to lend to more risky borrowers on average with 
a higher rate of default.
Varying the rate of interest charged may also affect the 
actions of borrowers and lead to moral hazard. Raising the 
interest rate required could cause the cost of finance to 
increase such that borrowers are no longer willing to invest in 
safer projects yielding a relatively low return, but prefer to 
invest in more risky projects with a smaller chance of success - 
but a far higher return in the event of success. If the project 
fails, the borrower defaults. In the event of success, however, 
far higher returns are enjoyed. Again, increasing the rate of 
interest may not lead to higher returns to the lender since
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borrowers feel encouraged to take increased risks, and the 
increase in defaults may outweigh the extra income derived from 
increasing rates of interest.
There are a number of other explanations for credit 
rationing. For example, there may exist a system of commitments 
between banks and their customers. In an attempt to forge 
mutually satisfying long term relationships, there may be 
informal agreements between banks apd customers establishing 
stable loan rates which are largely independent of market rates. 
When these two sets of rates diverge, it could be that potential 
new customers are denied credit at any price as regular customers 
must first be satisfied at the implicit contract price.
Or it is possible that banks function according to some 
equity ethic where one rate is set for all borrowers. In this 
case it is the preferred borrowers who obtain credit, while the 
least preferred borrowers - those who are new and therefore 
unknown11, who are considered a poorer risk etc. - only get credit 
if any remains after more preferred demands are satisfied. 
Although historically ratings have only been common in the US,
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11 The lack of any credit rating can make borrowing even 
more difficult than a bad credit rating. An individual/company 
with a bad rating at least has a chance of improving their status 
and thus obtaining further loans by clearing arrears, whereas a 
zero-rated agent may not even have this opportunity. For example, 
there are often cases in the press of winners of very large 
amounts of money in lotteries being refused credit cards, hire- 
purchase facilities etc., since they have been careful not to 
live beyond their means and go into debt in the past, and now 
lack any credit rating at all.
attempts have been made in recent years to introduce a ratings 
system into the UK.
The theory outlined above is only really applicable to small 
firms and households. Bigger firms with established reputations 
against which lenders may attempt to estimate risk position are 
more likely to be rationed by price. This presumes however that 
there is unlimited availability of finance - another of the 
Modigliani-Miller assumptions. In fact it would appear that even 
the biggest firms do not necessarily have unlimited access to 
finance. It is possible that a proportion of the recent wave of 
takeovers and mergers has been by firms starved for finance 
(Jensen 1988). Carrying out the merger allows the acquirer 
access to the funds of the target firm, and to its sources of 
external finance.
With regard to cross country differences in gearing ratios, 
some further important insights are discussed by Mayer (1986). 
Two major criticisms of the more traditional theories are the 
failure to recognize that financing and investment decisions can 
not usually be separated, and the failure, to consider the 
importance of uncertainty and the lack of a complete set of 
contingent contracts allowing uncontracted outcomes.
In this case, different sets of financial instruments yield 
different allocations of control over returns. Suppliers of 
finance may have differing degrees of control over how their 
finance is used. Financing decisions may well affect investment
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decisions. Thus how the market supplies funds, and the relation­
ship between this and the corporate sector may be of great 
importance in determining corporate financial patterns, and 
investment.
For example, average gearing ratios observed in the UK and 
US non-financial corporate sectors are notoriously low and are 
sometimes blamed for the relative stagnation of industry in these 
countries; whereas the Japanese corporate sector is much more 
highly geared - and Japanese corporate investment is much 
healthier. But it is not necessarily gearing ratios per se that 
are directly related to investment: we saw in chapter II that 
rising gearing has not been associated with an increase in 
investment. It is how these gearing ratios arise that is of 
crucial importance.
For example, the UK and US financial markets are widely
considered to be the most efficient and competitive in the world,
and increasingly so in the light of recent innovations. One
would thus expect that since the average cost of capital faced
by the corporate sectors in these countries should be lower than
t
in the less efficient markets - Japan, Germany and France, for 
example - external funding and investment levels should be 
higher. This is not the case. In the UK for example, Mayer 
(1986, 1987a) finds that only 30% of corporate funding came from 
external sources in the period 1970-84. When acquisitions of 
financial assets are netted out this figure falls to zero - in
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this period non-financial corporate sector investment in the UK 
was 100% financed by retained earnings.
In Japan by way of contrast, external funding of the 
corporate sector is much higher, as is the average gearing ratio.
According to Mayer, these facts can largely be explained by 
the relationship between the financial markets and the corporate 
sector.
In the UK and the US, agents in the financial market are not 
as prepared to provide credit as they are in Japan, Germany and 
France. This is because of a lack of commitment^ . A firm seeking 
finance for a project approaches a bank who provides a loan in 
the hopes of gaining returns if the project is successful, and 
of maybe continuing business with the firm in the future.
However the bank is aware that the firm does not necessarily 
feel committed to staying with it. If the project is successful, 
the bargaining position of the firm changes: it attains the 
ability to shop around for better terms from other suppliers of 
funds. The more efficient and competitive the markets, the more 
alternative sources exist, and the more firms are likely to shop 
around. The bank being aware of the lack of commitment on the 
part of the firm is not prepared to commit itself either. This 
could lead to a reluctance on the part of banks to make long­
term loans at attractive rates. There is thus likely to be a 
tendency in countries with more highly developed financial 
markets for loans to be either predominately short-term (UK) or
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highly priced if longer term (US)12 to compensate for potential 
future loss of business.
Furthermore, because of problems in financing investments 
and of uncertain returns, firms may not be prepared to offer very 
attractive repayment schedules to lenders. The more committed 
borrowers are to an attractive repayment schedule, the more 
likely they are to obtain a loan, the longer the loan is likely 
to be and the less expensive.
Short-term debt can of course be rolled over - at the 
discretion of the bank. Roll-overs are not, however, automatic: 
further constraints could be inposed as a condition of granting 
these facilities. So the length of funding obtained may have an 
important influence on the behaviour of the corporation. Short­
term debt rolled over is not necessarily equivalent to long-term 
debt.
Potentially profitable investments may not be carried out 
if they require long term financing which the firm is unable to 
obtain. With only short-term finance obtained for specific 
projects the firm is constrained in its behaviour, and may not, 
for example, be able to invest in research and development with 
a view to the long term development of the firm. It is also 
possible that, given the limited liability status of the firm and
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12 Since the mid 1970s the UK corporate sector has had the
greatest short debt-total debt ratio out of the group (see
chapter II), and real long term interest rates have been the
highest in the US since the early 1980s (see chapter IV).
the constraints placed upon it by financing, firms might tend to 
invest in riskier projects hoping to increase short-term expected 
returns with the aim of improving longer term financial resour­
ces. But if lenders suspect this tendency, they could well 
impose covenants restricting the use of funds, or demand 
collateral, pushing up costs still further.
In the framework outlined above, the immediate consequence 
of the lack of commitment in efficient markets is either 
predominant use of short-term funding, or constraints on 
behaviour and use of relatively high cost longer-term funding. 
Where there do not exist committed relationships between the 
corporate and financial sectors, corporate investment may be 
lower, and of a more short-term nature than in countries where 
these relationships exist.
It has been argued that government intervention is required 
to remove, or at least alleviate this problem of 'short-termism' . 
It must however be remembered that short-term debt can often be 
rolled over, allowing longer term projects to be carried out. 
Since on the whole it would not appear that companies borrow to 
finance specific projects, or that lenders extend credit for 
specific projects either - it is rather the overall profit 
position of the company that appears to be of concern - the 
short-termism problem may not be as serious as feared. Jt could 
rather represent a way of yielding a high degree of control - 
control that is otherwise lacking in economies where borrowers
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do not feel 'committed' to lenders. Profitable firms are able 
to roll debt over without problem, but unprofitable firms have 
greater difficulties. Government intervention to allow provision 
of longer term debt could simply retard problems. In this case, 
the length (or rather shortness) of debt should not necessarily 
be seen as the cause of poor investment and profitability 
performance in the corporate sector. It may be, however, if 
markets and individual investors do not recognize profitability 
correctly, or if they only look at short-term profits.
A further constraint on investment is provided by the cost 
involved in shopping around when not committed to one supplier 
of finance. If a firm is unable to get the type of finance 
required, or feels that required rates of return are too high, 
they may choose to shop around. Against possible benefits 
gained, information and transactions costs must be offset. There 
are also adverse signalling costs. The more a corporation 
switches from supplier to supplier, the more its lack of 
commitment is reinforced. Furthermore, the signal may be 
interpreted as an indication that the firm is obliged to keep 
*
switching sources because it is having difficulty obtaining 
finance. Moreover, the firm does of course have the option of 
staying with the original supplier of funds. The costs of 
switching must thus be taken into account when calculating 
reductions in average cost of capital caused by more efficient 
markets and more conqpetitive alternative sources of funds.
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Another option is to use retained earnings rather than 
seeking external financing sources. The proportion of investment 
funded by retentions is higher in the US and the UK compared to 
the other countries in the study (Mayer 1989) . This suggests 
that external finance is either harder to come by than elsewhere, 
or that its provision is laced with unacceptable restrictions, 
or that it is too expensive. Nevertheless, relying heavily on 
retained earnings may restrict the investment opportunities open 
to corporations.
Corporate investment as a proportion of GDP in the UK and 
the US has certainly been lower than in Japan over the past two 
decades (see chapter II), and numbers of bankruptcies have been 
higher (see chapter IV), especially recently as efficiency and 
competitivity in the UK and US financial markets has been 
increasing.
The stagnation of the UK and US corporate sectors has been 
blamed on the lack of long-term investment. It has also been 
blamed on low gearing ratios. We have discussed at length why 
the cost of debt finance is likely to be below the cost of 
equity. An increase in the gearing ratio should thus be 
accompanied by a reduction in the average cost of capital thereby 
allowing increased investment. In countries where there is a 
lack of commitment between the corporate and financial sectors 
as described above, however, it may not necessarily follow that 
increasing corporate gearing ratios will bring about an increase
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in investment levels. In the UK for example, the debt used to 
finance corporate investment is predominately short-term. An 
increase in UK gearing ratios thus implies an increase in the use 
of short-term debt by the corporate sector: we saw above that
this will not necessarily lead to an increase in either the 
quantity or the quality of investment. In the US on the other 
hand, even though more long-term debt finance is used, the rate 
of return on long-term debt is very high. A rise in the gearing 
ratio in this case could actually lead to an increase in the
average cost of capital and have detrimental effects on invest-
\
ment levels in this way.
In Japan, Germany and France, gearing ratios and proportions 
of external funding obtained are higher than in the US and the 
UK. Investment has also been higher - particularly in Japan and 
Germany - despite the relative lack of efficiency of financial 
markets in these countries.
These facts can easily be explained by the theory outlined 
above. There is a much closer relationship between the financial 
systems and non-financial corporate sectors in these countries.
v
A possible reason for the development of these relationships is 
given in an historical explanation of the evolution of industry 
and of how financial systems developed according to their 
relationship with the industrial sector and the needs of industry 
in the major western economies provided by Hu (1975). Since 
Britain was the first nation to industrialize, nascent industry
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faced no competition and could develop at an unhurried pace. The 
personal finance of wealthy private entrepreneurs was sufficient 
to fund industry. In other countries however, individual finance 
was no longer sufficient as investment had to be carried out on 
a large scale if new industries abroad were to compete against 
established structures in Britain. A system was needed in which 
the channelling of household savings could be organised, in order 
that they be transformed into funds for large-scale investment. 
These mechanisms never developed naturally in Britain and are 
still lacking today. Elsewhere, however, either banking struc­
tures, or state/semi-state bodies developed to fulfil this role. 
Hence although in Britain there are many competing traders in the 
financial market, in Japan, Germany and France the financial 
systems are dominated by the banks. Furthermore, in an attempt 
to defend their power and profits the banks themselves are likely 
to actively discourage competition in the financial markets in 
these countries.
Restricting the range of alternative institutions and 
instruments available to investors restricts efficiency and 
competitiveness. However, with fewer alternatives on the market, 
firms are much more likely to become committed to one lender with 
possibly beneficial effects. If a corporation and a bank 
establish a long-term commitment, then the bank is far more 
likely to provide long-term finance.
These commitments would appear to exist in different ways
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depending on the particular characteristics of the country in 
question. In Japan and Germany, for example, many corporations 
are observed to stay with the same bank and there are exchanges 
of personnel between the two. The banks hold equity in the 
companies to which they lend. This stake increases the incen­
tive to develop a long-term mutually profitable relationship. 
At the same time, the bank has a far greater say in what is 
happening to its money if it has members sitting on the corpora­
tion board, and conflicts of interest are reduced. The costs of 
shopping around are removed, and costs of monitoring and 
information decreased. The banks can therefore afford to be more 
flexible and take a more long term view. For example, they may 
be prepared to stand current losses with the expectations of more 
long term profits. Thus risk-taking is more evenly shared, with 
apparent benefits to both parties.
However, there are also benefits to be gained by firms not 
committing themselves to suppliers of finance, for example 
freedom from constraints on their behaviour. In this case, firms 
may deliberately choose to pay higher rates of return for finance 
so long as they obtain the freedom to invest as they choose as 
a result. There is also the problem of time inconsistency. 
Although there are clearly benefits to be gained from a system 
of commitments, in the future with multiple outcomes possible, 
greater benefits may be derived from switching around. Finally, 
in the US the Glass-Steagal act made the holding of corporate
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equity by lending banks illegal, effectively banning one of the 
main planks of a commitment system.
Nevertheless, the benefits and reductions in costs yielded 
by committed relationships may be substantial if the relative 
performance of the corporate sectors in these countries is 
anything to gauge by. A reduction in the cost and an improvement 
in the quality of capital should lead to an increase in both the 
quantity and quality of investment.
Hence although the average cost of capital is presumed to 
be higher in countries with less efficient capital markets than 
those in the UK and the US, once the above factors are taken into 
account, it may be that the average total cost is not in fact any 
higher.
So we have identified a possible explanation for some of 
stylised facts observed in chapter II: namely, that high gearing 
ratios are associated with high levels of investment. We turn 
now to an attempt to explain how rising gearing ratios may be 
associated with poor investment performance.
A factor that may well be able to explain recent trends in 
corporate sector financial structure is financial liberalisation.
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In "Today's Institutional Environment" (Minsky 1982a), 
financial innovation is likely to have substantially reduced the 
perceived risk of borrowing.
Lenders and borrowers perceptions of risk may have lessened 
due to the appearance of new financial instruments, encouraging 
the former to lend more and the latter to borrow more. For 
example, the supply and use of variable rate debt instruments 
has significantly increased. Borrowers holding variable rate 
instruments see a reduction in the coupon they pay in a time of 
falling interest rates while fixed rate borrowers continue to pay 
the same fixed coupon. On the other hand, borrowers using 
variable rate instruments are worse off than the traditional 
borrower using fixed nominal rate securities in a period of 
rising interest rates. This is not to say that actual risk has 
decreased. With other things remaining unchanged, a shift from 
fixed to floating rate debt rather involves a shift from market 
risk to credit risk. So the mechanism by which interest rates ♦
and gearing ratios are related may be breaking down. The same 
is also true of the gearing-inflation link.
In order to hedge inflationary uncertainties the use of 
index-linked and variable rate securities has become more 
widespread. Other new instruments including swaps, securiti­
sations, and third party guarantees appear to lessen the risks
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faced by lenders by transferring credit risk, encouraging the 
provision of funds. This is also true of the growth of secondary 
markets where decreased perceptions of risk have encouraged more 
lending. Since debt is passed on, it is even possible for agents 
to lend in excess of their capitalization. Although total risk 
remains unchanged, it is more widely spread lessening the 
exposure of any one individual.
The liberalisation process has allowed risks to be seperated
and spread more widely. As a result, both price and credit risks
can be transferred thanks to new instruments vand market par-
\
ticipants can adjust desired risk profiles more precisely. In 
this sense, financial liberalisation has brought about an 
improvement in market efficiency.
At the same time there have also been developments encourag­
ing the use of equity. In the UK, for example, following large 
increases in over-the-counter trading in unlisted securities 
permitted by the stock exchange, the Unlisted Securities Market 
was opened in 1980 allowing small firms unable to get a full 
listing to market their shares publicly.
The appearance of these new instruments is part of a general 
move towards opening financial markets and allowing them to 
function more according to the rules of free market competition 
(Bank of International Settlements 1986). New instruments 
providing substitutes for traditional sources of finance, and the 
development of secondary markets has been mentioned above.
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Markets have become less segmented - for example building
societies in the UK no longer have the monopoly over the
provision of mortgages. Government regulation of financial
markets has been reduced - interest rate controls, usury ceilings
etc. have been reduced or abolished in many cases. This has
brought down the cost finance. Loosening these constraints and
opening markets and allowing increased access would also appear
to have helped contribute to an easing of credit rationing.
There is evidence suggesting that credit has in fact been
fairly widely rationed, particularly for small and medium sized
firms (see Davis, 1987), although it would appear to have eased
more recently, helping explain increases in gearing ratios.
Larger firms with proven track records and stronger negotiating
positions are less likely to face non-price credit rationing as
defined by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), but access to credit is
still not likely to be unlimited, particularly in the short term.
In the US (and UK to a lesser extent) this may be the cause of
the recent wave of leveraged buy-outs by corporations desperate
for credit. Highly geared firms that have used up all available 
t
lines of credit may target firms with unused credit lines, giving 
themselves access to new debt and increased collateral to pledge 
against further debts.
It may also help explain the phenomenon of 'short-termism'. 
Although the proportion of long-term to short-term debt has been 
rising in corporate sectors since the early 1980s (more recently
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in the UK), corporate investment, with an exception being found 
in the US, and more recently Germany, is still predominantly 
funded by short-term debt (i.e. less than one year). Provision 
of (especially long) debt would appear to be rationed even for 
big corporations. Recent increases in the supply of credit are 
thus likely to have brought about a general easing of the 
incidence of quantitative credit rationing.
At the same time, innovation and deregulation has encouraged 
managers to borrow more in the face of increased availability, 
and to borrow a greater proportion of the potential sources they 
have available. In less liquid markets companies ideally leave 
some borrowing capacity in reserve where possible in case of 
emergency, but where supply seems unlimited, there is no need to 
maintain these reserves. Liquidity enhancing innovations include 
money market mutual funds and negotiable deposit accounts.
The cost of capital curve for the corporate sector as a 
whole could hence have shifted outwards, helping explain the 
increases in corporate gearing ratios observed.
So we have seen that financial liberalisation can lead to 
an increase in gearing through a number of different channels, 
and may help explain the continued rise in corporate gearing 
ratios observed in the countries in our sample during the 1980s.
At the same time, the cost of borrowing in financial.markets 
may have fallen as a consequence of the liberalisation process. 
A rise in gearing ratios following a fall in the cost of capital
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may be indicating that the corporate sector has been able to 
obtain more funds with which to finance increased investment. 
Increasing financial liberalisation, through increasing the 
supply of credit, should allow increased physical investment as 
well. Moreover, any fall in the cost of capital occurring 
through increasing competitiveness and deregulation of financial 
markets brought about by the liberalisation process should 
reinforce the positive boost enjoyed by corporate investment.
Many of the new instruments available transform risk and 
allow it to be spread more widely around the market, allowing 
closer matching of individual lenders and borrowers requirements, 
bringing about increased effeiciency. However, it is far from 
clear that financial liberalisation will be accompanied by 
reductions in the cost of capital.
While competitive forces are liable to shave margins and
reduce the cost of finance, liberalisation and innovation could
well cause the volatility of asset price variations to increase,
pushing the cost of finance up (Mayer 1986) . Higher debt service
costs reduce the funds available for physical investment. At the 
t
same time, new assets could be mispriced, at least in the short 
run. Excessive rates of return demanded would have further 
pernicious effects on physical investment. This is unlikely to 
last, however, with competitive forces driving down costs. On 
the other hand, risk could be underestimated on new instruments.
Moreover, many of the new instruments, such as swaps,
131
options, interest and foreign exchange-1-futures, letters of 
credit, guarantees etc. are classified as 'off-balance sheet' 
items. They are not recorded as assets and liabilities on 
company balance sheets, although they clearly represent a 
potential credit risk in the event of default. Balance sheet 
gearing ratios in highly liberalised economies may not present 
an entirely accurate picture of gearing ratios, further clouding 
the true risks involved with the use of these new instruments.
As a result there are fears that use of debt is becoming 
excessive with respect to equity capital. If the markets 
persistantly underprice risk then systemic fragility is a pos­
sibility in the event of adverse circumstances. We saw that 
mispricing of risk is unlikely to persist into the long term, but 
if underpricing is sufficiently severe and sufficiently wide­
spread, problems could arise in the much shorter term. Moreover, 
it is possible that risks could be underestimated over a 
relatively long period, for example with respect to property 
lending. In many markets real estate was typically consider to 
be a rock solid form of collateral against which to borrow, as 
values could only increase. It is possible that risks were 
underestimated over a fairly long period judging by the size of 
the adjustment currently occurring in the wake of the collapse 
of property markets.
Increased access to credit occurring as a consequence of a 
relaxation of liquidity constraints allowing gearing ratios to
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increase could have a number of important effects. A potentially 
crucial aspect that economists have begun to consider recently 
is the implications of trends in corporate financing patterns for 
the conduct of monetary policy (see e.g. Atkinson and Chouraqui 
1986; Friedman 1990).
Monetary policy will have a greater impact on economies 
characterised by more competitive deregulated financial markets 
that use increasing amounts of debt, particularly floating rate. 
The dampening effects of higher interest rates on investment, 
output and aggregate demand are likely to be piuch severer and 
longer lasting than before. This is a particularly serious 
problem for the European countries as they move towards monetary 
union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates, and coordinated 
monetary policy aimed at price stability.
Furthermore, in the face of increased financial liberalisa­
tion, the effects of monetary policy could become unpredictable 
if the interest rate - credit availability link breaks down. The 
money supply could become increasingly difficult to define and 
control. Rising interest rates might not lead to credit 
restrictions a's the potential supply of credit multiplies, either 
through increased use of existing sources or through innovation. 
It might then be that higher quality borrowers switch to less 
expensive new sources and are replaced with poorer quality 
borrowers using more traditional sources such as banks. In this 
case, the quality of bank portfolios would worsen, reducing bank
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profitability and increasing fragility in the financial system.
Lines of unused credit held in case of inability to obtain 
credit in illiquid markets are held less in the wake of financial 
liberalisation with a greater apparent supply of debt available 
in the market. Should problems such as those mentioned above 
become at all widespread, apparent liquidity may prove illusory, 
sending yet more firms into distress.
Moreover, rising gearing ratios themselves may directly 
affect the conduct of monetary policy. The use of monetary 
policy by the authorities to achieve objectives such as price or 
exchange rate stability could be severely restricted. Interest 
rate hikes to support the currency, or control inflation, could 
have severe effects on a heavily indebted corporate sector 
causing investment to be reduced, or engendering defaults. Any 
subsequent loss in output and demand, and business confidence 
is likely to exacerbate problems in other parts of the economy. 
Furthermore, the monetary authorities may well become increasing­
ly impotent over time. Corporations, aware that authorities 
cannot risk provoking a bankruptcy spiral may take on more debt 
than is prudent, and may even be prepared to pay for it at higher 
prices than normal, causing gearing ratios and the burden of debt 
to rise still further. Moreover, if the managers of corporations 
become aware of a diminished capacity on the part of the monetary 
authorities for controlling inflation, they may feel encouraged 
to increase debt issue still further, anticipating future
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reductions in the real burden of outstanding debt through 
inflation.
Direct consequences of rising corporate gearing ratios - if 
due to increasing financial liberalisation - could thus be rising 
inflation, and an increasing risk of financial instability.
These ideas have serious implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy in the light of corporate sector behaviour 
consequent upon increasing financial liberalisation. New 
strategies may well have to be devised if transmission mechanisms 
have been distorted in the ways suggested above, and the 
potential consequences outlined do indeed begin to threaten 
economic performance.
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According to the theory, corporate sector gearing ratios are 
determined largely by risk, return and taxation. The supply of 
corporate sector debt should be negatively related to risk and 
required rates of return. Taxation systems, however, tend to 
encourage the use of corporate debt. We also saw that aggregate 
gearing ratios could be influenced by the relationship between 
the corporate and financial sectors, and by developments in the 
financial sector, and in particular financial liberalisation. 
In countries where there is a close relationship between the 
financial and corporate sectors, the cost of finance could be 
expected to be lower and the availability of finance higher. 
Gearing ratios could then be expected to be typically higher than 
elsewhere. The process of financial liberalisation is associated 
with an increase in the availability of capital. As a result, 
gearing ratios could be expected to rise. However, it is unclear 
whether it will bring about a rise or fall in required rates of 
return. If rates of return increase, rising gearing ratios could 
well be accompanied by falling investment levels.
In the next chapter attempts are made to empirically 
estimate the importance of these determinants, and to see how 
well these theoretical explanations explain corporate financial 
behaviour in recent years. Empirical analysis of taxation as a 
determinant of corporate financial policy poses problems as we
saw above. However, studies to date indicate that, empirically, 
taxation does not appear to perform satisfactorily as a deter­
minant of corporate finance despite its theoretical importance 
(Mayer 1987b). Furthermore, the burden of work involved in a 
comparative analysis of national tax systems over time is beyond 
the scope of this study. Hence, attempts are not explicitly made 
to empirically estimate the role of taxation.
Quantification of many of the other determinants noted above 
such as managerial motivation, agency costs and signalling costs 
is almost impossible, particularly in a way that will allow 
meaningful intertemporal or cross country comparison to be made. 
So although their theoretical importance is recognised, attempts 
are not made to empirically quantify their effects. We do, 
however, turn now to an analysis of the behaviour of risk premia, 
rates of return and inflation at some length.
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IV THE DETERMINATION OF THE CORPORATE GEARING RATIO: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
In chapter II we saw that there has been an increase in a 
number of debt ratios in the major western economies. We looked 
in particular at the financing of the corporate sector over the 
past twenty years and saw that financial gearing ratios have sig­
nificantly increased in all these countries with the exception 
of Japan. We also saw that investment performance has been poor 
over the same period, again with the exception of Japan. So over 
time gearing and investment would appear to be negatively related 
in the countries studied. However, at the same time we noted 
that gearing ratios have been relatively low in the US and the 
UK compared to Japan, France and Germany, suggesting that high 
gearing is associated with higher investment. In chapter III we 
looked at the theory of corporate financial structure in search 
of an explanation for these observations. In this chapter we 
examine how well the reasons discussed explaining observed 
financial patterns stand up to empirical analysis .
We begin by briefly summarising the determination of the 
corporate gearing ratio, before going on to consider the 
behaviour of the major determinants in more detail.
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It is assumed that investment decisions are taken indepen­
dently of financing decisions. Classical profit-maximizing 
behaviour on the part of managers is also assumed. An optimal 
gearing ratio is then established where the cost of finance is 
minimised, subject to certain risk constraints. There exist a 
number of empirical studies indicating that when setting 
financial policy managers do indeed appear to aim for a specific 
gearing ratio which they consider to be optimal (Marsh 1982; 
Taggart 1977) .
Although there are many different types of finance avail­
able, the analysis here has been restricted mainly to considering 
two broad classes: debt and equity. The fundamental distinction 
between the nature of debt and equity plays an important role in 
this study. Equity holders enjoy an unspecified return on their 
holdings comprising a dividend - set at the discretion of 
management - and capital gains determined by the change in market 
value of their equity holdings.
On the other hand, when a loan contract is drawn up, nominal 
yields are specified (although we have seen that the real future 
yield on debt is uncertain) : either in absolute terms in the case 
of fixed rate debt, or in terms of the circumstances in which 
nominal rates will vary, in the case of variable rate debt. 
Debt can either be unsecured, e.g. an overdraft, or secured
against some asset. It is also possible to include covenants in 
the loan contract specifying the use to which loaned monies may 
be put. The contract outlining the terms on which the loan is 
made is legally enforceable in the courts. Creditors can pursue 
their claims even to the point of forcing debtors into liquida­
tion. In the event of liquidation, creditors have a claim on the 
firms' assets. This is contrasted with the position of the 
equity-holder who receives a share of the firms' assets only 
after all debts have been satisfied. Equity holders as a class 
face greater risk than debt holders with regard to return on 
their financial investments.
In order to be persuaded to hold equity rather than debt, 
investors must therefore be offered a risk premium. The cost of 
equity is thus higher than the cost of debt. From the demand 
side, investors must make decisions concerning the amount of risk 
they are prepared to accept as the price for earning the 
potentially higher returns. The firm is faced with the opposite 
situation. Although debt is less costly to the firm than equity, 
because of the legally enforceable obligations involved it is 
also more risky.
Furthermore, the corporation tax system generally favours 
debt issue. Interest payments on debt are considered as fixed 
costs and can therefore be offset against the corporate tax 
levied on firm earnings. The same is not true of dividend 
payments.
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Moreover, it should be noted that recent tax reforms in the 
US and the UK have increased the tax advantages of borrowing. 
Although cuts in the rate of corporation tax in the UK have 
reduced the advantages of tax deductible debt interest, lower 
depreciation allowances and the abolition of stock relief have 
increased the incentive for debt finance. At the same time, 
reductions in the marginal income tax rate and increases in the 
marginal tax rate on capital gains have reduced the advantages 
of retentions for individuals as opposed to distributions, 
including in the form of debt interest (Wilson 1991) . In the US, 
following the 1986 Tax Reform Act, although the rate of corpora­
tion tax was reduced, the rate of tax on dividends and capital 
gains was brought down into line with income tax rates which are 
significantly below corporation tax rates (Brealey and Myers 
1991).
Thus debt financing is relatively less costly to the firm 
than equity financing, particularly in the presence of corpora­
tion tax1. However, we do not see firms tending to use debt 
finance exclusively because it becomes increasingly costly as the 
gearing ratio 'rises. As the number of fixed obligations on the 
firm's earnings increases, so does the risk of financial distress 
and bankruptcy. Equity holders perceive this risk, and since in 
the event of bankruptcy, debt holders have priority in settlement
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1 King and Fullerton (1984), provide empirical evidence 
in support of this statement, and attempt to estimate cost 
differentials in selected countries.
over equity holders, equity holders demand higher returns to 
compensate them for facing increased risk as the gearing ratio 
rises. The average cost of capital faced by the firm is thereby 
forced up. Debt holders also face increased risk as the number 
of fixed obligations competing with their own increase. So it 
can be seen that the firm faces a U-shaped average cost of 
capital curve (see Figure 1 Chapter III) . At low gearing levels, 
it is in the interests of the firm to increase the issue of debt 
as a net advantage can be gained by replacing equity with
relatively cheaper debt. After a certain point any further
\
increases in debt cause the average cost of capital to rise again 
as the costs of increasing risk of financial distress and 
bankruptcy outweigh the savings made by using relatively cheaper 
debt. Beyond a certain limit, the cost of debt is also likely 
to start rising. The optimal gearing ratio then occurs where the 
difference between the tax advantages of using debt and the costs 
due to the risk of bankruptcy are minimised.
So we have seen that the major determinants of corporate 
gearing patterns include risk, the cost of capital and taxation. 
Despite its theoretical importance, empirical evidence concerning 
the explanatory power of taxation as a determinant of corporate 
finance appears weak (Coates and Woolley 1975; Mayer 1987b). 
Furthermore, the burden- of work involved in a comparative 
analysis of the role of taxation is beyond the scope of this 
study and has not therefore been explicitly modelled.
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Thus in the next sections we concentrate on the behaviour 
of cost of capital, including the evaluation of risk. We look 
first at interest rates before going on to investigate the role 
of inflation. Although they help explain differences in levels 
of gearing across countries, we find that these determinants are 
not sufficient to explain recent trends in corporate financial 
behaviour. A further factor that appears to be an important 
determinant of recent trends in corporate gearing is discussed 
in section D: financial liberalisation.
v
B RATES OF RETURN
The above analysis outlining movement along the cost of 
capital curve is based in a static framework, indicating optimal 
behaviour at a particular point in time. In an inter-temporal 
framework, however, the curve itself can move. We would expect 
gearing ratios to move counter-cyclically. In a boom high 
corporate income and profits increase the value of equity. In 
the absence oi any issues of securities, the burden of debt could 
fall if increasing profitability raised the valuation of the 
firm. Moreover, higher income and profitability provide the 
firm With more funds for investment and service of obligations, 
reducing the need to borrow. In this case, market value gearing 
ratios would fall. At the same time, it is precisely when the
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firm is in a strong position that it is likely to make new equity 
issues. Book value gearing ratios might also be expected to fall 
in this instance. The opposite is true in times of recession. 
When the profits of the corporate sector fall and profitability 
is squeezed, the stock of internal equity begins to fall. In 
general it is likely that firms prefer not to compensate for this 
by issuing external equity because any new flotations made in 
these circumstances are likely to be under-valued. New financing 
needs are more likely in this case to be met from debt. At the 
same time, the burden of outstanding debt which has to be 
serviced from a shrinking income rises. In this case both book 
and market value gearing ratios could be expected to rise. 
Gearing ratios should thus tend to move counter-cyclically.
Real interest rates, however, would appear to move pro- 
cyclically. Thus we should see higher interest rates accompany­
ing lower gearing ratios in a boom, and the opposite in a reces­
sion. Increases in the corporate gearing ratio were to be 
expected during the 1970s as a consequence of the oil shocks and 
recessions experienced in the economies under consideration. The 
continued increase in corporate gearing ratios throughout the 
1980s during a period of sustained growth is, however., puzzling.
We have seen that gearing ratios are influenced by both the 
average cost of capital faced by the firm, and the relative cost 
of the various sources of finance. This section is devoted to 
a detailed discussion of these various costs. We begin by
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looking at various ways of measuring the cost of debt. The cost 
of equity is then investigated allowing comparison of the two 
categories of finance. Finally, the average cost of capital 
faced by the corporate sectors in the countries studied is 
considered.
B.l Nominal Rates of Interest
We begin by considering 'risk-free' rates of interest. Risk 
free rates of return are usually assumed to be represented by the 
yield on government debt. In reality, not even government debt 
is entirely risk free. Real returns on government debt are 
always subject to inflationary effects. During periods of infla­
tion, holders of government debt risk sustaining capital losses 
on non index-linked debt.
Although far from common, there is also always the risk of 
default. A rare example has occurred in UK local government 
recently. The credit rating of UK local authorities has been 
severely damaged following the High Court decision retroactively 
banning local authorities from carrying out swap transactions. 
All outstanding deals have become illegal, leaving local 
authorities unable to service their debts. The desire in UK 
local government for am attempt to regain credibility aund 
reputation is so great that a means will most likely be found
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before long allowing local authorities to satisfy outstanding 
obligations, even if they may not enter into any more of these 
kinds of deals in the future.
Reputation is so severely damaged in the event of default 
that governments are likely to try and avoid this outcome at all 
costs. Although not zero as we have seen, the risk of default is 
thus very small, at least in the countries considered in this 
study.
Trends in short and long-term public sector yields are 
presented below.
Clearly, the cost of debt to the corporate sector may exceed 
the cost of debt enjoyed by the public sector. We see shortly, 
however, that it is very difficult to calculate actual cost of 
debt faced by the corporate sector, particularly since we are 
interested in some 'representative' measure that allows us to 
compare behaviour across the countries in our study. Although 
not exactly equal, the definitions of the public sector yields 
are much more comparable than private sector rates. It was thus 
considered worthwhile first examining the behaviour of 'core' 
interest rates before going on to consider further elements 
involved in the cost of corporate sector debt.
B.l.i Long-Term Interest Rates
In the absence of money illusion, we would expect real rates 
of interest to have a greater impact on financing decisions than
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nominal rates. Both the outstanding level of real rates and 
expectations of future rates are important factors. Given that 
expected real rates must involve predictions of both inflation 
and nominal interest rates, movements in nominal interest rates 
could themselves also have an influence on behaviour, at least 
in the short term. Outstanding nominal interest rates are always 
known, whereas inflation is only known with a lag. Inflationary 
expectations are hence based on less up to date information than 
interest rate expectations. Thus when a change in nominal 
interest rates is made, it is possible that inflationary
%
expectations do not adjust instantaneously, in which case 
perceived real interest rates change. Managers may hence decide 
to adjust financing patterns. It is thus possible that movements 
in nominal interest rates have some influence on desired gearing 
levels.
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During the 1970s, it would appear that movements in nominal 
interest rates had little if any influence on financing decisions 
since gearing ratios rose in the countries under consideration 
{with the exception of Japan) despite significant long-term 
interest rate hikes over the period. During the 1980s, however, 
although inflation rates generally fell much more quickly than 
nominal interest rates, gearing ratios continued rising. Before 
concluding that movements in nominal interest rates must have 
begun to have a significant affect on financing patterns, the 
behaviour of interest rate variability over the period should be 
considered.
During the 1970s, nominal interest rates displayed a great 
deal of variability and two very high peaks in 1974 and 1981. 
Since then, the tendency has been for rates to trend fairly 
smoothly downwards. The resultant decline in variance and thus 
uncertainty may have caused perceived risk to have fallen and 
encouraged short term borrowing as opposed to long term borrowing 
or the use of equity. Over the period as a whole, interest rates 
in Germany, for example, displayed relatively low variance and 
German corporate gearing ratios have indeed been rising and 
remain relatively high. In the UK, on the other hand, where 
variance is more pronounced, particularly in the 1970s, the 
gearing ratios has been relatively low, again particularly in the 
1970s. However, nominal interest rate variance is relatively 
low in Japan, yet here gearing ratios have been falling, albeit
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from a relatively high level. And in the USA, where rates have 
been particularly erratic in the 1980s, one of the greatest 
increases in gearing has been witnessed.
Information yielded by a study of long-term nominal interest 
rates is clearly limited.
In the countries under consideration, corporate investment 
is typically financed by a mixture of short- and more long-term 
finance. The behaviour of short-term interest rates was thus 
also investigated. Again we see below that an examination of 
potential influences from this source is of only limited use.
B.l.ii Short-term Interest Rates
Short-term rates of interest have generally been lower than 
long-term rates, but have shown more variability. We saw above 
that we would expect low variance to be associated with high 
gearing. We would thus expect higher gearing ratios to be 
associated with more long-term debt. However, although the lowly 
geared UK corporate sector does indeed have a low proportion of 
long-term debt in the gearing ratio, and the proportion of long­
term debt in the high German gearing ratio has exceeded the 
proportion of short-term debt since the late 1970s, in the 
countries considered here it is not generally true that gearing 
ratios and use of long-term debt are positively related.
Any influence the behaviour of nominal interest rates may 
have on financing decisions is far from straightforward. The
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same is also true of real interest rates.
B.2 Real Rates of Interest
There is considerable debate about the precise nature of 
real interest rates, and how they should be measured (see e.g. 
Atkinson and Chouraqui 1985). However, it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to go into this area in detail. Moreover, the aim 
here is not to measure real rates with great precision at 
particular points in time, but rather to broadly outline how real 
rates have moved in the period considered, both over time and 
relatively between countries. We thus confine ourselves to 
considering widely used conventional measures of real interest 
rates i.e. nominal rates less the rate of inflation.
B.2.i Long-Term Interest Rates
In the mid-1970s, periods of negative long-term real 
interest rates were experienced in all the countries in the 
sample with the exception of Germany. However, these rates 
displayed a great deal of variability. The high level of 
uncertainty surrounding borrowing costs may have discouraged 
corporations from exploiting the negative rates, and very large 
increases in gearing ratios were not thus witnessed in this 
period: increases were relatively slow but steady in the UK and
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the US, and rather erratic in France. In Germany, on the other
hand, the unique stability of real long-term interest rates
during this period probably helps explain the significantly
faster increases in gearing witnessed.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s concerted efforts were
made to bring inflation under control via tight monetary policy.
This tended to take the form of interest rate policy rather
attempts at quantitative or qualitative restrictions. As a
result, interest rates in the countries under consideration rose
sharply in this period. Rates in the US were significantly
\
higher than the other countries in the group in the early 1980s, 
whereas Japanese rates have been significantly lower since the 
early 1980s. Rates in the EC countries have tended to converge 
during this period, but to a very high level. The continued 
increase in gearing ratios in the EC countries is thus rather 
strange. In the US as well, although rates did drop back after 
1983, they began to rise again after 1986, and thus cannot 
explain the continued rise in gearing ratios.
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B.2.ii Short-Term Interest Rates
Although generally lower than more long-term rates, the 
shorter rates display similar behaviour. There are, however, 
some significant differences to be noted.
With respect to the longer rates, greater variability was 
experienced in all countries until the early 1980s, at which 
time short-term interest rates began to display greater conver­
gence .
Another factor to point out is that since the early 1980s, 
rates in the UK have significantly exceeded the rates experienced 
elsewhere, whereas in the US they have been notably lower. The 
similarity of financial behaviour between the corporate sectors 
of these two countries has been noted above on a number of 
occasions: the behaviour of real interest rates has, however, 
been very divergent.
The rates of interest described above are commonly used 
indicators of the cost of debt. However, although the nominal 
rates have been corrected for inflation, the real rates of 
interest subsequently derived are unlikely to represent the 
actual cost of debt to the firm.
We noted above that the corporate sector is .unlikely to 
enjoy the same rates as the public sector. Moreover, when 
considering interest rates, we must be careful to distinguish 
between borrowing and lending rates. In the non-perfect markets 
of the real world, where there are transactions and information
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costs etc., the cost to the borrower and the return enjoyed by 
the lender could well diverge. The yield on financial instru­
ments would not, in this case, represent the true cost to the 
borrower of those financial instruments.
Furthermore, the relevant cost of debt to the firm is not 
the current actual cost but the expected cost, since when 
planning investments managers should compare expected returns to 
expected costs. However, it is difficult to quantify these 
various costs, some of which are not directly observable, for 
example expected rates of interest. We have seen that there are 
many other factors affecting the required rate of return on 
corporate debt, such as agency, information and transactions 
costs. Satisfactory evidence quantifying these costs is not 
available to us.
These problems are exacerbated in this study since ideally 
any rate used should include allowances for different types of 
debt instruments: loans, bonds, variable rates instruments etc. 
Hence it is probably not possible to directly calculate an 
accurate measure of the true cost of debt to the firm.
*An alternative way of trying to analyze the behaviour of the 
cost of corporate debt is to consider the risk premium of some 
representative corporate sector rate over the cost of risk free 
debt. The real cost of corporate debt can be seen as comprising 
two elements: a risk free return required to compensate lenders 
for the use of their money during the time period in question
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measured, for example, by the rate of return on public sector 
bonds; and a risk premium needed to compensate lenders for the 
various costs specific to the corporate sector mentioned above, 
and in particular the risk of default. The extent to which 
corporate interest rates exceed risk free rates of interest is 
thus an important indicator of the risk associated with the 
corporate sector, and hence an indicator of movements in the true 
cost of capital faced by the corporate sector. The magnitude of 
the difference between returns on corporate and government debt 
should therefore give some indication of the risks and thus costs 
involved with holding corporate debt. Although the level of the 
risk premium calculated in this way is unlikely to allow us to 
construct a perfect measure of the cost of corporate debt because 
of the problems mentioned above, the trends observed are an 
important indicator of tendencies in the cost of corporate debt.
B.3 Relative Real Rates of Interest
We would expect the gap between the required rate of return 
on risk-free debt and more risky debt (risk premium) to rise in 
periods of increasing uncertainty and risk - such as during the 
1970s when the economies in question suffered both periods of 
recession and rising inflation4 - and fall in more stable
4 As the present recession continues, there is again 
evidence of high risk premia with much adverse comment in the UK 
Press concerning the very high margins charged by the banks on 
loans to industry, particularly to the borrowers considered to
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expansionary periods. Risk premia could thus be expected to move 
in line with corporate gearing ratios. Empirical tests appear 
to support the idea of a positive relationship between measures 
of spread and gearing ratios. For example Davis (1987) in a 
study of the US, the UK, Japan, Germany and Canada found the two 
generally moving together, at least until the early 1980s. We 
see below that the relationship between gearing ratios and risk 
premia continued to hold during the 1980s.
The measures of corporate sector risk premia presented in 
chart IV.3 below are calculated as the cost of corporate sector 
debt less public sector debt. The cost of public sector debt is 
measured by the yield on long term fixed interest government 
bonds. The cost of corporate sector debt has been assumed to be 
given by the yield on fixed interest long term corporate bonds5. 
It should be noted, however, that despite a revival in bond 
finance in recent years, bonds do not contribute significant 
finance for investment in any of the countries studied except the 
USA (Mayer 1989). Moreover, increasing amounts of corporate 
sector debt are not fixed rate. Nevertheless, the securities 
✓
considered are fairly comparable across countries, and the yields 
investigated, while not necessarily entirely accurate measures,
157
be most risky, i.e. small and medium sized enterprises.
* Germany: yield on domestic, fixed interest industrial 
bonds; France: yield on private sector "premier signature" bonds; 
UK: secondary market yield on company bonds; US: capital market 
rates on all industry selected long-term bonds; Japan: secondary 
market yield on industrial bonds. Source: Cronos.
are likely to move in line with the cost of corporate sector 
debt in these countries.
We would expect risk premia to move countercyclically. In 
a recession, as aggregate creditworthiness deteriorates, risk 
premia demanded could be expected to rise, and vice-versa.
The yield on long term fixed interest corporate bonds has 
generally been a couple of points higher than government bond 
yields - as would be expected. During the period under con­
sideration, the minimum spread in the size of risk premia between
the various countries occurred in the early 1970s. Following\
the oil shocks in the mid and late 1970s, large variations are 
to be witnessed with the risk premium in France increasing 
sharply (in absolute terms) whereas the gap actually reversed 
itself in Japan for a few years, becoming slightly positive. 
Since that time risk premia have tended to converge again, but 
at a higher level.
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IV.3 Risk premium: Safe versus Risky Debt
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Thus the mark-up of corporate sector over risk-free 
government debt has continued to rise during the 1980s despite 
a long period of growth and stability. The relationship between 
risk premia and gearing ratios noted by Davis hence appears to 
continue to hold.
We have seen that financial liberalisation may help explain 
the increases in gearing witnessed in the 1980s: it may also 
have influenced the recent behaviour of risk premia. Deregula­
tion and increased competition should cause the mark-up on 
private sector debt to fall. At the same time the markets could 
well misprice new instruments. It is possible that an insuffi­
cient return is demanded, helping drive down mark-ups further. 
On the other hand, risk could be overestimated, driving yields
up. Lower grade debt such as junk bonds has also been introduced 
to the markets, increasing risk in the markets and average 
yields.
We saw in the previous section that the real cost of 'risk- 
free' debt has risen since the late 1970s following sharp 
increases in interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s by 
the monetary authorities keen to bring inflation under control. 
Since the late 1970s the mark-up of corporate over public sector 
risk-free debt has also risen. Risk premia in the countries with 
the highest degree of liberalisation, i.e. the UK and the US, 
have typically exceeded rates in the other countries in the 
sample, with the exception of France in the late 1970s. In the 
presence of increasing internationalisation of financial markets, 
upward pressures on required rates of return would appear to have 
spread to the other countries in the sample. Initially large 
variations in the mark-up are to be seen, as mentioned above. 
Although the spread between risk premia in the various countries 
studied subsequently fell during the 1980s, a definite upward 
tendency in the size of mark-ups is to be witnessed. Higher risk 
premia are being demanded from corporate borrowers as gearing 
ratios increase.
Not only has the risk free rate of interest been higher 
during the 1980s than during the 1970s, but so has the risk 
premium attached to corporate debt. Increasing use of debt by 
the corporate sector can not thus be explained in terms of income
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effects. We need then to consider whether trends observed may 
have arisen as a result of substitution effects. In the next 
section we discuss the cost of alternative means of finance as 
a prelude to investigating the recent behaviour of the relative 
cost of debt.
B.4 Cost of Equity ~
When calculating the return on equity it is not sufficient 
to look only at dividend yield - expected growth in earnings via 
either increased dividend yields or capital gains should also be 
included if we are to obtain an accurate measure of the real 
return on equity. The real rate of return should thus be 
measured by dividends plus expected growth in the value of the 
share. However, future expected growth rates are not directly 
observable. Thus although the dividend yields presented in chart 
IV.4 - dividends as a percentage of the price of equity - give 
an idea of the relative behaviour of the cost of equity in the 
countries in our sample during the past two decades, they do not 
give particularly accurate measures of the real cost of equity.
In chart IV.4 we see that peaks have occurred in recession 
years, followed by a steady decrease in dividend yields since the 
early 1980s - a trend that has been especially marked in France.
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IV.4 Dividend Yield
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Japanese dividend yields have been significantly below those 
enjoyed in the other countries since the early 1970s, and more 
stable, displaying a steady downward trend. In the other 
countries, yields have been considerably less stable but have 
converged since the early 1980s, with UK rates being slightly 
above the rest.
By the late 1980s, dividend yields were generally below 
their values of the early 1970s. We saw above that the real 
cost of debt to the corporate sector has been rising during the 
1980s. If it is true that the cost of equity has been falling 
at the same time, then both the absolute and the relative cost
of debt would appear to have risen during the 1980s. Reaching 
this conclusion makes the task of explaining rising corporate 
gearing ratios during the 1980s even more difficult. However, 
before investigating movements in the relative costs of debt and 
equity to the firm it is important to ensure that the measures 
of costs used are comparable.
Commonly used measures of financial instrument yields do not
necessarily accurately represent the true cost to the firm of
using these instruments. Furthermore, it is not improbable that
equity yields enjoyed by equity holders differ from the return
\
on equity earned by the firm, i.e. the true cost of equity, for 
reasons mentioned above such as transactions costs, asymmetries 
of information, etc.
The dividend yields presented above are generally considered 
to be 'real' rates of return. However, it is not strictly 
correct to compare them with the measures of real interest rates 
presented in the previous section unless it is presumed that 
share prices mirror the behaviour of the interest rate deflator 
used above - the consumer price index. A glance at charts IV.5a 
and IV.5b indicates that this assumption cannot safely be made.
Whilst the rate of consumer price inflation in the countries 
concerned has generally been decreasing and converging since the 
early 1980s, the behaviour of share prices has been extremely 
erratic and does not appear to display any trend at all, at least 
in the period under investigation.
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IV.5b Share Price Index
Source: Eurostat
An alternative measure of the real cost of equity to the 
corporate sector has thus been presented in chart IV.6. Here 
return on equity is measured by the profitability of equity*. 
The behaviour of the two indicators of the cost of equity has 
been quite different. In the second case, returns have been much 
more variable, and the ranking of the countries no longer remains 
the same. The rate of return on equity in Germany was persis­
tently the highest according to the profitability indicator, and 
France the lowest until recently when it increased significantly 
to become the highest.
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Net after tax profits divided by the stock of equity.
IV.6 Rate of Return on Equity
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UK rates have also increased significantly in recent years, 
and are now higher than at any other time during the period. The 
Japanese rates on the other hand after increasing significantly 
in the late 1970s, have since been falling steadily. No 
particular time trend appears to exist during the time period 
investigated, but there does seem to be some evidence of 
cyclicality in the countries in the sample with troughs occurring 
in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Returns to equity according 
to this second measure appear to have picked up significantly 
since the early 1980s, in line with the ending of the recession
and subsequent improvements in corporate income and profits.
The persistently falling trend seen in chart IV.4 is no longer
witnessed. Further investigation is thus required to establish
the behaviour of the relative costs of both types of capital.
It should be recalled at this point that the demand for
corporate finance is not determined solely by the rates of return
offered on the instruments in question, but also by the returns
offered by alternative sources, both within the corporate sector,
i.e. debt versus equity, and in competition with the corporate
sector, i.e. corporate sector instruments versus government and
\
foreign securities. It is beyond the scope of this study to go 
into the relative behaviour of foreign securities and we have 
already considered the risk premium attached to private over 
public sector debt in section B.3 above. The behaviour of the 
relative cost of debt and equity is thus considered in more 
detail below in am attempt to see whether this can help explain 
recent behaviour in gearing ratios.
B.5 Risk Premium: Debt versus Equity
As indicated in the introduction, equities pay a premium 
over debt holdings because their returns are relatively more 
risky. This measure of the risk premium could also be inter­
preted as indicating the difference between safer and more risky 
assets, i.e. as an indicator of the magnitude of the risk premium
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from the investors point of view. As mentioned above, we could 
expect risk premia to move counter-cyclically, falling in periods 
of stability and growth, and rising in recessionary periods. We 
have also shown why we would predict gearing ratios to move 
counter-cyclically. We should therefore expect gearing ratios 
and risk premia to move together. We saw above, however, that 
the counter-cyclicality of gearing ratios no longer appears to 
hold. We also found this to be the case for the risk premia 
between the cost of public and private sector debt. We now 
examine whether this is also true of the debt-equity risk 
premium.
Attempts to measure this value should be treated with 
extreme caution and only be interpreted as a very rough indicator 
of the relative cost of capital, not an accurate measure. The 
measure of the cost of debt used above is unlikely to be an 
entirely accurate measure of the true cost of debt, and although 
the return on equity measure calculated is probably more accurate 
than more commonly used measures of equity yield given by 
dividends divided by share price, it is probably not an entirely 
accurate measure of the true cost of equity either. We must 
presume a fairly large margin of error in the results presented 
in chart IV.7.
The series indicate that debt-equity yield differentials 
have been significantly negative over the period in question, 
except during the early 1980s in France. This supports theoreti-
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cal assumptions. We saw in chapter III that although there exist 
many different models concerning the cost of capital to the firm, 
it is generally agreed that the cost of equity to the firm 
exceeds the cost of debt.
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Over the period the yield differential has been largest in 
Germany, where high corporate gearing was also to be witnessed. 
German financial markets are relatively underdeveloped and highly 
regulated. Here, equity is scarcer with a significantly higher 
required rate of return. The risk premium in the UK, where 
financial markets were more highly developed and the use of 
equity more widespread, was also high until the late 1970s. It 
subsequently fell sharply during a time in which strong liberal­
isation of the UK markets got under way. As liberalisation in 
the other countries begem to catch up and internationalisation
of financial transactions increased, risk premia in the UK 
started to rise again in the mid-1980s.
French risk premia were persistently the smallest until the 
mid-1980s. The continued increase in gearing in France over the 
period is hence puzzling, especially in the early 1980s when the 
differential appears to have even reversed itself, with the real 
cost of debt exceeding the cost of equity in certain years - if 
the data is to be believed.
In general, the gap between the cost of equity and debt 
would appear to have fallen after the late 1970s before beginning 
to rise in the early 1980s, i.e. the relative cost of debt with 
respect to equity rose and then fell after the early 1980s. 
With the exception of Japan, gearing ratios have, however, 
displayed an upward trend throughout the period. There does not, 
therefore, appear to be a clear cut relationship between debt- 
equity yield differentials and gearing ratios.
The lack of concord between the movements of gearing ratios 
and the relative cost of capital may of course be due to problems 
with the measurements used, so it is perhaps unwise to put too 
much reliance on this evidence.
We turn our attention now to the relationship between 
gearing and what is, according to the theory, its most important 
determinant: the average cost of capital.
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B.6 Cost of Capital
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When deciding how to finance a desired amount of investment, 
it is presumed that managers attempt to obtain finance at the 
lowest possible cost, subject to the risk attached to the 
available instruments. In the previous section substitution 
effects associated with the relative cost of capital were 
considered. We now turn our attention to considering income 
effects associated with the behaviour of the average cost of 
capital faced by the corporate sector.
In this study we have limited the analysis to the considera­
tion of two broad categories of corporate financial instrument: 
debt and equity. The cost of finance to the corporate sector 
must then be a weighted average of the two, i.e:
C = [ (D / D+E) * rD] + [(E / E+D) * rE]
where D and rD are the stock of debt and returns to debt, and E 
and rB equity stock and returns. At a microeconomic level in 
perfect markets with no tax, transactions or bankruptcy costs 
etc., this measure could be calculated directly. However, in the 
real, non-perfect world many of these costs are not observable, 
and the measure must be estimated in some other way. A similar 
method can be adopted to the one used above to calculate the real 
cost of equity to the corporate sector. We have calculated the
profitability of corporate financial capital by measuring net 
profits after tax divided by stocks of both debt and equity. 
This indicator of the cost of finance is presented in chart IV.8 
below.
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IV.8 Cost of Capital
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The cost of capital has been highest in the United Kingdom, 
slightly exceeding the measure in Germany. BACH data for the 
USA also indicates a very high cost of capital7. The cost of 
capital in France was lowest over the period/ and even negative 
in 1975 and 1982, until significantly increasing after 1985 and 
becoming one of the highest. Rates have significantly increased 
everywhere since the early 1980s in line with higher real
7 See footnote 2 in chapter II for reasons why the level 
of the OECD ratio is much lower than the BACH ratios, and not 
strictly comparable.
interest rates, except in Japan where rates are now the lowest 
in the group and well below rates experienced in the late 1970s. 
Over the period as a whole, there has been much fluctuation in 
rates but no clear time trends emerging.
According to standard financial theory, the optimal gearing 
ratio occurs where the weighted average cost of capital is at a 
minimum point. In a static setting, once the optimal gearing 
ratio has been exceeded, two implications of further increases 
in gearing ratios arise immediately - rising average cost of 
capital faced by the firm, and an increase in the risk of 
default.
Before the minimum point on the cost of capital curve is 
reached, this need not necessarily be the case, however. Up to 
a certain point increases in gearing are likely to be associated 
with a fall in the average cost of capital. In the downward 
sloping region of the curve, debt is relatively less costly than 
equity, and increasing the proportion of debt in the financial 
structure brings down the average cost of capital. Indeed, 
increasing debt issues may not even cause the gearing ratio to 
rise at all if the funds so obtained are sufficiently profitably 
invested. The returns on new investments may be so great as to 
cause the value of the firm to rise sufficiently that the gearing 
ratio does not rise and may even fall. If the increased debt 
obtained is invested in such a way as to improve the value of the 
firm's assets or net worth, for example, the burden of debt need
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not even rise in which case the risk of default would not be any 
higher than before. Hence when examining the implications of 
rising gearing ratios, it is important to try and establish in 
which section of the cost of capital curve the movement takes 
place.
In an inter-temporal setting, we saw above that the curve 
itself may shift. Movements along and off the curve could have 
quite different inplications, and an attempt should be made to 
distinguish between the two by examining the relationship between 
the cost of capital and the gearing ratio.
During the period under consideration, with the exception 
of Japan where the average cost of capital has fluctuated around 
2% since recovering from its trough in 1975, the minimum average 
cost of capital appears to have occurred in 1981-82 in the 
countries considered. A rising gearing ratio up until 1982 would 
be predicted in line with a falling weighted average cost of 
capital. During the 1980s, however, the cost of capital has 
generally been increasing, but so have gearing ratios, as noted 
in chapter II. We thus have two possible outcomes: either there 
has been a movement away from optimal gearing and into the upward 
sloping area of the curve; or the curve itself has shifted 
outwards. In the latter case, the levels of gearing could still 
be optimal, but at a higher level. In the former case, however, 
exceeding the optimal gearing ratio implies there has been an 
increase in the risk of default.
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Increasing default risk may lead to bankruptcy. Indeed, it 
is precisely since the early 1980s that most concern about the 
indebtedness of the corporate sector has been expressed. Total 
bankruptcies in the countries under consideration are outlined 
in table 1. Comparison of the absolute numbers is not recom­
mended because of differences in sectoral definition and the 
definition of bankruptcy. It is, however, worth considering the 
growth of these numbers as an indicator of trends in bankrupt­
cies. Index numbers are thus also presented. The turning point 
of the last recession occurred on average in 1982 in the 
countries studied according to measures of industrial production 
and the volume of GDP growth. This year was thus selected as the 
index base.
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Table 1 BANKRUPTCIES 
A. Numbers
Germany France UK Japan USA
-1970 2069 2702 10748
1975 5398 2898 11432
1977 4112
1980 2122 5147 6890 3203 11742
1981 6303 8596 2974 16794
1982 3433 5955 12067 3092 24908
1983 3226 6475 13406 3284 31334
1984 3259 7146 13721 3455 52078
1985 3653 7137 14898 3043 57078
1986 3461 7051 14405 3217 61616
1987 3160 7707 11439 2395 61111
B. Index 1982=100
Germany France UK Japan USA
1970 60 87 43
1975 45 94 46
1977 69
1980 62 86 57 104 47
1981 106 71 96 67
1982 100 100 100 100 100
1983 94 109 111 106 126
1984 95 120 114 112 209
1985 106 120 123 98 229
1986 101 118 119 104 247
1987 92 129 95 77 245
Sources :
Germany - companies, Statistiches Jahrbuch; France - commerce, 
INS EE; UK - companies, CSO; Japan - manufacturing, Japan 
Statistical Yearbook; USA - industrial and commercial companies, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
The countries displaying the biggest increases in the cost 
of capital since 1982 - US and France - are also those that have 
displayed the biggest increase in corporate bankruptcies. The 
cost of capital in the UK has also risen strongly, beginning
somewhat before 1982: again a correspondingly large increase in
numbers of bankruptcies is to be witnessed when a longer time
period is considered. There is however a break in the UK series
in 1986. The Insolvency Act of that year introduced legislation
allowing the appointment of administrators to firms in financial
difficulties to hold off creditors. This could both delay
insolvencies, and reduce them permanently as companies are given
the time and the possibility of reorganisation. Recent reforms
in the US have also lessened the likelihood of bankruptcy,
allowing firms facing financial difficulties to file for
\
protection from creditors under chapter 21 for example. 
Moreover, the US data prior to 1984 exclude agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, finance, insurance and real estate, and services. 
They are therefore not strictly comparable with data for 1984 and 
later which are based on a larger sample. The rate of growth 
between 1983 and 1984 has been significantly overstated.
In Japan and Germany where the cost of capital in the 1980s 
is not particularly high compared to past experience, there has 
been no significant increase in bankruptcies over the period. 
In perfect frictionless markets, bankruptcy should simply lead 
to a transfer of ownership to bondholders without entailing any 
costs. However, it is likely that costs are involved in reality, 
and redistribution is not neutral but has damaging real effects. 
Thus a possible consequence of increasing gearing (above optimal 
levels) in the corporate sector and the subsequent rise in the
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risk of default is a loss of welfare.
If, on the other hand, gearing ratios have risen as a 
consequence of less binding liquidity constraints, default risk 
need not necessarily have increased. Since the late 1970s, there 
has been a marked trend towards improved competition, deregula­
tion and innovation in the capital markets. The private sector 
has enjoyed greater access to credit as financial markets have 
been liberalised and a greater amount of debt is available for 
a given rate of return.
Financial liberalisation is likely to have been accompanied 
by changes in required rates of return as perceived risk could 
well have changed, actual risk has been transferred and risks on 
new instruments and existing instruments in new circumstances are 
not yet known. Increasing numbers of bankruptcies also accom­
panying financial liberalisation suggest the risk of default has 
increased. A study of precisely which companies are going 
bankrupt could yield important insights into this question. For 
example, if the majority of bankruptcies relate to smaller 
companies who are not very active in the financially liberalised 
markets and defaulting rather on loans from more traditional 
sources such as banks, then we could not necessarily conclude 
that financial liberalisation brings about an increase in the 
risk of default. However, we do not unfortunately have a 
breakdown of bankruptcies by size.
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In the countries where the process of financial liberalis-
ation has been the fastest and most wide-ranging - the US and the 
UK - the cost of capital has been both highest and increasing at 
the fastest rate (chart IV.8). Very significant steps have been 
taken in the French financial markets in recent years towards the 
UK and US systems and, after a slow start, cost of capital has 
also been rising very rapidly in France in the last few years. 
In Germany and Japan, however, where the liberalisation process 
has been more hesitant the cost of capital during the 1980s has 
also been rising in the case of Germany while falling in Japan. 
Again behaviour in Japan differs from behaviour in the other 
countries in the sample.
In theory the return on financial capital to the firm should 
be equal to the return on physical capital, at least at the 
margin. Physical investment is carried out until the returns 
earned are equal to capital market returns. The returns on 
physical and financial capital should hence tend towards 
equality. Thus returns on physical investment are a way of 
proxying the cost of financial capital to the firm.
Divergences between these two measures are an important 
indicator of the incentive to (dis)invest. Clearly, if returns 
to investment exceed the cost of investment there is an incentive 
to invest and vice-versa. Given our interest in the relationship 
between gearing and investment, in chart IV.9 we have produced 
an alternative measure of the cost of capital to the firm: the
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rate of return on invested capital®. The time paths of the two 
measures behave in a very similar way. The figures for the 
French corporate sector are again the lowest and displaying 
slightly negative rates in 1975 and 1982. The rates in the USA 
are the highest, and rates in the other countries follow the same 
ranking as before. The only real difference is that the rate of 
return on physical capital generally exceeded the cost of 
financial capital over the period. However, where the denominat­
or of the first measure of the cost of capital comprised total 
financial capital available, in the second measure it comprises%
only invested capital e.g. it is net of corporate investment in 
marketable securities, cash etc. Return on invested capital 
could thus be expected to exceed the cost of financial capital.
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• Profits net of taxes divided by the stock of physical 
capital.
IV. 9 Return on Invested Capital
183
Source: BACH, Commission of the European Communities, OECD
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Comparison of these two rates is the basis for Tobin's 'q'. 
However, Tobin's valuation ratio compares return on investment 
as calculated by the profitability of the physical capital stock 
measured at replacement cost to the profitability of the 
financial capital stock, i.e. debt plus equity, but this time 
measured at market values. In order to make cross-country inter­
temporal comparisons possible we have been obliged to use the 
BACH data bank in which all measures are at book values.
Calculation of a ratio along the lines of 'q' would 
therefore probably be significantly overvalued since financial 
securities are constantly being revalued through replacement
after expiry, roll-overs, and issues, whereas the physical 
capital stock is rarely revalued, if at all. Chan-Lee (1986), 
for example, finds that although values of 'q' in the countries 
under consideration have indeed been rising over the period, they 
are still below one.
It would probably be very unwise for us to compare our book 
value measures of cost of capital and return on investment and 
try and draw any valid conclusions concerning incentives to 
invest. We can, however, make some predictions concerning the 
relationship between the cost of capital (according to either of 
the measures provided above) and investment.
We could expect the two troughs witnessed in the mid-1970s 
and the early 1980s in the cost of capital to be followed by a 
pick up in the level of investment. There is indeed some 
evidence of this although investment has declined over the period 
in general.
Empirical evidence indicates that real interest rates were 
low and often even negative during the recessionary periods in 
the 1970s. They have increased considerably since the beginning 
of the period of growth in the early 1980s and are now histori­
cally high. At the same time, corporate sector investment has 
generally been in decline over the period, with the exception of 
Japan where it has picked up markedly since the mid-1970s. We 
also saw that there was a general increase in gearing ratios 
throughout the 1970s, which continued during the 1980s (with the
184
exception of the Japanese corporate sector gearing ratios which 
have been falling steadily over the past twenty years). Hence, 
either the relationship between gearing ratios and rates of 
return has broken down during the past decade, or other factors 
have begun to outweigh them as determinants of financial 
structure. We thus now look at some further determinants of 
corporate financial structure before investigating the gearing- 
interest rate link further.
A major determinant to be considered here is inflation.
C INFLATION
Inflation erodes the real burden of outstanding debt fixed 
in nominal terms. The greater the proportion of corporate debt 
that is fixed rate, the stronger the effect will be. At the same 
time, price uncertainty increases the marginal cost of debt, but 
tends to reduce average costs through boosting the market value 
of equity. In a period of high inflation and especially when 
there are expectations of continuing inflation, if increases in 
the marginal cost of debt are exceeded by reductions in the real 
burden of outstanding fixed rate debt, companies should prefer 
debt financing to equity and hence try to increase their gearing 
ratios. Furthermore, in the presence of inflation the bias 
towards encouraging the use of debt as opposed to equity
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engendered by the tax system increases since taxes are levied on 
nominal amounts.
During the 1970s gearing rates rose in a period of high 
inflation, suggesting that reductions in the average cost of debt 
and increases in the value of equity did indeed dominate any 
potential increases in the marginal cost of debt.
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High rates of inflation experienced in the mid and late 
1970s have not however been followed by falling gearing ratios. 
It would appear that inflationary advantages have outweighed the 
disadvantages with regard to corporate debt. These conclusions 
may be reinforced if we consider the behaviour of market interest 
rates further.
The monetary authorities may choose to manipulate interest 
rate movements to meet policy objectives other than anti- 
inflationary, for example exchange rates. In this case, short 
term interest rates set by the authorities could be insensitive 
to inflation. Or rates might not be raised immediately to curb
inflation if it is only considered to be transitory. An increase 
in inflation could then bring about a fall in the real rate of 
interest. In section B above, we saw that during the 1970s 
rising inflation was indeed accompanied by falling real interest 
rates, which even became negative at times as unanticipated 
inflation rose sharply as a result of the oil shocks. In the 
late 1970s, however, a shift towards monetary targeting using 
interest rates occurred, and nominal rates were increased to 
bring inflation under control, causing real interest rates to 
rise sharply.
The mark-up of corporate debt over risk-free public sector 
debt rose during the 1970s. Although this mark-up is affected 
mainly by the credit risks associated with corporate debt as 
opposed to public sector debt, in the face of high inflation 
credit risks associated with the corporate sector may seem even 
greater if for example a hike in interest rates by the monetary 
authorities is feared. Increases in the marginal cost of debt 
and in the mark-up of corporate sector over public sector debt 
would appear to have been offset by reductions in the average 
burden of debt during this period. Since the early 1980s, 
however, with real interest rates rising as inflation fell 
gearing ratios have continued to increase. It would appear that 
higher average cost of corporate debt is now being offset by 
lower marginal costs and/or lower mark-ups. We saw, however, 
that both the real cost of risk-free debt and the mark-up of
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corporate over public sector debt appears have continued to rise 
during the 1980s. Low inflation in the 1980s has not been accom­
panied by a fall in the real cost of corporate debt.
An increase in the real rate of interest should discourage 
borrowing, reducing the funds available for investment. In this 
case, potentially profitable new investments may not be carried 
out, and outstanding projects may be delayed or abandoned. 
Corporate profits would then fall. However, rising real rates 
of return caused by falling inflation, although contractionary 
to the corporate sector, should cause a transfer of income from 
the corporate sector to households. At the same time, high real 
rates of return are likely to encourage households to save a 
greater proportion of present income along with the new increased 
income, thereby postponing consumption. Moreover, households 
also carry debt. Chart II.6 in chapter II shows household debt 
to have risen steadily in all the countries studied over the past 
two decades. The depressing effects of higher rates of return 
on household debtors will to a certain extent offset the 
expansionary effects of the higher incomes enjoyed by creditor 
households. The greater the burden of household debt, the 
greater the offsetting effects will be. The net overall effect 
on aggregate demand will depend on the magnitude of the interest 
elasticity of investment versus that of the marginal propensity 
to consume. Boutillier and Villa (1985) found that in France, 
for exanple, during the early 1980s the reduction in profitabi­
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lity and investment of the corporate sector exceeded the increase 
in consumption on the part of households. The overall effects 
of rising real interest rates were contractionary in this case. 
They would also appear to have been in the other countries where 
investment as a proportion of GDP continued to fall during the 
1980s, with the exception of Japan.
Where rising real interest rates adversely affect corporate 
profitability sufficiently, a fall in the market value of equity 
may arise, absent any new issues or redemptions of debt or 
equity. Moreover, managers are likely to prefer not to issue 
equity from a position of low or falling profits if they wish to 
avoid the issue being undervalued. In the presence of increas­
ing real interest rates, the real burden of debt rises while the 
value of equity remains the same or falls, other things remaining 
unchanged. This may help explain the continued rise in the 
gearing ratio that has been observed during the 1980s in studies 
using market value data (Bank of International Settlements, 1986: 
p 198) . Later studies (Davis 1987? Borio 1990) have however 
found market value gearing ratios to have fallen in the 1980s, 
despite increases in the use of debt, thanks to sharp increases 
in equity values accompanying a strong upturn in economic 
activity.
However, we have seen that book value gearing ratios have 
continued to rise over this period. On bonds which offer a fixed 
return, as the real interest rate rises the price of new bonds
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must fall in order to raise their real yield if a given supply 
is to be placed. The real cost of new fixed rate borrowing will 
also rise in the face of higher real interest rates. Where 
outstanding debt is variable rate, it is the outstanding burden 
to the firm that is likely to rise. In the longer term, when 
fixed rate debts have either to be rolled over or replaced, 
higher required rates of return apply to an increasing proportion 
of the debt stock.
Thus although desired gearing ratios may have fallen since 
the late 1970s in the face of high required rates of return, 
actual gearing rates have continued to rise.
Malinvaud (1986) suggests that desired gearing ratios in 
Europe did indeed fall during the recession of the early 1980s. 
A slow down in the rate of growth of European corporate profita­
bility beginning in the early 1970s - a trend which accelerated 
in the early 1980s - was accompanied by a general increase in 
the indebtedness of the European corporate sector. The corporate 
sector relied increasingly on debt finance due to the very low 
and at times even negative real rates of interest prevailing 
during the 1970s. The financial situation of the corporate 
sector subsequently began to appear rather precarious, as 
evidenced by a spate of bankruptcies caused by collapsing stock 
prices following the oil shocks in the mid and late 1970s. 
Furthermore, by the early 1980s real rates of interest were 
increasing fast. The decline in profitability of the corporate
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sector meant that the share of value added going to service debts 
was increasing, while, at the same time, increasing real interest 
rates were causing the burden of debt to weigh more heavily on 
the firm. Thus the actual burden of debt was exceeding desired 
debt levels, leading to a slow down in output, and hence in 
employment and national income. So although actual gearing 
ratios have continued to increase despite falling inflation and 
high real interest rates, desired gearing ratios have probably 
fallen since the late 1970s.
Widespread and largely successful anti-inflation policy
\
experienced in the countries under consideration during the 1980s 
should have made the use of debt less attractive to the corporate 
sector. Since that time, however, falling inflation in the major 
economies has not been accompanied by a general reduction in 
corporate gearing ratios, except in Japan.
So although the behaviour of inflation and average and 
relative real cost of debt helps explain observed differences 
between countries in gearing ratios, these determinants do not 
seem sufficient to explain recent trends in financial structure.
Other determinants of the rises in gearing ratios during a 
period of generally falling inflation rates and high real 
interest rates must be sought (see e.g. Volcker 1986). A sig­
nificant factor in the development of these trends would appear 
to be the recent changes in financial markets - financial 
innovation, deregulation and international financial market
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integration (Atkinson and Chouraqui 1986, Hodder 1988).
D FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
Innovation has led to the supply of a whole new range of 
financial instruments with a wide variety of characteristics: 
liquidity may have eased and perceived risk fallen. Increased 
efficiency, competitive forces and deregulation may have caused 
the cost of debt to fall. Lack of experience in pricing existing 
instruments in new conditions, and new instruments could well 
however, result in mispricing. Risk could be underestimated with 
insufficient returns demanded, or it could be overestimated 
driving yields up.
Increased use of debt by the corporate sector of the 
countries studied suggests that the availability of debt has 
indeed increased in the wake of financial liberalisation. The 
cost of debt, however, would also aappear to have risen over the 
past decade. Interest rates rose sharply in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s as the monetary authorities brought inflation under 
control, pushing up real required rates of return on all debts.
Since that time, despite significant falls in the rate'of 
inflation, real rates of return have remained historically high. 
Introduction of low grade high risk debt such as junk bonds will 
have increased average yields and the uncertainty in financial
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markets surrounding the whole process may also help explain the 
historically high real interest rates that have accompanied the 
opening-up of financial markets. Although there have been major 
regulatory changes in the financial markets of all the countries 
studied, the US markets and institutions have played a pioneering 
role in many of the innovations allowing increased debt. 
Moreover, although most of the new instruments are traded to a 
certain degree in the majority of financial centres, the US and 
the UK are the principal locations of the international market 
places and the domestic markets have been strongly influenced by 
developments as a result (Bank for International Settlements, 
1986) . Rates of return and risk premia in the US and the UK 
where the degree of financial liberalisation has been the highest 
in the sample under consideration have tended to be higher than 
in the other countries, at least in the earlier stages of the 
process. In France, where significant steps towards the US and 
UK financial systems have been taken recently there has also been 
a rapid increase in the cost of capital. We saw in the previous 
chapter that we would expect financial liberalisation to help 
bring down the cost of capital. This suggests that risk is being 
overes t imat ed.
Mispricing of new instruments, or of existing instruments 
in new conditions, is unlikely to last beyond the short term. 
If required rates of return are too high, competitive forces will 
soon shave margins removing excessive yields. On the other hand,
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if risk is underestimated, once financial difficulties and even 
defaults occur, required rates of return will soon rise9. If 
these high rates persist, their negative consequences on 
investment and production could be severe and a long run 
reduction in productive capacity is a serious possibility. The 
possible costs involved with increasing financial liberalisation 
are thus far from trivial.
In the previous chapter we saw that financial liberalisation 
may have a number of important implications for corporate finance 
and investment. We also saw how financial liberalisation and the 
consequent financial behaviour of corporations could impinge on 
the authorities room for manoeuvre in setting monetary policy.
In the next chapter we attempt to estimate some simple 
models of the determination of corporate gearing ratios, and 
carry out some tests of the relationship between gearing and 
investment, and monetary policy.
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9 This appears to be happening in the UK property market 
at the moment. In the late 1980s, lending for construction and 
house purchase grew very rapidly. Since the subsequent collapse, 
much higher rates of return have been demanded on lending, more 
stringent checks of creditworthiness have been carried out, and 
stricter controls have been imposed. For example during the boom 
households could borrow up to 100% of value of property they 
wished to purchase; this is no longer possible as lenders are 
concerned that collateral values remain sufficient in the face 
of falling prices.
V EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
In this chapter some very simple empirical tests of ideas 
discussed previously have been carried out. The following 
avenues were explored: firstly a general equation explaining
movements in gearing ratios using pooled time series data from 
all five countries was estimated; separate gearing equations were 
then estimated for each of the countries individually; a brief 
examination of the relationship between gearing and interest 
rates was carried out; and finally the relationship between 
gearing and investment was considered. We begin with a presenta­
tion of the gearing equations estimated.
A THE DETERMINATION OF CORPORATE SECTOR GEARING RATIOS
The data set available for carrying out empirical estimation 
is extremely limited. For the purposes of meaningful interna­
tional comparison the analysis in the earlier part of the paper 
relied mainly on information contained in the BACH data bank 
rather than more copious series culled from a variety of 
disparate sources. The first observations in the bank date from 
1971, so analysis of long periods of time covering a number of 
cycles is precluded. Moreover, the data is only annual, further 
limiting the number of observations available for study. It was 
thus not possible to estimate valid long-run equations and the 
results presented here must be treated with caution.
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The data sets for the various countries cover slightly 
different time periods. Once leads and lags are used, the number 
of observations common to all countries is very restricted 
indeed. Panel data analysis would appear a useful avenue to 
explore in this case with pooling the time series of the five 
countries studied here greatly increasing the degrees of freedom 
available for estimation. (See eg Hsaio (1992) for an extremely 
useful textbook on panel data analysis). However, earlier in this 
thesis we saw that patterns of corporate sector behaviour in the 
countries studied here have greatly differing characteristics, 
suggesting that a general model might not be the most suitable 
approach to this problem. In fact, estimating a satisfactory 
general equation using the pooled data proved far from straight­
forward, and the results generated were very difficult to 
interpret. Although the panel data results are reported below for 
the sake of completeness, in this section we concentrate on 
estimation on a country-by-country basis.
We have seen that the potential determinants of gearing 
ratios are many and varied. Moreover, many of these determinants 
e.g. those involving asymmetric information, agency and signall­
ing costs etc. are not easily quantifiable. Given this and the 
data problems mentioned above, it was decided to keep the model 
as simple as possible.
Throughout this study we have been interested in trends in 
corporate gearing ratios over time and across countries. 
Attempts were thus made to estimate a very simple model of the 
major influences explaining the determination of the gearing 
ratio.
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Achieving a desired financial structure is unlikely to occur 
instantaneously. It takes time to make new issues, redemptions 
etc. and partial adjustment was therefore presumed. Thus lagged 
variables were included, both dependent and exogenous to the 
model. However, given that we are only using annual data, 
adjustment could take place within one time period and lags might 
not necessarily be significant.
In the absence of fiscal changes, movements in gearing 
ratios in the countries in question were considered to be driven 
mainly by average and relative real cost of capital, inflation 
and financial liberalisation.
Average cost of capital is given by weighting the rate of 
return on debt and equity by the proportion of each in the 
financial structure. However, it is not possible to directly 
calculate the weighted average cost of capital to the corporate 
sector at the aggregate level. An alternative indicator of the 
cost of finance at the aggregate level was presented in the 
previous chapter: profitability of financial capital calculated 
by dividing net after tax profits by total liabilities.
A measure of the cost of debt relative to equity posed a 
problem. In chapter IV, we saw that it is very difficult to 
accurately measure the cost to the firm of either of these 
instruments. The potential errors included in any attempt to 
calculate the relative cost of capital directly could thus be so 
large as to render any measure derived meaningless. Inclusion 
of terms for both debt and equity yields would have led to 
problems of col linearity. Thus only the debt yields were 
included. In the partial adjustment model used here, the
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coefficient of the return on debt element is an indicator of the 
influence this variable has when all other determinants remain 
unchanged. Movements in the relative cost of capital thus enter 
the regressions implicitly as the return on debt varies in 
relation to the other fixed determinants.
If equity is not seen as an alternative source of finance 
to debt the relative cost of capital should be irrelevant to 
financial decision making. In countries with limited access to 
equity and relatively high gearing ratios e.g. Germany and Japan, 
substitution effects may have only a small role to play in 
corporate financial decision making. The variable used to 
capture this effect may not thus be large in all countries. 
Where it is significant, we would expect the gearing ratio to 
rise as the cost of debt relative to other sources of finance 
falls and have a negative coefficient.
A variable to test for income effects was also included. 
In the graphical analysis presented in chapter IV no relationship 
between gearing and average cost of capital was to be discerned. 
Previous attempts at empirical estimation of the relationship 
between gearing and cost of capital were also unable to find a 
relationship between cost of capital and gearing ratios (Coates 
and Woolley, 1975; National Economic Development Office 1975). 
The determinant was nevertheless initially included in the 
general model because of its theoretical importance.
We saw that the financial liberalisation process may have 
brought about changes in both the availability of credit, and the 
cost of corporate debt. Deregulation and innovation are likely 
to have helped both broaden access and increase the supply of
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credit. Increased supply could be another factor behind the rise 
in the use of credit. It is difficult to find variables 
adequately capturing financial liberalisation. In the UK, recent 
studies have used numbers of current accounts, numbers of credit 
cards and numbers of automated teller machines (ATMs) to measure 
financial innovation1. These innovations relate more to in­
dividuals than the corporate sector, with credit cards offering 
alternative means of payment, interest bearing current accounts 
and more price competitive liquid deposit accounts offering 
incentives for individuals to use bank accounts, and ATMs 
improving efficiency in cash holdings. For the corporate sector, 
given a lack of similar data, a time trend was included to 
capture this aspect of the effects of liberalisation on corporate 
gearing ratios.
Dummies were also used representing specific events such as 
'Big Bang* in the London stock market in 1986. This saw the 
abolition on minimum commission helping reduce the cost of 
finance. At the same time new instruments ««ere introduced into 
the market such as commercial paper, options and swaps. As a 
result, UK companies had access both to more sources of credit, 
and the possibility of hedging interest rate risks more effec­
tively, encouraging the use of more debt.
Finally, capturing the effects of liberalisation via its 
influence on the risk premium «»ere also considered. We saw in 
chapter IV that the premium has tended to be highest in the
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1 See e.g. Hoggarth, G. and Pill, H. (1992), 'The Demand 
for MO Revisited,' Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. Vol 32, No 3, pp 305-313.
countries enjoying the greatest degree of financial liberali­
sation, i.e. the US and the UK. Uncertainty accompanying 
deregulation and innovation, and greater speculative, destabiliz­
ing behaviour could thus have driven risk premia and the cost of 
corporate debt up.
On the other hand, financial liberalisation may also have 
exerted downward pressure on corporate debt yields through 
increasing competition, innovation and as a result of deregula­
tion. More efficient competitive markets should bring ab o u t 
reductions in arbitrage gains, reducing variance and spreads and 
hence risk premia.
Thus although financial liberalisation is likely to have 
affected the return required on corporate debt via its effects 
on the risk premium, it is impossible to gauge the overall effect 
on purely theoretical grounds, and hence to state a priori the 
sign of the coefficient on this variable.
A simple model of the following form was estimated:
T TGt = a + Z b_Gt-. + E C.REALP,-. + d PREMIUM» n=l n=0
T T+ Z e.C0Kt-„ + £ f.CPIINFt- + g TREND + e* n=0 n=0
where:
Gt = gearing ratio as measured by total debt as a
proportion of total liabilities at time t;
REALP = real return on corporate debt (rate of return on 
long-term private sector bonds minus the rate of inflation);
PREMIUM * rate of return on long-term government securities
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less the rate of return on long-term corporate sector bonds;
COK = average cost of capital;
CPUNF = annual rate of increase in the consumer price 
index;
TREND * time trend.
The following results were generated (t statistics in 
parentheses; the F statistic is to test the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of all explanatory variables are jointly equal to 
zero):
POOLED EQUATION
Gt = 0.009 + 1.254 Gt-i - 0.301 Gt., + 0.003 REALP*(0.55) (9.39) (-2.32) (2.44)
+ 0.007 PREMIUM* ♦ 0.002 CPIINF, +0.0002 TREND*
(1.80) (2.19) (1.26)
R* * 0.99, le m 0.99, DW = 1.93, F(6,65) * 1449.39,SER = 0.016
The term included for the cost of capital did not prove 
statistically significant and was eliminated at an early stage 
in the testing down procedure. This supports earlier observations 
concerning the apparent lack of a relationship between gearing
and the cost of capital, and work by other authors unable to find
any meaningful empirical relationship between these two vari­
ables.
Although the cost of debt and inflation are statistically 
significant determinants of the gearing ratio, the coefficient
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on the term for the real cost of debt is positive and does not 
accord with theoretical priors. This suggests that rising gearing 
ratios have been associated with an increase in the relative cost 
of debt. This could be evidence of a financial liberalisation 
effect, where uncertainty surrounding the process has driven up 
the cost of credit. However, it could also be evidence of an 
excess demand for credit in the face of rationing, or may be 
indicating that financial structure is independent of the cost 
of debt. Interpretation of this coefficient is far from easy in 
a pooled equation based on corporate sectors in countries with 
very differing characteristics.
It is disappointing to note that the two terms included to 
capture the effects of financial liberalisation - the risk 
premium and the time trend - are not statistically significant. 
Dropping these terms, however, causes the equation to collapse. 
Evidence of the role of financial liberalisation is thus at best 
very weak in the above equation. This is not surprising given the 
different degrees to which this process has occurred in the 
various countries studied, and the differing effects it may have 
had.
Clearly, it is very difficult to interpret the panel data 
equation described above. An individual country-by-country 
analysis would thus appear a more valid approach to the problem 
in hand. The latter strategy is adopted for the rest of this 
section.
The general model described above was tested using the data 
from each country separately. Where it proved impossible to 
achieve a meaningful specific model containing (at least some of)
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the above variables, the general model was respecified using 
alternative determinants and the testing down procedure carried 
out a second time.
Although statistically significant in the pooled equation, 
we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that inflation 
alone does not influence gearing ratios in any of the countries 
studied except the USA. Once the term in CPIINF was dropped, 
however, real interest rates were not found to play a statisti­
cally significant role anywhere except France. In chapter IV we 
saw it is possible that nominal interest rates could have a 
direct influence on financial behaviour. This is particularly 
so in countries with a high rate of inflation and price and
expectations uncertainty. Nominal interest rates were thus
included in the regressions in the place of real interest rates 
where the latter did not prove significant.
The following results were obtained:
GERMANY. 1972-67
Gt = -0.11 - 0.029 COKt + 0.010 PREMIUM, + 0.078 LN(P R O F IT)t(-1.76)(-14.02) (2.17) (14.52)
R* = 0.96, *R* * 0.95, DW * 2.38, F(3,12) « 97.33,
SER * 0.005
where:
COK = cost of capital measured by net profits after tax
as a proportion of total liabilities (see chart IV.8 in chapter
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LN(PROFIT) * (natural log of) net after tax profits.
A lagged terra in gearing was not found to be statistically 
signif icant, even as other potential determinants of gearing were 
added to the equation. It was thus dropped. Lagged values of 
the other determinants did not prove statistically significant 
either, indicating that adjustment to changes in the determinants 
discussed above occurs relatively quickly.
A variety of measures of the rate of return on debt were 
considered. Neither real nor nominal interest rates proved 
statistically significant. A measure of the real return on 
equity was also considered but failed significance tests. In 
Germany, the use of equity to finance activity is low compared 
to the UK and the US, and would not appear to play a major 
alternative role in financing German corporate investment.
Although we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that 
relative cost of capital did not influence gearing ratios over 
the period investigated, average cost of capital did prove highly 
statistically significant, and negatively related to gearing 
ratios as would be expected according to the traditional theory 
of corporate finance.
As the risk premium on corporate bonds over government bonds 
falls and becomes less negative (i.e. increases), we could expect 
the use of debt and thus the gearing ratio to rise. This 
suggests that the coefficient on the risk premium term should be 
negatively signed. However, in the above equation it is positive.
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IV );
Rising gearing ratios in the face of increasing cost of corporate 
debt could be evidence of financial liberalisation as described 
earlier. On the other hand, they may be a consequence of the 
interest rate used to indicate the required rate of return on 
corporate debt. For reasons of international comparability, the 
required return on corporate debt in the various countries 
studied was taken from a single source: Eurostat's yield on long­
term fixed interest corporate sector securities, intended to be 
a representative and comparable measure of the required rate of 
return on corporate sector debt. In the case of Germany, this 
is given by the rate on fixed interest industrial bonds. The 
proportion of funding of the German corporate sector that comes 
from this source is, however, very small compared to long-term 
loans provided by the banks. The rate of interest used may not 
thus be exactly representative of average aggregate corporate 
sector borrowing rates.
A time trend to capture the effects of increased availabil­
ity of credit did not prove statistically significant. On the 
other hand, a strong positive relationship was found between 
profits and gearing. No particular downward trend in the cost 
of capital faced by the German corporate sector was indicated in
4chart IV.8 in chapter IV. The empirical evidence thus appears 
to indicate that rises in German corporate gearing ratios have 
been largely due to strong German corporate profitability.
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FRANCE. 1 972-88
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Gt = 0.10 + 0.87 G,., - 0.005 REALPt + 0.045 DMITT(1.09) (6.85) (-2.64) (4.77)
R2 = 0.91, “R* = 0.89, Durbin's H * -1.95, DW = 2.51,F(3,13) = 41.97, SER = 0.015
where:
REALP = rate of return on long-term private sector bonds 
less the rate of inflation;
DMITT = dummy covering the years 1981-84 during which stop- 
go policies wei;e carried out.
Long-term solution:
G * 0.769 - 0.038 REALP + 0.346 DMITT
It proved very difficult to estimate an equation for France 
because of the many changes in regime over the period considered. 
The high coefficient on the lagged dependent term suggests that 
an equation in changes may be more appropriate: this was found 
impossible to estimate with the data set available. The levels 
equation outlined above was therefore maintained.
Various measures of the return on debt and capital were 
investigated and this time the real return on debt was found to 
be statistically significant. It is negatively signed, as would 
be expected. The dummy intended to capture the stop-go period
and consequent credit explosion during the early years of the 
Mitterrand administration also proved highly statistically 
significant.
JAPAN. 1976-87
ûGt = -0.032 + 0.004 PRIVIR,-! - 0.003 COK«.,(-3.20) (3.09) (-1.83)
RJ = 0.65, » 0.57, DW » 2.96, F(2,9) = 8.35,SER = 0.004
where:
ûGt = G, — Gt-i
Again attempts to estimate an equation involving expected 
determinants of corporate financial behaviour were not par­
ticularly successful. The very short time series severely 
restricted the degrees of freedom available. The above results 
should thus be treated with particular caution.
In the case of Japan, a specification in differences did 
appear more appropriate. Adjustment would thus appear to take 
place relatively slowly in Japan.
The coefficient on nominal interest rates is positive. Low 
and falling nominal Interest rates did not encourage gearing 
ratios to rise in the face of significantly positive real 
interest rates in the 1980s. Over the very short time period 
investigated rising nominal interest rates were associated with
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a falling corporate sector gearing ratio. However, we saw 
earlier that provision of debt is strongly dictated by the 
special relationship between the banks and the corporate sector 
in Japan, and the use of debt may well be largely independent of 
the required rate of return on debt.
Average cost of capital is negatively signed, as would be
expected. But again terms used to capture the influence of 
financial liberalisation did not prove statistically significant.
UK. 1972-86
G, = 0.484 + 0.003 oPRIVIRt - 0.009 PREMIUM*(81.05) (2.14) (-1.94)
+ 0.001 TREND + 0.028 D1986 
(2.63) (3.39)
R2 = 0.79, ~RJ = 0.71, DW = 2.36, F(4,10) = 9.52,
SER = 0.007
where:
D1986 = a dummy to capture the 1986 'Big Bang' in the London 
Stock Exchange.
In the UK there is strong evidence that corporate sector 
financial behaviour has been affected by financial liberalisation 
over the last twenty years: both the time trend and the dummy 
variable were highly statistically significant. This could help 
explain the signs on the coefficients of the remaining variables. 
The change in nominal private sector interest rates is positively 
related to gearing ratios, whilst the risk premium is negatively
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related.
The negative association between debt yields and gearing 
implied by traditional theory would not appear to hold in the UK 
during the period covered by the upheaval resulting from the 
liberalisation process. Increasing gearing ratios occurring as 
a result of increased credit availability may have begun to 
influence the rate of interest required and pushed up the cost 
of capital. Uncertainty surrounding the liberalisation process 
may also have driven up the rate of return required on debtT We 
saw in chapter IV that the risk premium paid by the corporate 
sector appears to have risen in line with financial liberalisa­
tion in the UK. Increased gearing is thus likely to have 
occurred more as a result of increases in the availability of 
credit rather than decreases in cost and risk premium.
USA, 1974-88
Gt = 0.148 + 0.821 Gt-* - 0.005 REALPt + 0.035 PREMIUM»(3.31) (7.76) (4.48) (3.47)
- 0.015 COKt - 0.004 C P IIN F t-i (1.87) (6.23)
R* = 0.95, R5* = 0.93, DW * 1.96, F(5,10) * 38.41, SER = 0.01
The US equation is closest to the general model outlined at 
the start of this section. Terms included for both average and 
relative cost of capital, and Inflation all proved significant. 
And although the time trend did not enter in the preferred 
equation, the risk premium indicator of financial liberalisation
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proved highly statistically significant. It should be noted that 
the coefficients on both the real cost of debt and risk premium 
variables are positively signed, suggesting that gearing ratios 
in the US have risen despite increases in the cost of debt. We 
saw earlier how this might be possible in the presence of 
financial liberalisation.
It must be recalled however that the US results are likely 
to have been distorted by the break in the data occurring in 
1984, after which time the series was based on a larger sample.
Summary
Strong evidence concerning the role of financial 
liberalisation as a determinant of corporate financial behaviour 
appeared in the UK and the USA. In the first three countries 
considered, however, no real evidence of the effects of financial 
liberalisation were to be found.
The role played by the cost of capital also varied between 
countries. Statistical evidence of income effects was to be 
found in Germany, Japan and the USA. The coefficients on the 
average cost of capital terms were all negatively signed as would 
be expected. Substitution effects appeared to be significant 
determinants of corporate sector financial behaviour in all the 
countries studied except Germany. However, in France alone 
relative cost of debt was negatively related to the gearing 
ratio, as the theory would predict. In the remaining three 
countries, the relationship was positive. Financing in the 
Japanese corporate sector is often determined by special
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relationships and could be largely independent of the market cost 
of corporate debt. In the US and the UK, on the other hand, it 
is possible that uncertainty surrounding the financial 
liberalisation process, whilst increasing availability of credit 
also led to an increase in cost of debt. Alternatively, 
increased demand for limited sources of credit may have driven 
up required rates of return. In the UK possible evidence of this 
appears in the positive coefficient on the risk premium. In the 
US, however, the risk premium has fallen as the gearing ratio has 
risen.
The higher returns on debt in the UK may have reined back 
excessive issue of new debt and the increase in the UK gearing 
ratio during the 1980s has thus been much slower than the 
increase in the US corporate gearing ratio. The rate of growth 
of bankruptcies in the UK has also been slower than in the USA 
during this period (see chapter IV.B.6). It is possible that in 
the face of financial liberalisation the yield demanded in the 
US has not always been sufficient to cover the risks associated 
with (new) corporate debt. The growth in US corporate gearing 
in the face of financial liberalisation may thus be less 
sustainable than patterns emerging in the UK and some downward 
adjustment might be expected. The boom in merger and takeover 
activity would appear to be slowing in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and there is indeed evidence in the press of efforts on 
the part of many US companies to reduce gearing ratios.
Fears thus expressed in previous chapters that distortion 
of transmission mechanisms resulting from the financial liberali­
sation process may be leading to a reduction on the part of the
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monetary authorities of their room to manoeuvre in the face of 
rising gearing ratios may have some foundation in the case of the 
US at least, given recent bankruptcy experience. We have thus 
carried out a series of tests examining this relationship.
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B CAUSALITY TESTS: GEARING AND INTEREST RATES
In chapter III.D we saw how it could be possible that 
authorities in countries with highly geared corporate sectors may 
feel constrained in their ability to raise interest rates to 
carried out desired monetary policy. We have thus run a series 
of regressions using Sims' methodology in an attempt to test the 
direction of causality between gearing ratios (G) and interest 
rates (IRS). The interest rates used are the short-term rates 
manipulated by the monetary authorities to indicate monetary 
stance; the gearing ratios are defined as in section A above.
The results reported in section A indicate that long lags 
are generally not appropriate in estimating the determination of 
corporate financial structure. Moreover, we are working with 
only a very restricted data set. Only one lead and one lag were 
hence used in the tests below.
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The results are as follows (t statistics in parentheses):
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Table V.l THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GEARING AND INTEREST RATES
Dependent Variable: Gearing Ratio (Gt)
Germany France Japan UK USA1972-86 1972-87 1976-86 1973-85 1972-87
constant 0.759 
(35.49) 0.655(17.07) 0.673(9.16) 0.514(21.85) 0.438(13.99)
IRSt 0.001 (0.47) 0.002(0.52) 0.3E-03(0.04) 0.001(0.71) 0.4E-0:(0.06)
IRSt.i -0.002 (-0.93) -0.003(-0.78) 0.008(1.25) -0.002(-0.99) -0.005(-0.92)
IRSt.! 0.4E-04 (0.02) 0.011(3.18) 0.007(1.07) -0.5E-03(-0.34) -0.006(-1.24)
Dependent Variable: Short-Term Rate of Interest (IRSt)
Germany France Japan UK USA1972-86 1972-87 1976-86 1973-85 1972-87
constant-29.042 (-0.99)
-22.035(-2.47) 7.309(0.47) -14.584(-0.29) 25.539(3.70)
Gt 297.737 (2.04) 21.472(0.60) -196.645(-1.40) 65.685(0.69)
5.998(0.10)
Gt.i 83.917 (0.83)
53.904
(2.55)
169.832(1.56)
3.918(0.06) -24.345(-0.68)
Gt-, -335.812 (-2.67)
-33.091(-1.37) 27.966(0.26) -17.837(-0.21) -31.078(-0.83)
In the first set of regressions, if interest rates are a 
determinant of gearing ratios but causality is not reversed, the 
coefficients on the lagged terms should be statistically 
significant with those on the lead terms remaining insignificant. 
Should both prove significant, there is evidence of possible dual 
causality.
In the first set of results with gearing as the dependent 
variable, with the exception of the constant terms only one 
determinant proves statistically significant at either the 5% or 
1% levels: according to this methodology, lagged nominal interest 
rates are statistically significant determinants of gearing 
ratios only in France. In no other country is the relationship 
between these two variables in isolation sufficiently strong to 
warrant any statistical conclusions.
The French result is supported by the second set of 
regressions with interest rates as the dependent variable: this 
time it is the lead value of gearing that proves statistically 
significant, while the lagged term in gearing remains insig­
nificant, confirming the results reported of the first set of 
regressions for France.
An interesting result now appears for Germany as well with 
the lagged gearing term proving a statistically significant 
determinant of nominal interest rates. It could thus be that the 
German authorities carry out monetary policy with a strong eye 
to the indebtedness of the corporate sector. The Implications 
of this are potentially important. Following economic and 
monetary union the German budget deficit has grown rapidly to 
finance the costs of unification. Interest rate increases have
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already been necessary to curb inflationary tendencies building 
up in the German economy. The above results imply however that 
unless German corporate gearing falls and the authorities feel 
there is no danger of overburdening the corporate sector, the 
fear of provoking financial distress or bankruptcies may deter 
the authorities from raising interest rates sufficiently to curb 
these tendencies. If this is indeed the case, the German Mark 
may no longer be the safe low inflation currency of the past. 
Given the pre-eminence of the DMark in Europe, German inflation 
could quickly spread to the remaining ERM countries. According 
to this scenario, the capacity of European governments to achieve 
domestic policy objectives and the credibility of the ERM 
mechanism itself could be severely damaged as a consequence of 
rising German corporate sector indebtedness.
However, the above scenario does not seem very likely given 
the Bundesbank's strongly credible anti-inflationary policy and 
historical behaviour. There may be other reasons for this 
result. We saw in section A that German corporate gearing ratios 
are strongly determined by profits. A cyclical upswing engenders 
inflationary tendencies only with a lag, however, following which 
required nominal rates of return begin to rise to maintain real 
returns and/or the authorities raise nominal interest rates to 
curb inflation. The reverse holds in a recession: falling
interest rates follow falling profits and thus gearing ratios 
only with a lag. Cyclical movements in gearing ratios are thus 
likely to precede cyclical movements in interest rates, particu­
larly if rising corporate profits slightly precede an economy- 
wide boom. It would be wrong to conclude that movements in
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gearing ratios cause movements in interest rates in this case.
Care must clearly be taken in interpreting the results of 
these tests if pitfalls are to be avoided. Although Sims' 
methodology provides us with a useful indicator of potential 
causality, the evidence provided should not be taken as con­
clusive.
In the other countries the lack of clear statistically 
significant, demonstrable relationships appears to confirm the 
idea that the link between interest rates and corporate financial 
behaviour is far from straight-forward. In Japan the continuing 
close relationship between the banks and industry in an economy 
where steps toward financial liberalisation have been behind the 
UK or the US tends to dominate the terms on which corporate 
sector credit is extended. Market rates would not thus appear 
to accurately reflect true debt yields paid by the corporate 
sector.
In the UK on the other hand, we saw above that liberalisa­
tion would appear to be associated with increases in debt yields. 
As a result, the relationship between gearing and debt yields 
would appear to have broken down. Increasing UK interest rates 
in an attempt to halt the credit increases of the 1980s could 
thus be unsuccessful. Marginal borrowers, such as new businesses 
and small and medium sized enterprises with limited access to 
credit might be forced to reduce gearing, or indeed be driven out 
of business, but the aggregate gearing ratio could well remain 
largely unaffected. Moreover, lack of access to new credit 
because of high marginal rates could squeeze investment.
We have thus carried out an investigation into whether
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movements in gearing ratios affect investment levels. The 
results are presented below.
219
According to the traditional theory of corporate finance, 
decisions concerning finance and investment may be made separate­
ly. Theoretically and empirically, we have seen that this 
separation may not always hold. Below we present the results of 
attempts to test this statistically.
When considering investment, the gross measures of gearing 
used in the previous two tests are no longer appropriate. Given 
that we have concentrated on the manufacturing sector, we are 
interested in physical investment in the capital stock. We have 
looked at the relationship between gearing net of financial 
assets (GN) (see chart 11.10 in chapter II) and investment as a 
proportion of GDP.
The Sims' methodology outlined in section B.2 was again used 
and the results are presented below.
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C CAUSALITY TESTS: GEARING AND INVESTMENT
Table V.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GEARING AND INVESTMENT 
Dependent Variable: Investment (INVt)
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Germ an v France Japan UK USA1972-86 1972-87 1976-86 1972-85 1972-87
constant 9.19 
(2.57)
9.57
(10.23)
15.65
(3.73)
21.40
(2.74)
3.77
(11.51)
GNt -9.61
(-0.61)
0.09
(0.02)
-19.22
(-0.75)
-12.68
(-0.79)
3.44
(0.30)
GNfi 5.68
(0.46)
-2.46
(-0.95)
10.99
(0.46)
-17.66
(-1.60)
-14.21
(2.38)
GNt., -4.54
(-0.42)
-7.45
(-2.42)
-6.85
(-0.26)
-6.79
(-0.48)
1.54
(0.23)
Dependent Variable: Net Gearing (GNt)
Germany France Japan UK USA
1972-85 1972-86 1975-85 1972-85 1972-86
constant 0.76
(10.53)
0.93
(18.29)
0.91
(12.54)
0.53
(42.84)
0.29
(9.24)
INVt 0.01
(0.36)
-0.03
(-0.69)
-0.03
(-1.52)
0.01
(0.51)
-0.01
(0.49)
INVt., -0.01
(-0.51)
-0.03
(-0.65)
-0.02
(-1.12)
-0.10E-02
(-0.13)
0.24E-03
(0.02)
INVt., -0.02
(-1.40)
-0.03
(-0.68)
0.01
(1.04)
-0.02
(-2.30)
-0.05
(-2.85)
Here the evidence is mixed. The table indicates that 
although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that gearing and 
investment may move independently in Japan and Germany, there is 
statistical evidence of a causal relationship in France, the UK 
and the USA.
Only in France is the lagged net gearing term statistically
significant. However, the coefficient is negatively signed 
suggesting that rising gearing ratios are liable to bring about 
falls in the investment ratio. In the USA, on the other hand, 
it is the lead net gearing term that is statistically significant 
implying reverse causality. This is confirmed by the results of 
a regression of lead and lagged investment on net gearing. The 
US lagged investment term is a statistically significant 
determinant of net gearing. However, whereas the first regres­
sion implied that rising investment would be followed by 
increases in gearing, the second regression suggests the 
opposite, implying that improvements in investment could bring 
about a fall in the gearing ratio. The same is true of the UK.
In the USA the evidence may once more be interpreted in 
terms of cyclical factors. It should be remembered that the long 
US series is measured at market values, whereas gearing ratios 
in the other countries are measured at historical book values. 
Thus, in a cyclical upturn, rising investment should be as­
sociated with rising equity values bringing about a fall in the 
gearing ratio, ceteris paribus. Subsequently, rising profits 
could encourage firms to borrow more and thus increase their 
gearing ratios. Rising gearing then follows rising corporate 
investment.
So there is no statistical evidence at all that rising 
gearing ratios will bring about improved investment performance. 
Moreover, in the case of France there is statistical evidence 
that they bring about falls. So suggestions that companies 
should increase gearing levels to help industry would appear 
unfounded.
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On the other hand, it would appear that in the US and the 
UK at least, investment may influence gearing ratios.
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VI CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have looked at the behaviour of corporate 
sector gearing ratios in Germany, France, the UK, Japan and the 
US over the past two decades.
Gearing ratios could be expected to move counter-cyclically. 
During a recession, the rate of growth of profits and internal 
equity slows or falls. When profit growth is low, managers are 
likely to be reluctant to make equity issues for risk of under- 
pricing. As firms turn to debt to meet financing needs, the 
gearing ratio rises. A general tendency for gearing ratios to 
rise in the major industrialised economies was thus witnessed 
following the oil-shocks and recessions of the 1970s.
Since the early 1980s, however, there has been a general 
upswing in economic activity. We would expect managers to prefer 
to issue equity when firms are enjoying healthy profits and when 
demand is strong. However, with the exception of Japan, and more 
recently France, there appears to have been no tendency in the 
countries investigated in this study for the pace of increase of 
gearing ratios to slow down or even decrease during the 1980s 
despite significantly improved economic performance in this 
period.
Whilst gearing ratios have been rising, the ratio of 
investment to GDP in the manufacturing sector of the countries
*
under consideration has been displaying a general decline over 
the past twenty years, again with an exception being found in 
Japan. An increase in gearing would thus appear to be associated
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with a decline in proportion of investment in GDP. However, 
countries enjoying the highest gearing ratios - Japan, France and 
Germany - have also enjoyed greater investment as a proportion 
of GDP than the US and the UK, suggesting that increasing gearing 
ratios should be associated with Increasing investment. The link 
between gearing and investment is thus far from clear.
We have found that a plausible explanation for part of this 
story lays in the nature of the relationship between the 
corporate and financial sectors.
In the countries where there is a close relationship between 
the corporate and financial sectors - France, Germany and Japan - 
gearing ratios have been the highest. The relationship gives 
the lenders scope to monitor and control the use of their funds. 
As a result, they are prepared to lend more, and for longer 
periods. Companies can then carry out investment both in 
specific projects, and in such areas as research and development 
with a view to the long term future of the firm without being too 
tightly constrained to earning short term profits. In countries 
where there is a lack of commitment, finance is either short term 
or very costly if longer term.
Although the above model helps explain the relationship 
between gearing and investment levels, it does not explain the 
relationship between gearing and investment over time. We found 
instead a possible explanation for this and for the continued 
increase in gearing ratios at a time of economic upturn to lay 
in recent trends in financial liberalisation.
In recent years, there has been a general trend towards 
financial liberalisation in the industrialised nations. Steps
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have been taken increasing the availability of finance, and 
deregulation and increased competition have brought down costs. 
At the same time, markets have become more efficient thanks to 
improved possibilities of closer matching of lenders and 
borrowers requirements and the spreading of risk. Increased 
availability and reduced cost of finance could be expected to 
bring about an increase in gearing and investment. However, we 
have seen that increased gearing in the countries where the 
liberalisation process has been most wide ranging has been 
accompanied by declining investment. This suggests that cost of 
finance has in fact increased. Uncertainty in the wake of 
financial liberalisation may wel 1 have caused new Instruments to 
be mispriced where risk characteristics have not yet been es­
tablished, at least in the short term, and volatility to 
increase.
It would appear that these latter effects have dominated, 
driving up risk premia and the cost of capital, with negative 
consequences for investment and/or the risk of default. We saw 
that risk premia have increased during the 1980s, and have tended 
to be highest in the countries where the liberalisation process 
has been most wide-ranging: the US and the UK. As a result the 
cost of capital has been increasing at the fastest rate in the 
US and the UK. It has also increased rapidly in France recently 
where significant steps have been taken towards opening up 
capital markets in the last few years. In Germany and Japan on 
the other hand, where liberalisation has been occurring at a much 
slower pace, cost of capital over the past two decades has been 
rising only very slowly in the case of Germany and actually
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falling in Japan.
So although financial liberalisation has allowed greater use 
of debt, it has also been associated with declining investment, 
and increased bankruptcies, especially in the US and France. 
This is particularly worrying given the tendencies for many of 
the new financing instruments available to be classified as off- 
balance sheet, suggesting that gearing ratios and risk exposure 
are if anything underestimated.
However, the above problems could well prove temporary. In 
time, the true risk position associated with new instruments and 
existing instruments in a new financial climate should become 
clear. At that time, efficiency gains should allow increased use 
of debt accompanied by reductions in cost, helping investment and 
lowering default risk.
Nevertheless, in the short term at least some downward 
adjustment in US and French gearing ratios could perhaps be 
expected. We saw that French gearing ratios have already begun 
to decline, and evidence of attempts on the part of US corpora­
tions to reduce gearing has already begun appearing in the press. 
And damage could prove longer term if poor investment translates 
into permanent reductions in the capital stock.
At the same time, we saw that greater use of debt arising 
from the liberalisation process could have further pernicious 
consequences in the wider economy. Definition and control of the 
money supply is increasingly difficult in the face of a prolifer­
ation of new instruments. At the same time, the authorities may 
become afraid to adopt tight monetary policies in economies with 
heavily indebted corporate sectors for fear of provoking
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widescale distress in the corporate sector. Inflationary 
tendencies could thus be engendered. Although we did not find 
any strong empirical evidence of this in the countries under 
consideration, in the period investigated inflation rates tended 
to follow a steady downward trend. More recently though, 
inflation rates have tended to pick up again. When the data 
becomes available a few years hence, it will be interesting to 
see whether there is any evidence that heavy corporate sector 
indebtedness does indeed have some influence over monetary 
stance, impinging on the capacity of the authorities to fight 
inflation.
Clearly, greater provision of funds to industry allowing 
increased investment is to be welcomed. To this extent the 
liberalisation process should be encouraged. However, we have 
seen that it could also entail potentially severe negative 
consequences both for the corporate sector and the wider economy. 
The authorities should hence carefully monitor the behaviour of 
financial markets if damage to Investment potential or financial 
fragility is to be avoided. If the cost of credit is not 
sufficiently high, risk might not be properly accounted for and 
potential instability could result. On the other hand, yields 
could be driven up too far by the process, crowding out invest­
ment. The authorities could then step in and either force yields 
up in the former case through e.g. regulation, levies etc., or 
lower interest rates in the second case. Regulatory behaviour 
of this type would further avoid the threat to the authorities 
of having their capacity to carry out desired monetary policy 
restricted for fear of provoking financial distress or bankrupt­
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cies in over-indebted economies. In this way the transition to 
a new equilibrium based on higher use of debt allowing increased 
investment and improved economic performance, could be made while 
avoiding the associated pitfalls.
In the absence of other major changes in circumstances, 
gearing ratios could then be expected to revert to counter­
cyclical behaviour but incorporating greater use of debt.
An important continuation of this research would be an 
attempt to quantify the costs in terms of reduced investment of 
financial liberalisation. In the costs prove not to be excessive 
and relatively short term with long term benefits to be gained, 
then the liberalisation process should be encouraged. On the 
other hand, research might suggest that the costs are so great 
that policy should move in completely the opposite direction. 
We have seen that higher gearing and investment have tended to 
occur where close relationships are enjoyed between the corporate 
and financial sectors. If the costs of financial liberalisation 
are found to be sufficiently great then further moves away from 
this model might be discouraged. Reregulation might be recom­
mended, with the authorities actively encouraging the adoption 
of committed relationships between corporate and financial 
sectors, in attempt to bring about higher investment and improved 
economic performance.
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